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Abstract 
A Study of the Mind-Body Theory in Spinoza 
by 
Sam-Yel Park 
This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the 
discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as 
hylomorphism., idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical 
comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's 
argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood 
as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body 
and that they have equal weight. 
Although the parallelistic interpretation is compatible with the above 
understandings, we cannot ascribe traditional parallelism to Spinoza. His 
parallelism is derived ftom his argument of identity between the mind and the body, 
which is based on his substance nionism. and attribute dualism. We should therefore 
understand Spinoza's mind-body theory as an identity theory which leads to a 
parallel relationship between the mind and the body. Since the double aspect theory 
argues both identity and parallelism between the mind and the body, the doctrine 
we should ascribe to Spinoza is the double aspect theory. 
Furthermore, owing to the fact that Spinoza maintains substance monism 
and attribute dualism (assuming an objective view of the attributes of thought and 
extension, which are distinct), there is, in Spinoza's theory, an identity between 
mental and physical events while there is no identity between mental and physical 
properties: the mental and the physical events are one and the same event described 
tinder mental and physical properties, respectively. From the fact that Spinoza finds 
identity in individuals or events, but not in properties, it follows that his theory 
should also be understood as a kind of token identity theory. 
There are Miculties in this interpretation. Spinoza tries to combine mind- 
body identity with the separation of attributes, but some have argued that the 
identity would threaten the doctrine that thought and extension are causally 
separate. Again, some have argued that if the attributes are distinct then a 
substance has more than one essence; while if they are not really distinct, but only 
seen as distinct, then even God cannot know the true nature of reality. It is difficult 
to render Spinoza's claims both consistent and plausible, but I have tried to flnd 
arguments for some of Spinoza's claims in this area: my interpretation of Spinoza's 
mind-body theory entails both token identity and property (or conceptual) 
parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism. So, I 
have called Spinoza's mind-body theory a token double aspect theory. 
Spinoza's discussion of the representative nature of ideas does not sit easily 
with his doctrine of parallelism, at least so far as finite beings are concerned, I have 
tried to make the doctrines consistent, but ultimately Spinoza seems to bring his 
representationalism and parallelism into line by appealing to the confused nature of 
human ideas. 
Despite all the problems, Spinoza's thought on mind and. body has seemed 
to many to promise real insight into the nature of mind and body, and I have tried 
to see how far modern versions of materialism (anomalous monism), person 
theory, and some developments in cognitive science can be said to follow strands 
in Spinoza's work. 
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Ethic. v is cited by the following abbreviations: E= Ethicv, and indicates (1) 
Number of the Part, (2) Number of Axiom, De-finition, Proposition or Postulate, 
(3) Where appropriate, Demonstrates, Corollary or Scholium, with the Mowing 
abbreviations: 
Ax = Axiom 
Corol = CoroRary 
Def = Definition 
Demon = Demonstration, 
Post = Postulate 
Prop = Proposition 
Schol = Scholium. 
Thus, for example, "E, 11, Prop 13, Schor' stands for thle schorium to proposition F 
thirteen of part two of Ethicv, and "E, 11, Prop 16, Corol 2" stands for the second 
corollary to proposition sixteen of part two of Ethics, 
Unless otherwise indieated in the footnotes, pass-ages from Spinoza's 
Ethics in this thesis wiR be quoted from: 
Spinoza, Benedict De. Ethics. Translated by James Gutma-m. New York and 
London: Hafner Press, 1949. 
Although James Gutmann translates the Latin term "Scholium' ' as "Note", I shall in 




1. Introductory Remarks 
There have been diverse interpretations of Spinoza's doctrine of the 
relationship between the mind and the body-hylomorphism, idealism, 
epiphenomenalism, materialism, parallelism, and the double aspect theory-all of 
which are controversial! It seems that all interpreters of Spinoza have adopted one 
or other of these theories. In contemporary thought, however, there has been no 
consensus or agreement as to whether to adopt one theory or another to interpret 
and evaluate Spinoza's solution to the mind-body problem and other related 
doctrines of his philosophy of mind and metaphysics. 
I shall explicate the widely misunderstood interpretations of Spinoza's 
account of the mind and its relation to the body, and then I shall elucidate 
Spinoza's mind-body theory by offering a -new 
idea: (1) Spinoza's min-d-body 
theory ought to be understood as involving token identity together with property 
(or conceptual) parallelism, and thus -should be classifled as a token double aspect 
theory, and (2) this double aspect theory could be supplemented by introducing the 
concept of representation. My belief is that this idea may provide a way of 
understanding Spinoza's ambiguity on the mind-body problem which is caused by 
his perplexing views on the attributes of the one substance, and that may help to 
redefine the explanation of his mind-body theory and give it stronger support. Thus 
I shall try to unravel the difficulties behind Spinoza's ideas and attempt to reveal 
the real meaning behind his thought. 
To investigate Spinoza's mind-body theory, I shall unfold this thesis from 
the following angles: 
Firstly, in chapters two and three, I shall consider various interpretations of 
Spinoza's mind-body theory in detail so that I can analyse the grounds and logic on 
which these interpretations are based, and try to find out how and why his theory 
was misunderstood. 
1 R- I Delahunty informs us of the diverse interpretations (except idealism) and briefly comments 
on them in his Spinoza (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). pp. 191-197. 
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Secondly, in cbapter four, I sball concentrate on Spinoza's doctrine of the 
attributes in order to establish a basis for interpreting Spinoza's mind-body theory 
as the double aspect theory. I believe that Spinoza's account of the relation of the 
mind to the body is inferred from substance monism together with attribute 
dualism. 
Thirdly, in chapter five, I shaff move on to argue for the validity of the 
double aspect theory, and try to explain why Spinoza's mind-body theory should 
be considered as a version of the double aspect theory, which holds that the mind 
and the body are two different ways of describing the same thing, namely 
substance. I shall also consider the problems of interpreting Spinoza's mind-body 
theory, comparing the double aspect theory with event-parallelism and deciding in 
favour of the former view. Furthermore, I shall offer a new interpretation that 
Spinoza's mind-body theory entails both token identity and property parallelism 
whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism (event-parallelism): if 
Spinoza's mind-body theory is a token identity theory, which leads to a parallel 
relationship between the mind and the body, we ought to regard Spinoza as a 
token double aspect theorist. In addition to this, I shall attempt to support the 
double aspect theory through the other areas of Spinoza's thought, such as his 
metaphysical determinism and moral theory. Unlike his mind-body theory, it is 
accepted by most commentators that a consensus exists in interpreting Spinoza's 
metaphysics as determinism, whereas his mind-body theory has been controversial 
with a variety of diverse interpretations. From my perspective, this kind of 
agreement or consensus regarding determinism could open the way towards 
seeking a solution to Spinoza's account of the relation of the mind to the body. In 
fact, Spinoza's account of the relation of the mind to the body relies on the one- 
substance doctrine, and this doctrine is also commonplace in the interpretation of 
Spinoza. Thus I shall consider Spinoza's metaphysical determinism so as to find a 
clue to the solution of his mind-body problem through his determinism. I believe 
that we can acquire some understanding of Spinoza's mind-body theory from his 
moral theory. Thus I shall also draw out Spinoza's points of view on the moral 
theory which can provide insight into the interpretations of the relationship 
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between the mind and the body. This kind of work may help to redefine the 
explanation of his mind-body theory and give it stronger support. In so doing, I 
shall show that the double aspect theory gives us the most fundamental Perspective 
on Spinoza's system. 
Fourthly, in chapter six, Spinoza's mind-body theory will be approached 
not only through his metaphysics but also through his epistemology. The former is 
the double aspect theory which is based on the relationship between the mind and 
the body, and the latter is representationalism which is based on the mind as the 
idea of the body. To understand Spinoza's mind-body theory in a comprehensive 
manner, we have to consider both doctrines. Therefore, I shall explore the concept 
of representation in Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
Fifthly, in chapter seven, I shall explore whether Spinoza's mind-body 
theory can be aligned with any theory of contemporary philosophy of the mind. I 
believe that some contemporary versions of the mind-body problem are in some 
way related to Spinoza's mind-body theory and hold the possibility of 
demonstrating a connection with Spinoza's perspective. Thus I shall deal with 
cognitive science and Strawson's person theory, and also compare Spinoza's 
position with Davidson's anomalous monism. The concept of representation in 
cognitive science can be seen as having links with Spinoza's mind-body theory, as 
both argue for the importance of a representational fimction. However, Spinoza's 
notion of mental causation is more robust than that used in cognitive science. 
Strawson has a similar position to Spinoza in arguing identity not in the 
onesideness of materialism or idealism but in a common referent of the mind and 
the body. But for Strawson this dual ascription is limit to one sort of object, that is, 
humans in the world, whereas for Spinoza everything has both sorts of property. 
Furthermore, for Spinoza, there is an identity between mental and physical events, 
whereas for Strawson, mental events are not identical with physical events. 
Spinoza finds identity of the mental and physical within tokens or events as 
opposed to Strawson who -finds identity within a primitive concept, person. As to 
Spinoza and Davidson, Spinoza's double aspect theory maintains that the mind is a 
thing which is described by the mental descriptions and the body is the very same 
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thing which is described by the physical descriptions. The core of his theory is that 
the mind and the body are one and the same individual although they have different 
types of descriptions. Similarly, Davidson's anomalous monism argues that the 
mental event and the physical event are one and the same event, which has mental 
and physical descriptions respectively. Further, both of them claim the identity of 
mind and body without the reduction of one to the other. However, for Davidson 
physical descriptions dominate, whereas for Spinoza both descriptions are of equal 
weight. I think that this kind of work is worthwhile in considering how far his 
mind-body theory contributes, as a classic theory, towards mind-body problems 
and provides, a route to tackling this problem today. 
Before proceeding with the main discourse, I shall briefly outline a preview 
of Spinoza's mind-body theory which is based on my perspective so as to lay the 
foundation- stone of this thesis. 
2. A Preview of Spinoza's Mind-Body Theory 
(1) God as Substance: Monism 
One cannot understand many philosophers' mind-body theories without 
first understanding their metaphysical systems, This is even more true of Spinoza 
whose mind-body theory is based on substance and attributes. In my view, 
Spinoza's metaphysical monism which emphasises the unity of substance should 
also be considered in relation to his mind-body theory, since without God 
(substance), it is not possible for finite modes to exist and therefore his 
metaphysical system cannot be established. Further, Spinoza tens us directly that 
identity between the mind and the body is inferred from the one-substance 
doctrine: 
[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same 
substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now 
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under that. Thus [sic], also a mode of extension and the idea of that 
mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, 111, 
Prop 7, Schol) 
This quotation implies that, in order to find identity between the mind and the body 
in Spinoza's theory, we should rely on the one-substance doctrine, Bennett takes 
the above quotation not as an inference, but as a comparison by treating the Latin 
term sic as likewise. 2 However, the fact that the mind and the body are modes of 
the one substance under the different attributes offers the interpretation that the 
relationship between the mind and the body follows the relationship between 
substance conceived under thought and substance conceived under extension. For 
Spinoza the mind and the body are the modifications of one and the same 
substance under the different attributes of thought and extension, respectively. As 
long as the mind and the body come from the one substance, Bennett's view that 
regards sic not as an inference but as a comparison is hardly acceptable to 
Spinoza's intention? Thus, I shall describe Spinoza's metaphysics before 
considering his mind-body theory, as I understand it. 
The first part of Spinoza's Ethics is entitled "Of God, " but it would be 
possible to entitle it "Of Substance, " because the term Substance is used in 
defining "God" and more precisely, for Spinoza, God is no more than substance. 4 
Spinoza defines God as the "substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of 
2 Bennett states that "I have rendered the Latin sic as 'likewise', which is one of its meanings. 
Another meaning is 'therefore'; but I think its sense here is comparative rather than inferential. 
Two identity propositions, each involving a straddle of the attributes, are being laid side by side 
and rightly implied to be similar" (Jonathan Bennett, A Studly of the Spinoza's Ethics 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], p. 142). 
' Most commentators regard it as inference rather than comparison. See Edwin Curley, Behind 
the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), p. 153, note 3; Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 129-130; Leyden, Seventeenth Century Metaphysics 
(London: Gerald Duckworth, 1968), p. 21; Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 85-86; Richard Aquila, "The Identity of Thought and 
Object in Spinoza, " Journal of the History of the Philosophy, vol. 16 (1978), pp. 272-273. 
4 Richard Schacht argues that "it would have been still better if it had been entitled 'Concerning 
Substance'; for this term is the most basic of the three [God, Substance, and Nature]" (Classical 
Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant [London: Routledge, 1993], p. 75). 
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which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (E, Iý Def 6), and God is the only 
possible substance. If there were any substance besides God, this substance would 
exist possessing some attributes of God, because God possesses all possible 
attributes (infinite attributes) due to the fact that God is an absolutely infinite 
Being; accordingly, there would exist two substances which have the same 
attribute (E, 1, Prop 14; Def 6). However, for Spinoza, it is impossible that there be 
two or more substances with the same nature or attribute in Nature (E, 1, Prop 5). 
Consequently, besides God no other substance can be granted or conceived of (E, 
1, Prop 14). In this way, God is identified with one single substance in Spinoza's 
metaphysics. This is his official statement as to substance monism. 
However, for Spinoza, it is impossible that there be two or more substances 
with the same nature or attribute in Nature (E, 1, Prop 5). Consequently, besides 
God no other substance can be granted or conceived of (E, 1, Prop 14). In this 
way, God is identified with one single substance in Spinoza's metaphysics. This is 
his official statement as to substance monism. 
However, a minor problem arises from the ten-n "infinite. " Either "infinite" 
does not mean what we normally take it to mean, or Spinoza's argument is a bad 
one. When Spinoza mentions "substance consisting of infinite attributes" in 
definition 6, the term "infinite" has to be regarded as denoting number. Otherwise 
Spinoza's demonstration would not be understood. That is to say, unless we take 
"infinite attributes" to imply all possible attributes, Spinoza's argument would be 
unjustified. We can infer this point from the following statement: 
Since God is Being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute can be 
denied which expresses the essence of substance (Def 6), and since He 
necessarily exists (Prop 11), it follows that if there were any substance 
besides God, it would have to be explained by some attributes of God, 
and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attributes, 
which (Prop 5) is absurd. (E, 1, Prop 14, Demon; my italics) 
I think that the phrase "of whom no attribute can be denied" implies that God 
possesses "all possible attributes. " We should distinguish the statement that God is 
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the being infinite from the statement that God possesses infinite attributes. The 
former statement means that God is the being absolutely perfect (i. e. our general 
sense), whereas the latter means that God possesses all possible attributes. It 
follows that God is the being "perfect without limitation7' constituting "all 
attributes without exception. "' I think that Spinoza believed that if God has the 
nature of the infinity God must have infinite numbers of attributes. 
It is commonplace to regard "infinite attributes"' as all possible attributes. 
Curley states about this point: "[I]f there must be a substance which has infinite 
attributes (where having infinite attributes implies having all possible attributes), 
.... 
556 Bennett also has the same point of view: "The role of infinity in Ethics Ip I 4d 
shows that Spinoza takes 'God has in-finite attributes' to entail that God has all the 
attributes. This entailment does not hold when 'infinite' is used in our way; so 
Spinoza's meaning for the term differs from ours, and the question is, 'HowT One 
possible answer is that he used 'infinite attribute' to mean 'all (possible) attributes, ' 
so that Nature's having infinite attributes is consistent with its having onl y two. "7 
From these explanations, I suggest that we should bear in mind all possible 
attributes, when Spinoza mentions "infinite attributes. " 
-Returning to his substance monism, there necessarily exists only one thing 
which exists per se (in itself), namely God. Notbing else can be in itself, that is to 
say, there necessarily exists only one substance. If so, what is the status of all other 
things? According to Spinoza, they are not substances but merely modifications, of 
the one substance, God. Thus mind and body are modes not substances. In 
' George Kline claims these two senses of the term "infinite" in Spinoza ("On the infinity of 
Spinoza's attributes, " in Siegfried Hessing [ed. ], Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977 [London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977], pp. 342-343). 
6 Edwin Curley, op. cit., p. 10. 
7 Jonathan Bennett, "Spinoza's Metaphysics, " in Don Garrett (ed. ), The Cambridae Companion 
to Spinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 65. Alan Donagan also takes 
"infinite attributes" to mean "all attributes without expect attributes" following George Kline's 
treatment of "infinite attributes" ("Spinoza's Dualism, " in Richard Kennington [ed. ], The 
Philosopkv of Baruch Spinoza [Washington D C: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1980], pp. 93-94); see also his Spinoza (-New York: Harvester and Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 83-84. 
J. 1. Friedman regards "infinite attributes" as "infinitely many attributes" ("Spinoza's Denial of 
Free Will in Man and God, " in Jon Wetlesen [ed. ], Spinoza's Philosophy of Man [Oslo: 
Universitetsvorlaget, 1977]ý p. 53). 
8 
Spinoza's metaphysical system, however, we can flnd the attributes of thought and 
extension between the substance and modifications; the concept of the attribute is 
very important in interpreting Spinoza's metaphysical system as well as his mind- 
body theory. According to Spinoza, an attribute is that "which the intellect 
perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (E, T, Def 4). That is to say, the 
attribute is that "which expresses the essence of the divine substance" (E, 1, Prop 
19, Demon). In the discussion of Spinoza's notion of the attributes, there have 
been the subjective and the objective interpretations. Nowadays, although most 
commentators support the latter, there have been many different suggestions within 
the objective interpretation (as we shall see in chapter four). There are infinitely 
many attributes, but humans can only perceive the attributes of thought and 
extension. Spinoza understood that humans are manifested in the mode of the mind 
through the attribute of thought as well as in the mode of the body through the 
attribute of extension. 
From these expositions of Spinoza's metaphysics, we can summarise the 
position as Mows: 
(1) There is only one substance and this substance is God, which necessarily exists. 
(2) Substance possesses the infinite numbers of attributes, which express the 
essence of the substance. 
(3) All finite beings are modifications of the substance. 
(4) Between the substance and modifications, there are the attributes of thought 
and extension which are the only ones we as humans can perceive. 
(5) Therefore God (the substance) has the attributes of thought and extension. 
(6) The modes are the modifications of substance under the approximate attribute; 
the mind is the mode of the substance tinder the attribute of thought and the 
body is the mode of the same substance under the attribute of extension. 
(7) It follows that all things belong to the one substance, that is to say, that nothing 
can exist or be conceived of without God (substance). 
' 
8 In addition to these, there are also immediate infinite modes and mediated infinite modes which 
solve the unbridgeable gap between the infinite realm and the 
finite realm in explaining his 
ontological system from the substance to the modes. 
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This conclusion is the basis on which the common characterisation of Spinoza as a 
monist is maintained in relation to the unity of substance. 
Spinoza, as is well known, maintains that one substance has the attributes 
of extension and thought, unlike the dualism of Descartes, where the thinking thing 
and the extended thing are different substances-9 Spinoza recognises the unique 
existence of substance, and therefore he establishes monistic metaphysics. 
Conceptually, thinking substance is different from extended substance due to the 
fact that one single substance has the attributes of thought and extension. 
However, these two substances are in reality one and the same thing (substance). 
The order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes should be explained 
through the attribute of thought as long as things are considered under the attribute 
of thought alone, whereas when things are considered under the attribute of 
extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute 
of extension alone. Accordingly, when we consider one substance under the 
attribute of thought it is the substance thinking and when we consider one 
substance under the attribute of extension it is the substance extended. From thisý 
we can see that one and the same substance Mers in how it is conceived, and this 
is Spinoza's substance monism. 
(2) The Mind and the Body 
Spinoza's mind-body theory is rooted in his substance monism. Spinoza 
regards the mind as the mode (the modification) of the substance tinder the 
attribute of thought and the body as the mode (the modification) of that substance 
under the attribute of extension. Namely, the mind is the modification of the 
substance conceived as thing thinking and the body is the modification of the very 
same substance as thing extended. When Spinoza says that the mind and the body 
9 There is a tine expression as to the relation between Descartes and Spinoza in The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: "It is certainly true that the study of Descartes was seminal for Spinoza, and there 
are obvious debts both of doctrine and of terminology. Nonetheless, Spinoza's philosophy is in 
one crucial respect at the opposite pole from that of Descartes" (Alasdair MacIntyre, "Spinoza, 
Benedict, " in Paul Edwards [ed. j. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,, vol. 7 [New York: 
Macmillan,, 1967], p. 534). 
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are the modes of attributes, we should understand him as meaning that the mind is 
the mode which expresses the essence of the substance tinder the attribute of 
thought, and the body is the mode which expresses the essence of the very same 
substance under the attribute of extension. The mind and the body are not distinct 
modes of the attributes of thought and extension, but they are modes of the same 
substance through the attributes of thought and extension respectively. 'O The mind 
is the mode of the substance as given by mental descriptions (attribute of thought), 
and the body is the mode of the same substance as given by physical descriptions 
(attribute of extension). 
Since the mind and the body are modes of the one same substance, we can 
infer his position on the identity of the mind and the body from substance monism. 
It follows that if the substance thinking and the substance extended are one and the 
same thing, the mode considered mentally (the mind) and the mode considered 
physically (the body) are one and the same thing. Hence, just as a. single substance 
is a substance thinking as well as a substance extended according to the attributes 
of thought and extension, so a single individual thing is at one time a mode 
mentally and at another a mode physically which both express the substance in a 
certain and determinate manner. The latter relationship is only a special case of the 
fon-ner. One and same mode differs in bow it is conceived, as, one and the same 
substance differs in how it is conceived; the former is Spinoza's mind-body identity 
theory derived from the latter, his substance monism. Spinoza did not leave any 
doubt as to the identity of the mind and the body. He mentioned "mind and body 
are accordingly one and the same thing conceived at one time under the attributes 
of thought, and at another under that of extension7 (E, 11 Prop 7, Schol). This 
statement makes it quite clear that even if there are differences between the mind 
and the body, they are ultimately and essentially the same thing with two different 
aspects. 
Howeverý some commentators concentrate on there being two attributes of 
thought and extension, and from this they claim that there must be two sets of 
events. However, as I have argued, the mind and the body are not the modes of the 
10 This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter five (pp. 133-136). 
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attributes, but are modes of the one substance considered at one time under the 
attribute of thought and at another under the attribute of extension. Substance 
monism guarantees identity between the mind and the body, so mental events and 
physical events are not two different sets of events but are one set of events. Those 
commentators who assert that these two sets of events are paranel with each other 
rely most on Spinoza's statement that "[flhe order and connection of ideas is the 
same as the order and connection of things" (E, TI, Prop 7). 
However, this does not mean that there are two orders of events, but it 
means that there exists one order of events. Why is it that the event which has 
mental properties and the event which has physical properties are one and the same 
event for Spinoza? Without one substance doctrine, we cannot answer this 
question. Since there exists one single substance, substance conceived as mental 
and substance conceived as physical possess the same essence and consequently 
they are identical. Then, since there is one sort of event owing to the fact that they 
are modes of one substance, the event described by mental properties (the mode of 
the former substance) and the event described by physical properties (the mode of 
the latter substance) possess the same essence and consequently they are identical 
with each other. 
I suggest that the parallel relationship occurs not in two sets of events but 
in one set of events: one event under the mental descriptions and the same event 
under the physical descriptions are parallel. " The two attributes-doctrine does not 
provide a one-to-one correspondence between the mind and the body. Rather, 
substance monism is the reason that the mind and the body are one and the same 
event. This fact that there is one set of events is the reason that "the event under 
mental descriptions" (mind) and "the same event under the physical descriptions" 
(body) are parallel with each other. Thus, I disagree with the interpretation that 
11 As we shall see in chapters three and five (pp. 67-69; pp. 136-137), for Spinoza a parallel 
relationship occurs not only between "the event under mental descriptions" and "the same event 
under the physical descriptions" but also between the mental and the physical properties (or 
descriptions). The former would be called conceptual parallelism, the latter property parallelism. 
Both of them are derived from Spinoza's doctrine that there is one order of events; there is no 
identity between the mental and the physical properties due to the fact that the attributes of 
thought and extension are really distinct. 
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argues the parallel relationship between the mind and the body without considering 
identity between the mind and the body. I also disagree with the interpretation that 
regards parallelism as being prior to the identity theory by arguing that parallelism 
entails the identity theory. 
In this way, if the mind and body are one and the same individual conceived 
in two Merent ways and their relationship is parallel due to the fact that they are 
one and the same thing, we can regard this as a version of the double aspect 
theory. As we shall see in chapter five, the double aspect theory entails both 
identity and a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. If there were 
two substances (thinking and extended) with respect to the mind and the body, it 
could not be considered as the double aspect theory. But this, as we have seen, is 
absurd for Spinoza due to his substance monism; according to his monism there is 
only one substance and one order. Therefore, once we establish the formulation 
that they are identical with each other from the fact that the mind and the body are 
both aspects of the same entity which is one substance, we need to ask what the 
relationship is between the two aspects, and then our answer is that there is a 
parallel relationship as the outcome of identity. 12 1 believe that this version of the 
double aspect theory gives us a whole perspective on Spinoza's system. The 
double aspect theory as the mind-body theory is consistent with Spinoza's monism 
and his explanations of the parallel relationship of the mind and the body. Thus, 
Spinoza's mind-body theory should be considered within the version of the double 
aspect theory which holds that the mind and the body are two different ways of 
describing the same thing, namely substance. 
12 Spinoza also argues that representational relationship exists between the mind and the body. I 
shall discuss this in chapter six. 
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Ch ter Two 
Diverse Interpretations of Spinoza's Mind- 
Body Theory 
The first premise in this chapter is that the relative weighting of thought 
and extension is equal, and therefore we can give greater weight neither to the 
body nor to the mind. That is to say, the body is not prior to the mind or vice 
versa. The second premise is that there is no causal relationship between what is 
thought and what is extended, and consequently the mental never causes the 
physical or vice versa. With respect to this, Spinoza states as follows: 
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things - (E, 11, Prop 7) 
Hence it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to His actual 
power of acting, that is to say, whatever follows formally from the 
infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God [Idea Defl, in 
the same order and in the same connection objectively in God. (E, U, 
Prop 7, Corol) 
The body cannot deten-nine the mind to thought, neither can the mind 
determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there 
be anything else. (E, HI, Prop 2) 
Therefore,, as the order and connection of the. ideas in the mind is 
according to the order and connection of the modifications of the 
body (Prop 18, pt. 2), it follows, vice versa (Prop 2, pt. 3), that the 
order and connection of the modification of the body is according to 
the order and connection in the mind of thoughts and ideas of things. 
(E, V, Prop 1, Demon) 
It follows that we must be suspicious of any interpretation which is not compatible 
with these premises, even if it. offers some otherwise adequate explanation of 
Spinoza's theory. In other words, any interpretation has to be in accord with the 
premises. Among the various interpretations which have been advanced, 
epiphenomenalism is contradictory to the first premise as well as the second, and 
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materialism and idealism have problems of compatibility with the first premise. 
They deny the equality of the mind and the body; either the mind or the body is 
given priority in these interpretations. On the other hand, hylornorphism, 
parallelism, and the double aspect theory can retain "the equality of the mind and 
the body" and "no causality between the mind and body, " and therefore they are 
compatible with the two premises. This gives us some reason to prefer one of these 
interpretations. However, even if the former interpretations are incompatible with 
our two premises, they may have some other advantages. We should, therefore, 
consider their strengths as well as their problems, and this can help us arrive at a 
clearer understanding of Spinoza's mind-body theory. Therefore I shall, in this 
chapter, examine their perspectives on Spinoza and discuss some of the problems 
which arise from their interpretations and the inadequacies of applying them to 
Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
1. Hylomorphism 
Hylomorphism. has its origin in Aristotle's "matter and form7' system which 
posits that every natural object is somehow composed of matter and form There is 
a hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, which is advocated 
by H. A. Wolfson. According to him, Spinoza's philosophy inherited this doctrine 
through Aquinas' metaphysics during the scholastic period. This interpretation 
emphasises Spinoza's intellectual inheritance from Aristotle and the resemblance 
between the systems of Aristotle and Spinoza. 
(1) Hylomorphism in Aristotle 
In order to examine the hylomorphic interpretation, we need to grasp the 
outline of Aristotle's "matter and fornf' system. According to Aristotle, a 
particular thing such as a house, is a composite of matter such as bricks and timber, 
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formed in a certain way. In a further example, we can distinguish "what stuff a 
thing is made of' from "what makes that stuff the thing it is-say a bronze sphere"; 
the former is matter (bronze), and the latter is form (sphericity). The "form, " 
however, should not be thought of simply as "shape" as in the example of a bronze 
sphere. In the case of an oak tree, for example, the "form" is not simply its visual 
shape. It encompasses its whole organisation which is characterised by activities 
such as growth by synthesising water and other nutrients, and its production of 
fruit. I 
f HOWS. 2 This "form-matter systenf 'can be iRustrated as 0 
(1) 
bronze 
wood and iron 
bread and cheese 
(2) 
sphericity 




a bronze sphere 
an axe 
a sandwich 
bricks and timber 
letters 
n, k a bility to shelter 
placed in order 
a house 
a word 
An item (1) constitutes an item (3) if it has the appropriate item from (2); therefore 
(1) is designated "matter, " (2) is "form, " (3) is "composite. " Regarding axes, for 
instance, some wood and iron constitutes an axe by virtue of its having the power 
to chop. 
Here we can see that "fomf' is, in Aristotle, regarded as properties, 
structures, and powers. He regularly distinguishes form, matter, and the composite 
i. e. the actual thing. The distinction between matter and form is to explain what an 
individual thing is. In other words, to speak of form and matter is to speak of the 
form and matter of such a thing. The form and matter system is also applied to 
living things such as human beings. More precisely, in Aristotle, the soul is the 
' R. S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: the Concept of Substance in Seventeenth 
Century Metaphysics (London: Routledge), p. 10 
2 J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Definition of psuche, " in Jonathan Bames, Malcohn Schofield, 
Richard Sorabji (eds. ),., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4 (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 66. The last 
example is mine. 
17 
form of a natural body with organs and the terms "body, soul, man (or animal or 
plant)" is "matter, form, and composite, " respectively. In the case of human beings, 
therefore, "what makes a body a marf 'is his having a rational soul? To be sure, the 
hylomorphic conception of a human being is a composite of an organising form, or 
rational soul, and of matter, the flesh and blood of the body. Tn other words, the 
soul is regarded as the form of the body which is matter. 4 
Although interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relationship between 
body and soul have been widely divergent, the above is a. general interpretation of 
Aristotle's "matter-form systenf' in relation to the mind and body of living things 
(man, animals, plants), and Wolfson's hylomorpbic interpretation of Spinoza is 
posited on this point of view of Aristotle. 
(2) The Hylomorphic Interpretation of Spinoza 
The hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory treats his 
"mind" and "body" as Aristotle's "fornf' and "matter. " According to Wolfson, 
Spinoza's mind-body theory and other related areas of his philosophy should be 
interpreted as stemming from this doctrine. He strongly asserts and insists upon 
Aristotle's influence on Spinoza through the medieval Aristotelians. He develops 
this point of view throughout his book5 The Philosophy of Spinoza, and we can see 
that he stresses this influence on Spinoza's mind-body theory as follows: 
Consequently, following the. Aristotelian view that it is the form of a 
thing and not its matter that is identical with the soul, Spinoza says that 
the first thing which is identical with the actual human mind is the idea 
of a thing; the term "idea" here is used by him in the most general sense, 
comprehending what Aristotle would call the sensible, imaginable, and 
intelligible form of a thing. Since the mind or the soul is identical with 
Ibid. See also Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in Aristotle, " in Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm 
Schofield, Richard Sorabji (eds. ), ibid., pp. 43-45. 
4 The term "soul" is anima in Aquinas' Latin, and psyche in Aristotle's Greek. 
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the idea, Spinoza sometimes uses the expression "idea or soul" (idea, 
seu. anitna). ' 
Let us examine Wolfson's hylomorphic interpretation in more detail. The principal 
points that Wolfson suggests as the main influences of Aristotle on Spinoza are as 
follows: 
(1) The ontological system 
the doctrine of substances and modes (Spinoza) / the principle of species and 
genus (Aristotle) 
(2) The doctrine of attributes 
extension and thought (Spinoza) / the system of matter and form (Aristotle) 
(3) The psychological doctrine 
mind as the idea of the body (Spinoza) / soul as the form of the body 
(Aristotle) 
Firstly, as to Spinoza's doctrine of "substance and mode, " Wolfson holds 
that the relation of mode to substance can be explained as the relation of species to 
genus in Aristotle. He emphasises that even if Spinoza reconstructs and amends the 
mediaeval Aristotelians' definition of substance in terms of the additional phrase 
"conceived through itself' and by restricting it to God alone, there is, in fact, no 
change from the mediaeval definition. 6 He states: 
Thus the mediaeval definition of the term "substance" has not 
undergone any change in Spinoza, though its application was 
restricted only to God. It is still defined as that which is in itself. 
5 H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2 (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 47- 
48. 
6 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 61-78. As to Spinoza's 'ýmodes, " Wolfson claims that in spite of the fact that 
Spinoza's modes are entirely changed from Aristotelian accidents, his modes can also be found in 
Aristotelian logic, i. e. "species in its genus. " He states that "[tjhis is what Spinoza means by his 
definition of mode as 'that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived'. - that is 
to say, it is in another thing in the sense that it is conceived through it, namely, as the individual 
in its genus" (ibid., vol. I., p. 76). 
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Even the additional fact of its being a summum genus, undefinable 
and unknowable, is not new; it is a mediaeval commonplace. 
Hence, for Wolfson, when Spinoza states that the modes exist in substance it 
implies Aristotle's concept of genus and species as well as of substance and 
qualities. That is to say, Spinoza speaks of modes and substance in the same sense 
as Aristotle in saying that "man is in animal and generally species [is] in 
genus. "(Physics, IV 3,210a 18). In this way, Wolfson conceives of Spinoza's 
substance as the most general genus, the genus of any species, and a mode as a 
species of a genus. In Wolfson's words, "[w]e shall therefore use here the term 
ýgenus, ' and describe Spinoza's conception of the relation between mode and 
substance as that between the individual essence and its genus. "8 Therefore, 
Wolfson suggests that just as in Aristotle the genus is prior to the individual, so in 
Spinoza substance is prior in nature to its modes (E, 1, Prop 1). 9 Here, we can see 
that Wolfson attempts to make Spinoza an Aristotelian. Speaking more precisely, 
Wolfson unfolds his view that in spite of amending the definition of substance, 
Spinoza's metaphysical system is under the influence of Aristotle. 
Secondly, with respect to the attributes of extension and thought, 
Wolfson's treatment of them is that the root of Spinoza's attributes is to be found 
in Aristotelian matter and form rather than in Descartes. According to him, 
Spinoza's "extension and thought" are the two constituent elements of the world, 
matter and form., which Spinoza prefers to call extension and thought. 
10 The 
translation of "form and matter" into "thought and extension7' is the fundamental 
task for Wolfson in order to adduce his hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza. As 
to the reason for changing "fornf' into "thought, " Wolfson says "the reason for 
Spinoza's substitution of thought for form is quite obvious, for the highest form or 
God is spoken of by Aristotle and throughout the Middle ages as pure thought. "" 
Next, concerning "matter into extension, " he mentions as follows. 
7 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
8 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
9 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
10 For Wolfson's treatment of Spinoza's "extension and thought, " see ibid., pp. 214-261. 
Ibid., p. 235. 
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The common matter underlying the four elements, according to 
Aristotle and his commentators,, is something extended; in fact, it is 
the first kind of matter that is extended, and hence could be called 
extension. 12 
Wolfson explains that Spinoza needed to find certain equivalents for matter and 
form, and he found these two terms in extension and thought which stand 
respectively for one traditional specific matter and for one traditional specific form. 
Thus, according to Wolfson, Aristotle's terms "form" and "matter" are modi-fied to 
"thought" and "extension" by Spinoza to suit his own theory. " In this way, 
according to Wolfson's view, the Aristotelian metaphysics is transformed into the 
metaphysics of Spinoza. 
Lastly, regarding the mind as the idea of the body, Wolfson, as quoted at 
the beginning of this section, termed it "the soul as the form of the body in 
Aristotle. " The key to this point of view for Wolfson is Spinoza's doctrine that 
omnia. animata.. Spinoza states in his Ethics, "those things which we have proved 
hitherto are altogether general, nor do they refer more to man than to other 
individuals, all of which are animate, although in different degrees" (E, 11, Prop 13, 
Schol). This statement is the starting point of and the reason for a hylomorphic 
interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory. Wolfson interprets this not as 
panpsychism but as hylomorphism by holding that all things are said to have an 
anima in the same sense as in older philosophy where all things have aforma. In 
the Aristotelian "matter-form7' system, Wolfson tries to find the real meaning 
behind Spinoza's utterance that all things are animate, defending Spinoza from a 
pappsychistic interpretation. In his words: 
This statement that all things are animate, as we have been trying to 
show,, does not point to a pan-psychistic conception of nature. ... 
All 
that he means by his statement that all things are animate in different 
12 Ibid., p. 234. 
13 Ibid., p. 234-235. 
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degrees is exactly what Aristotle would have meant by saying that all 
things have forms in different degrees. 14 
Spinoza's term "ideW' is used in the sense of the intelligible, imaginable, and 
sensible forms. Wolfson holds that Spinoza uses it in the place of the old ten-n 
"fornf' which corresponds to Aristotle's cognition, imagination, and perception 
respectively. Therefore, just as Aristotle's "form7' exists in all things in a variety 
of different meanings, so Spinoza's "idea" exists in all things in a different degree. 
In this way, Spinoza's omnia animata is explained, and the hylomorphic 
interpretation is generated by Wolfson. 
(3) The Inadequacy of the Hylomorphic Interpretation of Spinoza 
In the Letter to Hugo Boxel, Spinoza says that "[t]he authority of Plato, 
Aristotle, and Socrates does not carry much weight with me" (Letter 56). " This 
seems to imply that Spinoza's system is difficult to interpret as hylomorphism or at 
least that Spinoza was rather confused. In the face of the such evidence, Wolfson's 
insistence on seeing Spinoza as a hylomorphist seems strained. Let us examine 
whether his solitary position is justified. 
a. Metaphysical System 
Wolfson's view that the term "substance" denotes genus and the term 
"mode" denotes individuals, may provide us with a source of historical influence on 
Spinoza. However, this interpretation of Spinoza's terms "substance" and "mode" 
is not convincing. 
14jbid., vol. 2, pp. 58-59. 
15 k H. M. Elwes (trans. ), The Chief Works of Spinoza, (London: Chiswick Press, 1883), Vol. 2, 
p. 388. E. M. Curley and Thomas Carson Mark use this letter to attack Wolfson's position 
(Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1969], p. 3 1; T. C. Mark, Spinoza's Theory of Thith [Now York: Columbia 
University Press., 1972], p. 11, note 4). 
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Wolfson regards Spinoza's "substance" as Aristotle's "genus, " and also his 
"mode" as Aristotle's species, or ultimately individual things. Wolfson treats 
Spinoza's substance as "a transcendent immanence" or "a whole transcending the 
universe, " and therefore he regards the relationship between substance and mode 
as whole and part, in the same sense as the relationship between genus (whole) and 
species (part) in Aristotle. 16 Therefore, he alleges, both "genus" in Aristotle and 
"substance" in Spinoza have the common characteristic that they exist in 
themselves and they are prior to individual things or modes; Spinoza's substance 
also exists in itself (E, 1, Def 3) and it "is by its nature prior to its modifications" 
(E, 1, Prop 1). 
In fact, the relationship between genus and species in Aristotle cannot be 
identified with the relationship between substance and mode in Spinoza. We 
should, therefore, pay careful attention to the Merence between "substance and 
mode" in Spinoza and the Aristotelian "genus and species/individual thingS.,, 
17 The 
Merence is that for Aristotle there is no suggestion that a genus is more real than 
(species or) individual things, whereas for Spinoza the individual thing is less real 
than substance. Furthermore, as Curley rightly points out, if modes exist in 
substance in the same sense as individuals exist in a genus, as Wolfson claims, the 
modes would have to be, in predicative sense, substances by the principles of 
Aristotle's logic. " Let us consider this point in some more detail. 
According to Aristotle, for example, if Socrates is a member of the species 
44mah" and "man " is a species of the genus "animal, " we can say that Socrates is a 
man and also say that he is an animal: "the species is predicated of the individual, 
the genus both of the species and of the individuals" (Categories, Ch. 5,3' 36- 
39). '9 But in Spinoza's philosophy this kind of relation cannot be found. If the 
" See Wolfson, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 74-75. 
17 Wolfson uses at one time the word "species, " at another uses "individual things. 
" 
18 Curley, op. cit., P. 32. 
19 Aristotle, again states: "[M]an is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so 
animal will be predicated of the individual man also-for the individual man 
is both a man and an 
animal" (Categories, Ch. 3, P 10-15). As to Aristotle's quotations 
in this chapter, I use W. D. 




relation of mode to substance is the relation of a species to a genus in the 
Aristotelian sense, as in Wolfson's Spinoza, we would have to say that "substance" 
is predicated of modes. We cannot say this of modes in Spinoza. Therefore, we 
cannot derive substance from mode in the same way as we can derive genus from 
species. Here lies the problem. One of the fundamental principles in Spinoza is that 
modes are not self-subsistent but are the modifications of substance. In so far as 
modes are dependent on substance in Spinoza, it is clear that the relationship 
between substance and mode is not the same as the relationship between species 
and genus. 
Furthermore, there is a problem with "priority" in Aristotle and Spinoza.. 
Wolfson argues that substance is prior to modes in Spinoza in the same way as 
genus is prior to species in Aristotle, so that the relationship between substance 
and modes in Spinoza is rooted in the relationship between genus and species. It is 
certain that for Spinoza substance is prior to modes. It follows that if genus is prior 
to species, Wolfson seems to have evidence for interpreting Spinoza as an 
hylomorphist. However, we should not accept this without examining the sense of 
"prior to" in the relationship between genus and species. 
For Aristotle, the sense of "prior to" is unfolded in several ways: (1) time- 
44 older" or "more ancient"'; (2) non-reciprocity as to implication of existence-A is 
prior to B when, if there is B there is A, but if there is A there is not necessarily B; 
(3) order-in geometry the elements are prior in order to the propositions; (4) 
value-better and more valued; (5) cause-A causes B (Categories, 12,14b). 
However, we cannot infer that genus is prior to species from any of these 
definitions. These definitions are in a context where Aristotle is picking out 
Merent uses of "prior. "" Priority of genus over species is unusual in Aristotle 
(though some medieval philosophers might have defended the priority of genus). 
Thus we need to examine whether genus is prior to species and the nature of the 
priority. Concerning this, Aristotle writes as follows: 
For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too is annulled, so 
that these are prior to the species. They are also more familiar; for if the 
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species is known, the genus and differentia must of necessity be known 
as well (for any one who knows also what a man is knows also what 
animal and terrestrial are), whereas if the genus or the differentia is 
known it does not follow of necessity that species is known as well; thus 
the species is less intelligible (Topics, VI, 4,14 lb 28-34). 
Wolfson maintains that this statement of Aristotle corresponds with his fourth 
definition of priority---"better and more valued" (above). If they do correspond, 
we can infer "the priority of genus to species" from the assertion that genus is 
better known or more intelligible than species. We can therefore say that in some 
sense genus is prior to species in Aristotle as Wolfson maintains. But, Wolfson's 
quoted passage is not very typical. See Categories Ch. 5,2 b 6-10: "Of secondary 
substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, and Ch. 5 on 
secondary substances 2b 29: "It is more informative to give man than animal. " 
Moreover, even if Wolfson is right in pointing out that genus is prior to 
species in Aristotle, we still need to discover whether Aristotle's sense of "priority" 
between genus and species is the same as Spinoza's sense of "priority" between 
substance and modes and Wolfson is wrong about this for the following reasons. 
Wolfson takes two senses of "priority" between genus and species: "better" and 
"the cause of something. ýý20 However, I cannot find that genus causes species, as in 
Aristotle's fifth definition of priority. Since substance is the cause of mode in 
Spinoza, genus must be the cause of species in Aristotle, for Wolfson's 
interpretation to be correct. Wolfson asserts: "This seems to be nothing but a 
legitimate extension of its use in the sense of 'cause, ' for the genus is considered 
by Aristotle as the cause of the individual essence. Or it may also reflect Aristotle's 
statement that the whole is prior in nature to the parts. "2' But the relationship does 
not imply the sense of cause. From where, then, does Wolfson infer that genus 
causes species? Where Wolfson says, as above, that "the genus is considered by 
Aristotle as the cause of the individual essence, " his footnote indicates that this is 
'0 Wolfson, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 77. 
21 Ibid., p. 78. 
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from Analytica Posteriora, 11,29 90a 
,31. But, I cannot find the fifth definition of 
cause in the discussion on priority in that text. Furthermoreý that text has no 
discussion of "genus and specieS.,, 22 It is hard to find evidence that "priority" of 
genus does imply the sense of "cause. " It seems clear that Wolfson misinterprets 
the sense of priority between genus and species in Aristotle and applies this 
misinterpretation to Spinoza. It is misleading to make Spinoza Aristotelian by 
emphasising genus so much and regarding it as prior in causality to the individual. 
Hence, Wolfson's perspective cannot be adopted in interpreting Spinoza's 
"substance and mode" system. 
Wolfson, as we have seen in the first section, also maintains that Spinoza's 
"thougbt and extension" is transformed from the Aristotelian "form and matter, " It 
cannot be denied that Spinoza's "thought and extensiorf' is in-fluenced by 
Aristotle's "form and matter. " Nevertheless, Wolfson misses an essential aspect of 
Spinoza's thinking which is derived from Descartes. Spinoza's conception of 
metaphysics is greatly influenced by Descartes in spite of his objection to 
Descartes' dualism. Descartes selected extension as the essence of material 
substance, and thought as the essence of immaterial substance. The difference 
between these concepts of Spinoza and Descartes is that Descartes distinguished 
between extended and thinking substance, wbile Spinoza treated them as attributes 
of the one single substance. Apart from the difference of the status of "extension 
and thought. " Spinoza follows Descartes' conception of them. Therefore, there is 
not only Aristotle's influence but also Descartes' on Spinoza's concepts of 
extension and thought. However, in Spinoza, these concepts are derived less from 
Aristotle's concepts of "matter and fornf' than Descartes' concepts of "extension 
and thought. " Furthermore, Wolfson argues that "in fact, it is the first kind of 
matter that is extended, and hence could be called extension. "2' However, for 
Aristotle, pure matter is just potentiality with no properties at all, whereas, for 
22 The passage is as follows: "For perception tells that it is now screening it (for it is clear that it 
is now eclipsed); and from this the universal would come about. So, as we say, to know what it is 
is the same as to know why it is-and that either simpliciter and not one of the things that belong 
to it, or one of things that belong to it, e. g. that it has two right angles, or that it is greater or less" 
(Posterior Analytics, 11,2,90a 31-34). 
23 Wolf 
., 0 son V. cit., Vol. 1, p. 234. 
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Descartes and Spinoza, extension is the essence of material substance. In view of 
the above explanations, it is clear that in spite of Aristotle's influence, Spinoza's 
acceptance of Descartes' view does not allow us to interpret Spinoza's "extension 
and thought" as hylornorphism. 
In addition to this, Wolfson's subjective interpretation of the attributes is 
contradictory to his connection between Aristotle's "form and matter" and 
Spinoza's "thought and extension. " If the attributes are an illusion or invention of 
our mind as Wolfson argues, it is hardly acceptable to argue "thought and 
extension7 are derived from Aristotle's "form and matter, " since for Aristotle 
"form and matter" exist outside our mind and they are not the illusory concepts. 24 
Thus, Wolfson's view that Aristotelian "matter and form7' is transformed into 
Spinoza's "extension and thought" is problematic. 
b. Mind. -Bociý Theory 
Furthermore, Wolfson asserts that the relationship between mind and body 
in Spinoza is understood as differing only in terminology from the Aristotelian 
point of view that the soul is the fon-n of the body. That is to say, he interprets 
Spinoza's "mind as the idea of the body"2' as the Aristotelian "soul as the form of 
the body. " Concerning this, he advances the view that "it [Spinoza's definition of 
mind as the idea of the body] is nothing but a new way of restating the Aristotelian 
definition of the soul as the form of the body. iý26 Here we can see that Wolfson 
identifies the term "idea7' in Spinoza with "fornf ' in Aristotle. 
The clue to Spinoza's position at this point is provided by his concept of 
the idea. We should understood Spinoza's "idea7' not as Aristotle's concept of the 
form but under the epistemological version. In Spinoza, the idea is the medium 
24 1 discuss the objective and the subjective interpretations of attributes in chapter four. 
25 Here are the statements of Spinoza with reference to "mind as the idea of the body": "The 
object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension which 
actually exists, and nothing else" (E, 11, Prop 13), or "[t]he idea which constitutes the 
formal 
being of the human mind is not simple, but is composed of a number of ideas" (E,, 
11, Prop 15). 
Proposition 13 is quoted from Edwin Curley for the sake of clarity (Ae Collected Works of 
Spinoza, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 457). 
261bid., p. 48. 
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which represents (confusedly) the human body and external bodies. The human 
mind, "perceives no external body as actually existing unless through the ideas of 
the modifications of its body" (E, II, Prop 26). From this proposition, we can infer 
that the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and the ideas represent 
both the knower's own body and external bodies. This role of the idea is clearly 
distinct from the role of the form in Aristotle. In Aristotle, as we have seen at the 
beginning of this paper, the form is regarded as properties, structures, powers and 
so on. In the case of human beings, accordingly, the body is "what a man is made 
of' and the soul as the form is "what makes the body a man. " There is no 
representative role in Aristotle's concept of the "fornf' as in Spinoza's concept of 
idea. It seems to me that Wolfson does not pay attention to this kind of 
representative role of idea in Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
Apart from the role of the idea, there is some sin-d1arity between Spinoza's 
idea and Aristotle's fonn, since there are the two uses of idea in Spinoza. Spinoza 
talks of the Oference between the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of 
Peter's mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man (E, 11, Prop 17, Schol). 
The former seems to be closer to Aristotle's concept of "form. " Nevertheless, a 
similarity does not lead us to making Spinoza a hylomorphist. Furthermore, in 
Aristotle, the soul has more actuality than the body whereas there is no suggestion 
in Spinoza of mind having priority over body (as we have seen in the first premise), 
and thus this similarity is not sufficient in interpreting Spinoza's theory as 
hylomorphism. From this, we can confirm that Spinoza's concept of "idea7' (even 
the similar one) is, after all, Oferent from Aristotle's "form. " 
The contradiction between Wolfson's subjective interpretation of the 
attributes and his connection of Aristotle's "form and matter" with Spinoza's 
"thought and extension7 does not also allow us to interpret Spinoza's mind-body 
theory as hylomorphism. For Aristotle, the mind is the form of the body, that is, the 
mind is what makes a body a man. However, if the attributes of thought and 
extension are an illusion as in the subjective interpretation, we cannot argue that 
for Spinoza the mind as the idea of the body would make the body a man in spite 
of Spinoza's claim that the idea constitutes or explains the essence of the man. 
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Even more, Wolfson's subjective interpretation of the attributes cannot justify his 
other argument that just as Aristotle's doctrine that "fornf ' exists in all things in a 
variety of Merent meanings so Spinoza's "idea" exists in all things in a different 
degree, because under the subjective interpretation of the attribute "idea7 does not 
really exist in all things due to fact that the attribute of thought (together with all 
the other attributes) does not really exist. 
There is another ground for refuting the hylomorphic interpretation to be 
found in Spinoza's metaphysical determinism. We have seen that the crux of this 
interpretation is that the relationship between mind and body in Spinoza is 
understood as differing only in terminology from the Aristotelian point of view that 
the soul is the form of the body. That is to say, Wolfson interprets Spinoza's "idea 
(mind) as the form of the body" as the Aristotelian "soul as the form of the body. " 
However, Spinoza's metaphysical determinism rejects this hylomorphic 
interpretation. In this interpretation, the idea is "what makes the body a man, " but 
according to Spinoza's determinism a man is determined by substance in a certain 
manner. A man is not made in terms of the finiction of form but is determined by 
substance (God) in Spinoza's system in two attributes of thought and extension. 
Consequently, the idea does not correspond to form as in the soul of Aristotle's 
theory nor is the body "stuff' as in Aristotle's matter. It is just as much "fornf' as 
the mind is. The mind and the body are nothing but the modifications of the 
attributes of the substance in a determinate matter, and therefore a man is not 
"what the idea makes from the body" but the modification of substance in both 
thought and extension. Furthermore, if the mind makes the body a man as in the 
hylomorphic interpretation, it implies that to a certain extent the mind can 
determine the body even if it is doubtful whether this relationship is causal or not. 
But it is true that there is no interaction between the mind and the body, since from 
Spinoza's deternU*M*SM the mind and the body are determined by the attributes of 
thought and extension respectively, but neither can extension determine the mind 
-nor can thought 
determine the body. Therefore, it follows that the bylomorphic 
position that treats the soul as the form of the body is not compatible with Spinoza 
due to his metaphysical determinism. 
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Wolfson makes an ingenious attempt to interpret Spinoza's mind-body 
theory and other related areas of his philosophy via an historical approach. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle's influence on Spinoza which Wolfson strongly asserts and 
insists upon throughout his writings is overstated. 27 He does not, in my opinion, 
express accurately Spinoza's mind-body theory as we have seen in this section. 
Therefore, Wolfson's hylomorphic interpretation does not provide us with an 
adequate perspective on Spinoza's system. 
2 Idealism 
Unlike hylomorphism, the idealistic interpretation makes much of Spinoza's 
doctrine that there are an infinite number of attributes, of which we know only 
thought and extension (E, 1, Prop 11). 2' However, an idealistic interpretation of 
Spinoza, like the hylomorphic interpretation, is ffindamentally dependent upon the 
dominance of the attribute of thought over extension and the other attributes; the 
attribute of thought is, following this interpretation, highlighted and treated as the 
primary one. The main arguments in favour of the dominance of thought in the 
idealistic interpretation are derived from the following sources: Spinoza's 
definition of substance, the definition of attributes, and "letter 66" to Tschirnhaus, I 
27 Some commentators criticise Wolfson's interpretation by pointing out that he too much 
undercuts Spinoza's originality. Curley states: "[W]e could reconstruct nearly the whole of the 
Ethics just by making appropriate selections and arrangements of the doctrines of his 
predecessors. This is an extreme thesis---one which Wolfson is forced, later, to qualify in curious 
ways, and one which makes Spinoza's originality quite problematic" (Curley, op. cit., p. 30). R 
J. Delahunty also states: "By minimising his originality, Wolfson falsifies his thought"' (Spinoza 
[London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1985], p. 194). 
28 See also Spinoza, Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Weýfare, Part 1, Chapter VH, note. a 
in Edwin Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 88. 
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shall, in this section, consider these sources as they are the grounds for supporting 
the dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation. 29 
(1) The Sources of the Idealistic Interpretation 
Those who support an idealistic interpretation highlight the phrase "the 
intel-lect perceives of' in the definition of the attributes. Spinoza's precise definition 
is as follows: "By attribute I understand that which the inteflect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence" (E, 1, Def 4). 1 Clark Murray uses this 
definition in claiming the precedence of thought over the other attributes. Murray 
states the view as fol-lows: 
[A]II attributes are defined to be what they are in themselves by what 
intellect conceives them essentially to be. That is to say, they are 
defined by their relation to thought; and thus thought becomes the 
supreme attribute or category, by relation to which all else must be 
30 interpreted. 
In this way, Murray argues that Spinoza's attributes are ordered in the intellect, 
and he adopts the phrase "the intellect perceives of' as evidence of the dominance 
of thought. He gives a privileged position to thought and asserts that "all attributes 
are ultimately interpretable in terms of thought. "" FoHowing on from this, Murray 
claims that in Spinoza all attributes are united in substance and he designates this 
unity as an intelligible unity. 32 
So as to support his idealistic interpretation, Murray also uses the definition 
of substance and emphasises the phrase "is conceived" as he does in the definition 
29 The idealistic interpretation of Spinoza is different from idealism in a general sense since the 
former maintains that mind has dominant or extensive power over body rather than mind is real 
and body is unreal. 
30 j. Clark Murray, "The Idealism of Spinoza, " The Philosophical Review, 5 (1896), p. 479. 
31 Ibid., p. 48 1. 
32 Ibid., p. 480. 
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of the attributes. His idealistic point of view from the definition of substance is as 
follows: 
Substance is defined to be, not merely that which is in itself, but also 
that which is conceived by itself, and, to make the meaning perfectly 
explicit, this latter predicate is more fully expanded into "that of 
which the concept does not require the concept of anything else, by 
which it has to be formed. " Substance is, therefore, not an empirical 
idea taken up simply as something which happens to be found 
among the natural furniture of our minds. It is a necessary concept of 
reason. 33 
Murray tries to solve the problem of the one substance and the diversity of 
attributes by interpreting Spinoza's system as idealism. In other words, he tries to 
make the unity of thought and substance the key to understanding Spinoza's 
system and making it inteffigible. Concerning this point, Murray refers to the 
scholium to proposition 10: 
[Spinoza] is at pains to explain that there is no absurdity in supposing a 
substance to possess several different attributes (1,10, Schol). But there 
is another connection between the two attributes of thought and 
extension. Thought is conscious of itself, but it is conscious of extension 
as well. Werentially we may add that thought must be conscious of all 
the attributes of substance. 34 
In Murray's opinion if there is unity of thought and substance, the system of "one 
and many" is not hard to explain, because all the modes of inflnite attributes are 
ordered in the system of thought. 
Spinoza's correspondence with Tschirnhaus is another of the grounds used 
to support an idealistic interpretation; Erroll- E. Harris used this letter as the source 
33 Ibid., pp. 477-478. 
34 Ibid., pp. 479-480. 
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of the idealistic interpretation of Spinoza . 
35 Tschirnhaus raises the issue that in 
Spinoza's system, the argument of infinite modes of infinite attributes is 
contradictory to the argument that our mind perceives only the body. 
Hence it seems to follow, that the modification constituting my mind, 
and the modification constituting my body, though one and the same 
modification, is yet expressed in infinite ways-first, through thought; 
secondly, through extension; thirdly, through some attribute of God 
unknown to me, and so on to infinity, seeing that there are in God 
infmite attributes, and the order and connection of the modifications 
seem to be the same in all. Hence arises the question: Why the mind, 
which represents a certain modification, the same modification being 
expressed not only in extension, but in infinite other ways, -why, I 
repeat, does the mind perceive that modification only as expressed 
through extension, to wit, the human body, and not as expressed through 
any other attributes? 36 
What Tschirnhaus points out here is that if we are modes of infinite attributes, 
there is a conflict between our existing as modes of infinite attributes and our 
awareness of ourselves as the mind's perception of the body; the fact that the mind 
cannot perceive modes in attributes other than extension is problematic. Here is 
Spinoza's answer to this question. 
But in the answer to your objection I say, that although each particular 
thing be expressed in infinite ways in the infinite understanding of God, 
yet those infinite ideas, whereby it is expressed, cannot constitute one 
and the same mind of a particular thing, but infinite minds; seeing that 
each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the rest, as T have 
35 Erroll E. Harris, Salvation ftom Despair (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 70-7 1. 
Thomas states that for Harris "The dominance of the order of God's thinking, implied by Letter 
66, makes this letter one of the main grounds for this interpretation. " ("Spinoza's Letter 66 and 
Its Idealist Reading, " Idealistic Studies [ 1994], p. 19 1). 
36 Letter 65 in R. H. A Elwes (trans. ), The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. 2, (London: 
Chiswick Press, 1887), pp. 400-401. 
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explained in the same note to Ethics, H. vii., 37 and as is also evident 
from I. x. If you will reflect on these passages a little, you will see that 
all difficulty vanishes, &c. 38 
In this way, Spinoza distinguishes the infinite intellect from the finite mind, and 
therefore he claims that the hifinite series of attributes and modes appears not to 
the finite mind but to the infinite intellect. 
The idealistic interpretation can be derived from this letter. From this letter, 
Harris inferred the fact that thought is more dominant than any of the other 
attributes, since although our mind cannot comprehend any other attributes besides 
thought and extension, the infinite intellect comprehends all attributes. According 
to him, in God's thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute, and it 
follows from this that the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the 
others: '9 "First, because if there is an infinity of singular minds (or ideas) for every 
mode of substance, and if this inflnity is, as it must be, comprehended in God's 
intellect, then the attribute of thought is, in spite of an Spinoza says, in some sense 
more comprehensive and 'wider' than any other attribute. For every mode in every 
attribute will have its own idea and all ideas belong to the attribute of Thought. -)940 
Furthermore, Harris points out the contradiction between the dominance of 
thought and the independence of all attributes, and regards it as an inconsistency in 
Spinoza. With respect to this, he states: 
37 Among the many statements in the scholium of proposition 7 in part H, the relevant statements 
are as follows: "Nor have I had any reason for saying that God is the cause of the idea, for 
example, of the circle in so far only as He is a thinking, and of the circle itself in so far as He is 
an extended thing, but this, that the formal being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived 
through another mode of thought, as its proximate cause, and this again must be perceived 
through another, and so on ad infinitum. So that when things are considered as modes of thought 
we must explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of 
thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of 
Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes. " 
And proposition 10 in part I is as follows: 'Tach attribute of a substance must be conceived 
through itself. " 
38 Letter 66 in R- H. M. Elwes (trans. ), op. cit., vol. 2., p. 401. 
39Harris, op. cit., p. 71. 
401bid. 
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No doubt, Spinoza's theory of infmity of the attributes is untenable and 
cannot be made self-consistent, and no doubt, to be consistent, he should 
have maintained that the modes in all attributes were united to one 
another as the mind is united to the body. His statement in the 66th letter 
is itself out of harmony with his main teaching, and contradictory even 
on its face. For he says that each thing is expressed in infinite ways in 
the infmite intellect of God, and yet that the infinite ideas by which it is 
expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing. 41 
This problem is discussed in his later article "Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae, " 
and is argued as follows. (1) The dominance of thought as complex or multi- 
dimensional in the letter is incompatible with Spinoza's argument that "the order 
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" in 
proposition 7 of part 11 in Ethicv, because "the order of causes in any attribute 
other than Thought is, so to say, one dimensional, the order of ideas in God's 
intellect is, as it were, multi-dimensional to infinity. ýý42 (2) The assertion that "each 
of the infinite numbers of ideas has no connection with the rest" in the letter is 
consequently posited on the perspective that there must be separate worlds. But 
this is incompatible with Spinoza's position. 43 (3) In Spinoza, there must be an 
infinite number of modes on the basis of the infinite numbers of attributes, so that 
there must be as many different ideas of different modes as there are different 
attributes. However, Spinoza's theme that "all corresponding modeS"44 are 
identical in substance is incompatible with the theme that the ideas of the modes of 
all other attributes than thought are not identical with one another; Harris infers the 
latter from Spinoza's statement that the ideas of the modes of all other attributes 
than thought cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, and 
41 ibid., P. 89. 
42 Harris, "Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae, " Neue Hefte Fur Philosophie, vol. 12 (1977), p. 
10. 
43 ibid. 
44 The mind, the body, and the rest of the unknown modes at same time. Harris states: "So body 
and mind are one and not two entities, being identical in substance. It should follow that the 
coff esponding modes in other attributes are identical with our bodies in substance" (ibid. pp. 10- 
11. ) 
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have no connection between themselves . 
4' Harris is aware that this incompatibility 
is solved by Spinoza's theses "(a) that an absolutely infinite substance must have 
infinite attributes, and (b) that the human mind can become aware of two only. " 
Accordingly, Harris regards these as the apparent incompatibilities, and the reason 
that these incompatibilities appear in Spinoza's philosophy is due to the 
contradiction between dominance of thought and the independence of the 
attributes. 46 Harris highlights the former, and therefore his interpretation of 
Spinoza is idealistic. 
(2) Remarks on the Idealistic Interpretation 
The above description of the idealistic interpretation is the main argument 
in its favour. We can subject this interpretation to the following criticisms. 
Firstly, as Murray argues, Spinoza's definitions of the attributes and 
substance could be the ground for an idealistic interpretation. In fact, as Frederick 
Pollock argues, so long as Spinoza defines an attribute in tenns of what "the 
intellect perceives, " whether it is Spinoza's intention or not, the attribute of 
thought is counted twice as opposed to the other attributes. Pollock states that 
"inasmuch as Attribute is defined by reference to intellect, and Thought is itself an 
attribute, Thought appears in a manner counted twice over. 1947 Pollock also 
emphasises the privileged position of the attribute of thought in Spinoza's system. 
He asserts this point as follows: "The series of ideas or modes of Thought is 
whole and continuous ; no other Attribute has any part in it. ... Hence all the 
Attributes except Thought are really superfluous : and Spinoza's doctrine, when 
thus reduced to its simplest terms, is that nothing exists but thought and its 
modifications. 08 
45 ibid. 
46 Thomas points out this (Thomas, op. cit., pp. 192-193). 
47 Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899), 2d 
ed., p. 153. 
48 Ibid., P. 164. Robert N. Beck also argues for that "the attribute of Thought has a predominant 
and hence idealistic role in Spinoza's metaphysical vision" ("The Attribute of Thought, " in 
James B. Wilbur [ed. ], Spinoza's Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation [Assen: van 
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However, in my opinion, the fact that Spinoza uses the phrase "the intellect 
perceives of' in the definition does not imply that he holds the view that thought is 
dominant over the other attributeS. 49 What we can infer from this phrase is not that 
everything is or exists in God's thinking but that everything is represented or 
perceived by God's thinking. The difference between the former and the latter is 
important. The former leads to the dominance of thought in the idealistic 
interpretation, whereas the latter emphasises the representational role of thought. If 
in God's thinking the attribute of extension, or any other attribute exists, it exists 
not as itself but as the idea of extension. Thought expresses the essence of God as 
well as representing the other attributes. It follows that we ought to distinguish 
representational dependency from ontological dependency, and pay attention to the 
fact that "the dominance of thought" is not related to the latter but related to the 
former. Even if thought is distinctive or singled out from the other attributes, this is 
the representational function of thought. The dominance of thought should be 
regarded not as ontological dependency but as representational dependency. "The 
dominance of thought in a representational sense" does not lead to idealism. 
Moreover, in Spinoza's system, for every idea there is an ideatum, and this implies 
that the idea is equally dependent on the ideatum. Here we can see that 
representational dependency occurs in both ways which is from the mental to 
physical as well as vice versa. If the dominance of thought is treated as arising 
ftom the representational function between the mental and physical, 
representational dependency does not lead to either idealism or materialism. Hence, 
idealism is not an obvious conclusion. 
Gorcum, 1976], p. 10). Beck also states that "a type of idealism may be ascribed to him [Spinoza] 
because of the kind of priority the attribute of Thought has" (p. 1). 
49Let us define the intellect as infinite intellect, because Spinoza's definition is not the definition 
of only attributes of thought and extension but the definition of the infinite attributes in general, 
and in Spinoza, even though it is insufficient as Tschirnhaus asserts, it is clear that the finite 
intellect cannot perceive the other attributes besides thought and extension (and this is what 
Spinoza makes clear in Letter 66). That is to say, as long as the definition talks about the 
attributes in general, the intellect has to be the infinite one due to the fact that the finite intellect 
can only perceive only two attributes of thought and extension. Although Murray does not 
mention whether the intellect is the infinite or the finite, it should be the infinite intellect in his 
argument due to the above fact. I discuss this definition of attributes in chapter four. 
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The same criticism can be attached as to the idealistic interpretation in 
terms of Spinoza's Letter 66, because it also asserts the dominance of thought. As 
we have seen in the above, Harris observes that the attribute of thought is more 
comprehensive than the others from Letter 66. Why is it more comprehensive? The 
reason for his suggestion is because, from the letter we can infer that in God's 
thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute. And this is the manner of 
the dominance of the order of God's thinking. However, if in God's thinking there 
were the modes themselves of every attribute, we would say that thought swallows 
up all the other attributes, and the idealistic interpretation could be ascribed to 
Spinoza. But, in reality, as long as there is an idea of the modes of every attribute 
instead of the modes themselves, we should say that thought is representative 
unlike the others; it follows that although we could say it is "more comprehensive, " 
we cannot say it is more real. From this perspective, as to both the definition and 
the Letter 66,1 would like to suggest the representative interpretation rather than 
the idealistic interpretation. 'o It follows that we can point out the uniqueness of 
thought in Spinoza's system in terms of the representative fimction, but should not 
interpret Spinoza's system as idealism. 
For Spinoza, as in one of the premises in this chapter, the relative weighting 
of thought and extension is equal, and therefore we can give greater weight neither 
to the mental series nor to the physical series. I shall cite again Spinoza's 
statements on this point. 
Hence it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to His actual 
power of acting, that is to say, whatever follows formally from the 
infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God [idea Dei], in 
'0 One might say that the representative role of the attribute of thought is related to the 
dominance of thought over the others i. e. the dominance of thought in a representative sense. But 
even in this case, it is difficult to support the idealistic interpretation, because the dominance of 
thought in a representative sense does not imply that thought is real and extension is unreal. In 
other words, if the other attributes belong to God's thinking as an idea in a representative sense, 
the doctrine of the attributes has a certain distance from the idealistic interpretation. In my 
opinion, even though the dominance of thought is the idealistic element in the interpretation of 
Spinoza, it does not play a major part in his system but a small part which we have to unravel. 
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the same order and in the same connection objectively in God. (E, H, 
Prop 7, Corol) 
The idealistic interpretation is not compatible with the above statement, while the 
representative interpretation is compatible with it. " Viewed from this perspective, 
it is clear that the idealistic interpretation is a misunderstanding of Spinoza's real 
tendency, and consequently it is hardly possible to regard Spinoza as an idealist. 52 
I Epiphenomenalism 
We can quickly dismiss one finther viewpoint, advocated by Harold 
Barker, that Spinoza was an epiphenomenalist. " This interpretation is not only 
incompatible with a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body but 
also with the equality of weight between the mind and the body. However, it will 
be helpful to explore the rationale behind Barker's claim. Especially, in view of the 
interest to modem theories of mind, it is worth looking at this claim- 
initially, we should reflect on some general definitions of 
"epiphenomenalisnf' so that Barker's point of view is better understood. 
Epiphenomenalism is generally defined as the view that "all mental events [are 
considered] to be the effects of physical events but never the causes of either 
5' The representative interpretation will be dealt with at some length in chapter six. 
52 One might say that even if idealism is not Spinoza's intention, Spinoza is somehow committed 
to the assertion of the dominance of thought and subsequently his system can be regard as an 
idealistic one. However if Spinoza was committed to it., we should regard it as a contradiction or 
inconsistency rather than interpreting it as idealism. The most important point in- the 
interpretation of Spinoza, as in the interpretation of any philosopher, is trying to find his real 
tendency and thinking. Spinoza's real tendency is not arguing the primacy of idealism but 
overcoming the inadequacy of materialism and idealism. Therefore we should not infer an 
idealistic interpretation from the definition and the letter, since Spinoza's real tendency in both 
sources is, as I have explained, not an idealistic but a representative one. 
53 H. Barker, "Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics, " in S. Paul Kashap (ed. ), Studies in 
Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press., 1972), pp. 10 1-144. 
39 
physical or other mental events, 04 and ephiphenomenalists "have maintained that 
the body acts upon the mind to produce consciousness, thought, and feeling, but 
that the mind itself has no physical effects. "" 
(1) H. Barker's Notes on Ethics 
a. The Priority of the Body 
From the above substantially similar deflnitions, we can identify and arrange 
the characteristics of epiphenomenalism as foRows. 
(1) There is only one direction of causalityý--from the body to the mind. In other 
words the body acts upon the mind but not vice versa. 
(2) The mind is never the cause of even any other mental events. 
(3) Without the body, there can be no mental effects such as consciousness, 
thought, and feeling. In other words, bodily effects result from bodily causes 
and mental effects also result from bodily causes. 
From the above tbree cbaracteristics, we can recognise that epipbenomenalism is 
posited on the basis of the priority of the body to the mind. 
Now, Barker, throughout his article, in order to maintain consistency with 
the epiphenomenalistic interpretation as wel-l as to support it, emphasises the 
priority of the body in Spinoza's discussion of the relation of the mind to the body, 
We can note the fact that Barker has a scheme which is intended to hold the 
priority of the body in his mind from the first page of his article by expressing 
dissatisfaction with the phrase "per se concipi" (be conceived through itself) in 
proposition 10 of Ethic. v, part 1: "Each attribute of a substance must be conceived 
through itself " Here, he holds that thinking and knowledge depend upon an 
54 Antony Flew, ed.,, 4 Dictionary ofPhilosophy (London: Pan Books, 1979), p. 109. 
" Richard Taylor, Metapkysics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-flall, 1974), p. 17. Another similar 
definition is that "the causal connection goes in only one direction, from body to mind, so that 
mental events are effects only, never causes., of brain events" (Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body 
Problem, " in Paul Edwards fed. ], The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, vol. 5 [New York: Macmillan, 
1967], p. 343). 
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objective world. That is to say, he places stress on the priority of extension over 
thought in the relationship between these two attributes and thus argues against the 
independence of the attributes. " 
Barker adheres to this kind of tendency in explaining the relationship 
between the attributes of thought and extension, the mind and the body. For 
example, he emphasises the priority of the body, even arguing that it is misleading 
to translate "Deus" in the Ethics as "God" especially with respect to the attributes 
of thought and extension. The tenn"Deus, " according to Barker, should have been 
understood as "Natura. " Hence, it ought to be translated into English not as "God" 
but as "Nature, " since the "Deus" of Spinoza is not the "God" of ordinary 
,, 57 linguistic usage. 
Barker maintains that as long as someone uses the ordinary term "God" 
which concerns "the divine mind and divine omniscience, " he will fall into the 
Oficulty of criticising God as a thinking thing rather than God as an extended 
thing. In Barker's words, "he will be less critical about the notion of Deus as res 
cogitans than he is about the notion of Deus as res extensa. "" He further carries 
the criticism into the domain of "thought" in Spinoza's "attributes-modes" system. 
As to the attribute of extension, Barker does not regard it as giving rise to 
difficulties of understanding. However, concerning the attribute of thought, he 
regards it as posing a difficult problem. 
Next, we can see that he tries to move Spinoza's theory from paraRelism. to 
epiphenomenalism. He unfolds an epiphenomenalistic interpretation pointing out 
some problems of parallelism, or at least he presents the argument of "the priority 
of the body over the mind" effectively. He states in relation to this interpretation 
the following: 
[I]n spite of his denial of any communio between the attributes, his 
argument repeatedly suggests that he is really thinýg of the mind as 
56 H. Barker, op. cit., P. 101. 
57 Ibid. ý pp. 
11 0_ I 11. 
58 Ibid., p. 110. 
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determined by the body, so that, not parallelism, but epiphenomenalism, 
would be the word to describe the real tendency of his thought. '9 
What is the reason for Barker asserting the above point of view? In other words, in 
what sense does he think that the mind is determined by the body in Spinoza's 
theory? I shall explore the answer to this question. 
h. The Epi]phenom. ena-listic Interpretation 
I would like to take two statements presenting Barker's main argument 
from which he adduces his epiphenomenalistic interpretation, although there are 
other statements afleged by hirn. The first is on the ground of the scholium, to 
proposition 13, part 11, the other is on the ground of the scholium. to proposition 2, 
part 111. Here are parts of the statements. 
Firstly, after he complains of the confusion of the scholium to proposition 
13ý he offers an epiphenomenalistic interpretation. He states this as follows: "But in 
the sentence that begins, Hoc ta. men in genere dico [Thus much, nevertheless, I 
will say generally], he is evidently thinking of the body as the organ of mind or 
indeed as determining it, and the stress he lays on a prior knowledge of the body as 
,, 60 the key to an understanding of the mind then takes on a different significance. 
That is to say, even though Spinoza claims the union of mind and body in the first 
paragraph of this scholium, Barker argues that in the second paragraph the mind is 
determined by the body-for instance, "in proportion as one body is better adapted 
than another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at 
the same time be better adapted to perceive many things"(E, 11, Prop 13, Schol). In 
this way, Barker interprets this scholium (at least in the second paragraph), as 
showing that Spinoza's mind-body theory is epiphenomenalistic, because he 
interprets the above statement as that the body acts upon the mind but not vice 
versa, that is to say, changes in the body are the cause of changes in the mind but 
not vice versa. 
59 Ibid., p. 144. 
" Ibid., p. 149. 
42 
Secondly, Barker's epiphenomenalistic interpretation finds support in the 
scholium to proposition 2, part 111. From the scholium he brings in his 
epiphenomenalistic statement of Spinoza's philosophy of mind. This is related to 
what he sees as the essential point and obvious tendency of this scholium. Barker 
says: "[T]he essential point is that he really gives priority or predominance to the 
body, in spite of his professed doctrine of the complete independence and equality 
of the attributes. The obvious tendency of the scholium to 111,2-in spite of what 
the proposition itself asserts-is to glorify the body at the expense of the mind. 41 
From this statement, we can see that Barker emphasises the priority of the body as 
determining the mind, and therefore he takes a strongly epiphenomenalistic point of 
view on Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
(2) The Inadequacy of the Epiphenomenalistic Interpretation 
I shall criticise Barker's epiphenomenalistic interpretation in the following 
respects: firstly, I shall treat the scholium of the proposition 2 in part III at 
length ; 62 and secondly, point out that Spinoza's mind-body theory contradicts 
definitions of epiphenomenalism. By doing so, I shall show that Spinoza's real 
tendency is not epiphenomenalistic. 
a. The Equality or Priority between the Mind and the Body: 
the Scholium ofProposition Two, Part Three 63 
Spinoza regards thought and extension as equal attributes, although some 
passages seem to imply the priority of extension. Spinoza also strongly attacks 
interaction between the mind and the body. Let us consider these two points in the 
following passage (E, ITT, Prop 2, Schol); I shall break this passage up by 
numbering for convenience. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Barker, also, as we have seen, relies on the scholium. of proposition 13 in part 11. As to this 
scholium, I shall deal with it when I discuss the materialistic interpretation in the next section. 
6' There are no divisions within the passages in this scholitun in the Latin text, but for 
convenience I shall divide one long section into some passages. 
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denial of "the superiority of the mind over the body" and of "mind- 
body interactionism " 
Although these things are so, and no ground for doubting remains, I scarcely believe, 
nevertheless,, that without a proof derived from experience, men will be induced calmly 
to weigh what has been said, so firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of 
the mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend upon the 
will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought. For what the body can do no one 
has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught no one hitherto what the 
body, without being determined by the mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws 
of Nature alone, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal. 
(1) For no one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be 
able to explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are observed in 
brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that sleepwalkers in their sleep do very 
many things which they dare not do when awake-all this showing that the body itself 
can do many things from the laws of its own nature alone, at which the mind belonging 
to that body is amazed. 
(2)Again, nobody knows by what means or by what method the mind moves the body, 
nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body, nor with what speed it 
can move the body. So that it follows that, when men say that this or that action of the 
body springs from the mind which has command over the body, they do not know what 
they say, and they do nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing 
about the cause of the action and see nothing in it to wonder at. 
(3) But they will say that, whether they know or do not know by what means the mind 
moves the body, it is nevertheless in their experience that if the mind were not fit for 
thinking the body would be inert. They say, again, it is in their experience that the mind 
alone has power both to speak and be silent, and to do many other things which they 
therefore think to be dependent on a decree of the mind. But with regard to the first 
assertion, I ask them if experience does not also teach that if the body be sluggish the 
mind at the same time is not fit for thinking? When the body is asleep, the mind 
slumbers with it and has not the power to think, as it has when the body is awake. 
Again, I believe that all have discovered that the mind is not always equally fitted for 
thinking about the same subject, but in proportion to the fitness of the body for this or 
that image to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that 
object. 
(4) But my opponents will say that from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as it is 
considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that the causes of architecture, painting, 
and things of this sort, which are the results of human art alone, could be deduced, and 
that the human bodyý' unless it were determined and guided by the mind would not be 
able to build a temple. I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the 
body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and 
that they find that many things are done merely by the laws of Nature which they would 
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never have believed to be possible without the direction of the mind, as, for example, 
those things which sleepwalkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are 
astonished when they wake. I adduce also here the structure itself of the human body, 
which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those things which are constructed by 
human art, not to mention, what I have already proved, that an infinitude of things 
follows from Nature under whatever attribute it may be considered. 
I shall give the main points of each stage of the argument: 
(1) An explanation can in principle be given for much behaviour in ten-ns of the 
corporeal. 
(2) The hypothesis of mental/physical interaction is more abstruse than that of 
physical action. 
(3) There is an illusion of the mind freely bringing about change in the corporeal, 
but if the body is sluggish the mind is also sluggish. 
(4) For all we know a physical explanation is possible for any action. 
From this summary, we can see that this passage concerns bodily explanation in 
order to refute the common belief, held in Spinoza's time, of the superiority of the 
mind over the body, and also presumably to repudiate Cartesian interactionism. We 
can see that Spinoza denies the dependency of the body upon the m wi-id by pointing 
out repeatedly a. common -misunderstanding regarding the 
body. He holds that the 
body can do many things without the direction of the mind from the analogy of 
sleepwalkers. All these examples and explanations are intended to undermine the 
view that the mind can determine or act upon the body, that is to say, the mind can 
cause the body to move. 
It may be argued however that Spinoza's real tendency is to assert the 
priority of the body over the mind as Barker suggests. However, does Spinoza 
really hold a priority of the body over the, mind in this scholium? I think not. The 
proposition itself informs us of two points: (a) the body cannot determine the mind, 
(b) the mind cannot determine the body. What Spinoza seeks to do in the second 
paragraph, as he mentions in the first sentence, is to prove point (b) so as to 
persuade those who strongly believe in the dependency of the body upon the mind, 
He regards this belief as blocking a fair consideration of the matter, It was a 
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common belief in Spinoza's time that the mind commanded the body. The 
following statements of Spinoza's (at the beginnin of the above quotation) M=9 
conveys this fact: "... so firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the 
mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend on the 
will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought. " Spinoza might not have 
felt the need to offer a proof of point (a) since the belief that the mind commands 
the body was so widespread. We cannot argue from his silence here that he 
thought there was physical-mental causality, in view of the fact that he clearly 
denies it in several places. 
The passage which could possibly be regarded as claiming the priority of 
the body is restricted to "in. proportion to the fitness of the body for this or that 
image to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that 
object. " However, we should note that Spinoza's meaning is that the mind and the 
body move together as well as that the mind is the idea. of the body and the body is 
the object of the mind. That is to say, we should regard this not as giving priority 
to the body but as asserting equality to the body. Spinoza's intention and purpose 
in arguing against the common belief that the mind determines the body is to 
support his denial of causal interaction between the mind and the body which he 
claims in the proposition itself Spinoza's explanations, in- the schorium are 
compatible with this interpretation. I shall consider more passages in the scholium. 
of proposition 2. 
(ii) one order of event and two descriptions of the mental and the physical 
[T]he infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy 
believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he 
seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his -mind 
be speaks the. 
things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, 
the boy, and others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by a free command of 
the mind, whilst, in trutk they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to 
speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that -men 
believe 
themselves to be ftee simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing 
nothing of the causes by which they are determined; it teaches, too, that the decrees of 
the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which differ, therefore, according to 
the different temper of the body. For every man determines all things from his emotion; 
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those who are agitated by contrary emotions do not know what they want, whilst those 
who are agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither. All this plainly 
shows that the decree of the mind, the appetite, and determination of the body are 
coincident in Nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing which, when it is 
considered under the attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called a "decree, " 
and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws 
of motion and rest is called a "determination. " 
The same order of events which can be described mentally can also be described 
physically; there is also a suggestion that "appetites" are a Merent way of 
describing "decrees" and "determinations. " Are they mental, or physical? If mental, 
he might be implying that reference to appetites is a better way of describing the 
mental than reference to "decrees. " 
(iii) denial of "the command theory of mind )y 
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This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is another thing which I 
wish to be observed here-that we cannot by a mental decree do a thing unless we 
recollect it. 
(1) We cannot speak a word, for instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the free 
power of the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed, therefore, that 
the power of the mind extends only thus far-that from a mental decree we can speak or 
be silent about a thing only when we recollect it. 
(2) But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we do so from a free decree of the 
mind,, and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is the result of a spontaneous motion of 
the body. We dream, again, that we are concealing things, and that we do this by virtue 
of a decree of the mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent about things we 
know. We dream, again, that, ftom a decree of the mind, we do some things which we 
should not dare to do when awake. 
(3) And I should like to know, therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the 
mind-one belonging to dreams and the other free. If this be too great nonsense, we 
must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind which is believed to be ftee is not 
distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation 
which the idea necessarily involves in so far as it is an idea (Prop 49, pt. 2). 
(4) These decrees of the mind, therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the 
ideas of things actually existing. Consequently, those who believe that they speak or are 
silent or do anything else from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open. 
641 shall also break up this passage by numbering for convenience. 
47 
Spinoza goes on to develop the view that reference to "decrees" is inadequate and 
confused: 
(1) It shows an inadequacy which does not cover all mental acts 
(2) Decrees in dreams do not really bring about anything 
(3) Unless there are two sorts of decree, we must treat all decrees of the mind as 
ineffective 
(4) Apparently free decrees are really caused. 
This passage thus supports the argument contained in the second paragraph. It 
refutes the common belief that the mind commands the body, or even, perhaps, that 
the mind commands the mind. His point is that we engage in some activity not by 
the free will of the mind but by responses to external stimuli. In other words the 
action of the body does not depend upon the free will of the mind. 
Now, we can see that this schollium is not concerned with either giving a 
priority to the body or glorifying the body at the expense of the mind, as Barker WW 
argues. But it is concerned with the explanation of the experience of the body in 
order to refute the common belief of the superiority of the mind over the body and 
to refute Cartesian interactionism by showing the causal independence of the body 
from the mind. I think that, in the scholium, Spinoza's intention is to expound and 
prove what be says in the proposition (the mind cannot determine the body) 
through the example of sleepwalkers, and he does not -have any 
further intention to 
give priority or predominance to the body. 
Barker uses the phrase, "in spite of what the proposition itself asserts "65 hence, it 
is evident that he is aware of the clear sense of proposition 2, part III. 
Nevertheless, he seems to reinterpret it. Here, we should remind ourselves that this 
scholium. is attached to proposition 2. That is, "the body cannot determ 'me the mind 
to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to 
anything else if there be anything else" (E, 111, Prop 2). In Spinoza, we should not 
consider any scholium without the associated proposition in the Ethics. How 
would Barker be able to treat the proposition itser. Barker should have interpreted 
this scholium in a manner faithful to the proposition itself Moreover, we haNe seen 
65 Ibid., p. 149. 
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that the scholium does not necessarily lead to the priority of the body over the 
mind. Consequently, as long as Spinoza holds Proposition 2 and the scholium is 
consistent with the proposition, it is hardly possible to interpret his position as 
epipheno-menaHsm. 
b. Incompatibility between Definitions of Epi]phenomenahsm, and 
Spinoza's Theory 
Barker, as we have just seen above, tries to attach epiphenomenalism to 
Spinoza's mind-body theory. I shall discuss some problems of this kind of 
interpretation dealing with the definition of epiphenomenalism. At the beginning of 
section 1.1 drew some points from the definition of epiphenomenalism. These 
were: 
(1) There is only one direction of causality-from the body to the mind. In other 
words thle body acts upon the mind but not vice versa. 
(2) The mind is never the cause of even any other mental events. 
(3) Mental events such as consciousness, thought, and feeling are always the effect 
of bodily causes. 
As to point (1), 1 have just criticised Barker's assertion with relation to these 
points. Now, let us examine points (2) and (3) in the definition of 
epiphenomenalism. Normally in Spinoza, the relationship between mind and body 
is presented by saying that a mind is the idea of a mode of extension and a body is 
the object (ideatum) of a mind. This kind of relationship, however, also occurs 
within the mental process since Spinoza states, "[flhis idea of the mind is united to 
the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body" (E, 11, Prop 21; 
my italics). Therefore we can see that there is an idea of the idea in Spinoza's 
system, and that the object of this idea is not the body but the mind. This gives self- 
consciousness. If Spinoza is interpreted as an epiphenomenalist, the fact that "the 
body is the object of the mind, " must imply that the body is the cause of the mind, 
and the mind the effect of the body. Likewise, concerning the idea of the idea, The 
mind is the cause of the idea. of the idea, " since here the mind is the object 
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[objectum. ] of the idea of the mind. This contradicts the definition of 
epiphenomenalism, precisely, in point (2): the mind would have to be causally 
active in producing the idea of the mind. Due to the above fact, it is not true that 
Spinoza's mind-body theory can be interpreted as epiphenomenarism. In other 
words, so long as there is the theory of idea ideae in Spinoza's philosophy of 
mind, it is unlikely to be possible to treat Spinoza's theory as epiphenomenalistic. 
According to Barker, the idea ideae is "a reflective awareness of what is in 
the mind, " and he adds "reflective knowledge can only become aware of, not 
create, any unity or continuity there is in the mind. 9ý66 However, the mind must be 
the cause of the idea of the mind in respect to the epiphenomenalistic sense, since 
the body is, in epiphenomenalism, treated as the cause of the mind. 
Apart from this argument, we can simply dismiss the epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation. There exists a consensus that for Spinoza, there is a causal 
relationship within the realm of the mind (also within the realm of body), whereas 
there is no causal relationship between the mind and the body. In Spinoza's view, 
causation occurs between mental events and does not rely on causation of the 
physical. For Spinoza, the causation of mental events is determined by mental laws 
(and physical events are caused by physical laws), although there is ultimately one 
order of causation. Here we can see that the mind is active in Spinoza's theory 
unlike the mind according to epiphenomenalism. Thus, if Barker maintains the 
epiphenomenalistic interpretation he is the only one who disagrees with this 
consensus, since the thesis of epiphenomenalism is completely the reverse of each 
case of the causality. Consequently, since all characteristics of epipbenomenalism 
contradict Spinoza's mind-body doctrine, epiphenomenalism should be discarded in 
the interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
When Barker interprets Spinoza's statement, in my view, he places too 
much stress on the isolated statements which seem to suggest that Spinoza speaks 
of the priority of the body rather than concentrating on the whole context of what 
Spinoza says. Moreover, he does not accept Spinoza's direct statements literally, 
66jbid., p. 157. 
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as we have seen in the discussion on proposition 2 of part 11. It seems to me that 
Barker's treatment of Spinoza's statements of the mind-body theory is suspect 
because it is preconditioned by his own epiphenomenalistic interpretation. Barker's 
view sometimes seems attractive when we find the isolated statements which seem 
to suggest that Spinoza speaks of the priority of the body. However, even if there 
were the priority of the body in Spinoza's system, it could not be interpreted as 
epiphenomenalism, since it is clear that in Spinoza's system, there is no causal 
relation between the mind and the body while there is causality in the mental realm. 
These essential points of Spinoza's mind-body theory are not compatible with the 
definitions of epiphenomenalism. So the priority, if there is one, requires a different 
sort of explanation. As we shall see later, others have found an explanation in 
Spinoza's discussion of the representative function of ideas. (See chapter six. ) 
Briefly, for now, if we consider the role of the "idea" in the relationship 
between mind and body, we can realise there is the representational function in 
Spinoza's mind-body theory, and this function is the most important part of the 
mind-body relationship, as well as the crux of interpreting his point of view on that 
relationship. For Spinoza, the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and 
these ideas of the events in the body are contained in the mind. Therefore the ideas 
in the human mind represent the nature of its own body, together with external 
bodies which affect the human body. In Spinoza's epistemological realm, the 
relationship between the human mind and its body or external bodies is a 
representative one through the medium of ideas which represent those objects. 67 
Barker does not consider this kind of representational role. He just 
highlights "the priority of the body" and converts Spinoza's mind-body theory into 
a position whereby "the body is the cause of the mind" through Spinoza's assertion 
that "the body is the object of the idea of the mind. " He misses the representational 
role of the idea in Spinoza's mind-body theory, and the doctrine of 
representationalism is irrelevant to "the priority of the body. " 
67 Even though the word 'ýrepresentationll is rare in Spinoza, we can infer a representative role 
from his cognitive theory. 
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In section IýI used determinism to criticise the hylomorphic interpretation. 
From my point of view, deternnimism is also available as a means to criticise an 
epiphenomenalistic interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body tbeory. We can criticise 
it in terms of Spinoza's metapbysical deternuiniism. 
Barker, as we have seen, regards epiphenomenalism as Spinoza's real 
tendency. But if it is Spinoza's real tendency, it is contradictory to his metaphysical 
determinism. For Spinoza the cause of thought is substance and not anything else, 
and the cause of extension is also substance. If Spinoza's substance is merely a 
physical one, epiphenomenalism is plausible in the interpretation of Spinoza's 
mind-body theory. But it is clear that Spinoza's substance is not only physical but 
also mental. In Spinoza, there are two distinct causal series: one is from thought to 
the mental modes, the other from extension to the bodily modes. The mind is 
determined only by the attribute of thought, and the body is determined only by the 
attribute of extension. Thought cannot be the cause of the body and extension 
cannot be the cause of the mind, because the attributes are conceptually 
independent (E, 1, Prop 10); for Spinoza, the mind is conceived through the 
attribute of thought and the body is conceived through the attribute of extension, 
and the phrase "is conceived througW' implies causation (E, 1, Ax 5; E, 11, Prop 6, 
Demon) . 
6' Hence, his metaphysical determinism makes clear the fact that there is 
no causal interaction between the mind and the body. This kind of metaphysical 
determinism in Spinoza is quite enough to refute an epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation of Spinoza's theory. Unlike epiphenomenalism, in Spinoza's system 
what determines the mind is not the body or any other physical thing, but the 
attributes of thought belonging to the one substance. Therefore, in so far as his 
metaphysical determinism is allowed in both the mental and the physical realm, that 
is to say, in so far as for Spinoza the mind is determined by substance and this 
substance has the attribute of thought together with the attribute of extension, 
epiphenomenalism has no ground for support in Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
Viewed from the perspectives which I have explained in this section, we 
can say that Spinoza's position on the mind-body theory is not epiphenomenalism 
68 This issue is discussed pp. 83-84 in chapter three. 
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since that would not be an accurate interpretation or an adequate one. Therefore, 1 
would like to conclude this section by suggesting that, in relation to Spinoza's 
assertion that "the body is the object of the idea of the mind, " representationalism 
rather than epiphenomenalism is the key to interpreting Spinoza's mind-body 
theory. 69 
4. Materialism 
In philosophical discussions of the mind-body problem, there has been from 
the time of the ancient Greeks until the present day a wide range of theories of 
materialism such as classical materialism, behaviourisn-4 reductive materialism, 
central state materialism, and so on. Strictly, materialism is posited on the view 
that mental events are really nothing more than physical events occurring to 
physical objects, but, as we shall see, it can also refer to positions which emphasise 
the dominance of the physical explanations over the mental explanations. 
The first premise in this cbapter is that for Spinoza the relative weigbting of 
thought and extension is equal, and therefore neither can we give greater weight to 
the body nor to the mind: the body is not prior to the mind nor vice versa. 
However, from time to time, some commentators give weight either to one or to 
the other; as, for example, we have seen in Harris' idealism and Baker's 
Epiphenomenalism. Furthermore, among the various interpretations of Spinoza's 
mind-body problem, there is a notable materialistic point of view: "modified 
materialism" by Stuart Hampshire. In the following two sections, I shall consider 
the appropriateness of his perspective on Spinoza and discuss some of the 
problems which arise from his interpretation and some of the inadequacy of 
applying it to Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
69 See chapter six for more on this. 
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(1) The Interpretation of Stuart Hampshire 
a. The Princi]pal Point Ofthe Book "Spinoza 
In order to examine and evaluate Hampshire's materialistic interpretation of 
Spinoza's mind-body problem, we need to expound his point of view regarding 




book Spinoza (195 1), Hampshire tends to regard Spinoza as 
holding the view that humans are nothing more than a part of nature, and he 
naturally finds it difficult to understand how individuals can become free in 
Spinoza's theory. He is thus doubtful as to whether Spinoza's Ethicy really provide 
a way of salvation or merely a means of distinguishing between servitude and a 
freedom which we can never attain . 
70 Thus he states Spinoza's position as follows: 
"[O]ur whole duty and wisdom is to understand fully our own position in Nature 
and the causes of our imperfections, and, having understanding, to acquiesce; 
manýs greatest happiness and peace of mind (acquiescentia animi) comes only 
from this full philosophical understanding of himself. "71 Elsewhere Hampshire 
briefly points out that Spinoza's position is that a human body embodies a human 
mind. More precisely, "every modification of, or change of state in, a human body 
necessarily involves, in view of the identity of the order of causes within the two 
attributes, a modification of the idea of that body, and so involves a modification of 
the mind. ýý72 Then, Hampshire does justice to the innate power of the mind by 
comparing it with Freud's conception of libido. According to him, it is a reflection 
of man's physical energy. 
Hatred and love, jealousy and pride, and the other emotions which 
he feels, can be shown to him as the compensations necessary to 
restore loss of "psychical energy. " ... 
Every person is held to 
dispose of a certain quantity of psychical. energy, a counterpart (for 
70 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 195 1), p. 115. 
71 Ibid., P. 12 1. 
72jbid., p. 68. 
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Spinoza at least) of his physical energy, and conscious pleasures and 
pains are only reflexions of the relatively uninhibited expression and 
frustration of this energy. 73 
Hampshire does not directly propound any kind of materialistic interpretation of 
Spinoza in any part of the book Spinoza, and it seems to me that Hampshire's 
assertions in his book Spinoza. cannot be formulated clearly enough to explain 
Spinoza's standpoint on the relationship between mind and body, Moreover, 
initially his two pages (pp. 68-69) of explication of Spinoza's mind-body theory 
(under the title "Mind and Body") do not seem to give this subject adequate 
consideration. The points in these two pages is that (1) for every body there is an 
idea of that body, (2) a body involves a mind (an idea of that body) in view of the 
identity of the order of causes, and (3) the greater or less Power and perfection of a 
human mind follows from the power and perfection of the body and vice versa. 
Hampshire does not argue these points but merely states them, so that it is Oficult 
on their basis to assert a distinctive position on Spinoza. 
However, throughout the book we can surmise that his point of view on 
Spinoza's mind-body problem is basically a materialist interpretation. For example, 
Hampshire states: "In the last century Spinoza was sometimes celebrated, and 
much more often abominated, as a precursor of materialism; but his was a 
materialism with a difference, if only because the word 'matter' normally suggests 
something solid and inert, and no such notion of matter is to be found in his 
writing. 5174 He also claims that, in Spinoza, the body can do many things without 
the mind. In other words, Hampshire believes that, in Spinoza's theory, behaviour 
can be explained without mental processes such as win or judgement through the 
example of the behaviour of animals and of sleepwalkers. 
75 (See quotation on pp. 
44-45. ) 
73 Ibid., p. 14 1. 
74jbid., p. 79. 
75 Ibid., pp. 13 0-13 1. 
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b. A Kind ofMaterialism 
Hampshire returns forcefully to his materialistic interpretation of Spinoza 
about 20 years later. We can find this in his book Freedom of Mind (1972), in the 
chapter called "A Kind of Materialism. " I shall, therefore, move on to Freedom of 
Mind, within which a clearer materialistic interpretation is advanced by Hampshire. 
Here, Hampshire interprets Spinoza's mind-body theory as "a modified 
materialism7' which is a new term among the variety of interpretations of Spinoza's 
philosophy. Hampshire regards "a modified materialism" as "the sense, or point, of 
Spinoza's so-called double aspect theory of personality. 5176 
The main assertion of this theory is that, for Spinoza, "every change in the 
state of the organisn-4 which is a change in thought, is also a change in some bodily 
state, and usually in the principal instrument of thought, the brain. ýý77 In other 
words, his point of view on the relation of the body to the mind in Spinoza is that 
the body is a contrivance for producing thought, and therefore the mind is 
embodied in the body as its contrivance. 78 With respect to this point, Hampshire 
says that "if the condition of the instrument is grossly changed, as by drugs, the 
power of thought is grossly changed also . "79This 
implies that the body is prior to 
the mind in the order of explanation. Hampshire's above explanation is, I assume, 
rooted in the apparent asymmetry between the mind and the body in the scholium 
to proposition 13 in the Ethics,, part 11; Hampshire does not quote or indicate the 
source of his explanations, but they bear a strong resemblance to the 
aforementioned scholium. 80 
76 Stuart Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism"' in his Freedom ofMind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1972), p. 229. 
77jbid., pp. 225-226. 
78 Ibid., p. 218. Hampshire's terminology is initially puzzling. The trouble is that phrases such as 
"instrument of thought" and 'ýphysical instrument of the mind" tend to suggest "that which is 
employed by thought. " This gives all the wrong associations. To describe the brain as the 
instrument of thought suggests something thought uses: Mind calls the shots. Thus, even though 
Hampshire uses this phrase, I avoid it and use the phrase 'machine for producing thought" except 
in the direct quotations, since this better represents his materialistic interpretation. 
79 ibid. 
11 This scholitan will be considered in more detail from p. 59. 
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A 
, ',, -cording to the modified materialistic interpretation, modes of thought 
and modes of extension are irreducible one to the other, since this interprets 
Spinoza's two orders as follows: The order of thoughts can only be adequately 
explained by the rational and associative connections peculiar to thoughts, and 
physical states by their connection with other physical states in accordance with the 
laws of physics. "" Therefore, Hampshire holds that "the classical materialists are 
wrong in supposing that the two orders of explanation could properly be reduced 
to one. 02 In this way, Hampshire points out that Spinoza denies reductionism of 
the mental to the physical. He means that Spinoza's mind-body theory is 
materialism without reduction. 
Now, we can identify the crux of the modififed materialistic interpretation as 
follows: 
(1) The priority of the body over the mind 
Not only is the body independent from the mind in explaining it, but it is also 
primary and the mind is secondary in the order of explanation by virtue of the 
predon-ýinance of the laws of physics (with the mind being secondary). At final 
analysis, the mind is embodied in the body, especially in the brain (and not vice 
versa). 
(2) The problem of reduction 
Unlike classical materialism, this doctrine regards the two orders of explanation 
(mental and physical) as irreducible. 
Modified materialism can thus be seen as accepting a central feature of the double 
aspect theory namely the double order of explanation. In that sense, it is a 
reconsideration of the interpretation of the double aspect theory through 
materialistic glasses. 
Hampshire's -materialistic 
interpretation and double aspect view both 
involve physical descriptions and mental descriptions. But the difference between 
8' Ibid., p. 229. 
82 Ibid. In his book Spinoza, Hampshire also considers this point: "[B]oth conceptions of the 
Universe are complete in themselves, but one is not reducible to the other" (p. 58). Here it is not 
so clear that the order of thoughts is complete. 
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them is that in Hampshire's materialistic interpretation he emphasises that physical 
descriptions are prior to mental descriptions in getting an overall picture of the 
world. 
(2) Inadequacy of Hampshire's Interpretation 
First of all, I would like to point out the fact that modified materialism 
differs from strict materialism, since "materialisuf ' is generafly presented as 
follows: 
Materialism must either deny that there are any nonmaterial mental 
objects, events, and states, or claim that while there are some entities 
classified as mental, each one is actually not only identical with but 
reducible to purely material phenomena, usually said to be certain 
brain processes. " 
From the above definition of strict materialism, we can infer that it is dffficult to 
classify ifi ., modified materialism as strict materialism. 
The reason is that mod ed 
-materialism, as we 
have seen, accepts the fact that there are nonmaterial laws and 
explanations and it does -not accept the possibility of reducing one order of 
explanation to the other. Therefore, we can see that modified material-ism is the 
doctrine that the mental order exists, but the physical order dominates; but yet that 
mental events do -not exist over and above physical events. 
Modified material-ism involves both the double aspect theory and 
materialism. Hampshire, as we have seen, insists on his materialistic point of view 
on Spinoza by treating the brain as the machine for producing thought. According 
to him, for Spinoza., the bodyý--principafly, the brai-is a machine for producing 
thought, and the mind is associated with the body in the sense that the mental 
properties are ultimately a physical state of the brain. 
83 James W. Cornman, Materialism and Sensations (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 197 1), p. 1. 
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It is, however, problematic to say that this kind of interpretation can be 
regarded as Spinoza's view. Although Hampshire does not quote or indicate 
directly, the reason or ground for his interpretation is, as I mentioned, Spinoza's 
following statement: 
Therefore, in order to determine the difference between the human mind 
and other things and its superiority over them, we must first know, as we 
have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human 
body. I am not able to explain it here, nor is such an explanation necessary 
for what I wish to demonstrate. Thus much, nevertheless,, I will say 
generallyý--that in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to 
do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at the same 
time be better adapted to perceive many things, and the more the actions of 
a body depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies co-operate with 
it in action, the. better adapted will the mind be for distinctly understanding. 
(E, 11, Prop 13, Schol) 
There is an asymmetry between the mind and the body in this statement. 
Hampshire seems to take this asymmetry as ground for the physical order 
dominating, so that he thinks that this leads to a materialistic interpretation. 
However, I do not think this asymmetry argues for materialism. In the above 
passage, Spinoza is saying that the best way of discovering mental differences is by 
studying physical differences. Body is prior to mind as far as gaining knowledge is 
concerned: Spinoza favours the physical over the mental as a way of gaining 
knowledge. This ties up with what we said earlier (pp. 43-49 in section 2): the way 
we explain how minds work. is more confi-ised than the way we explain how bodies 
work: talk of commands, with no proper measurements (E, 111, Prop 2, Schol). 
Does that argue for materialism? Not really. What Spinoza claims in the above 
statement is not that the physical is actually prior to the mental, but that the way in 
which we explain things using mental vocabulary is less successfi-il than the way we 
explain things using physical vocabulary. I shall emphasise that this passage does 
not argue for materialism by the following points. Firstly, in m any places Spinoza 
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argues for the equivalence of adequate mental and physical descriptions. Secondly, 
there is no reason to think Spinoza would have permanently ruled out the 
possibility of good mental explanations. The present position is best seen as a 
temporary phase in our coming to acquire a better knowledge of things. We can 
-hope 
for complete mental as well as physical explanations one day. 
I think that Spinoza really has this sort of attitude in arguing his philosophy: 
that is, our knowledge at the present day is not capable of completely grasping 
some facts, but we shall be able to discover them when our knowledge is increased 
by more scientific discovery. Even when Spinoza talked of unknown attributes, he 
makes this point: 
From what has now been said, it is clear that Idea of infinite attributes in 
the perfect being is no fiction. But we shall still add the following: After 
the proceeding reflection on Nature we have not yet been able to find in 
it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect being. 84 (My 
italics) 
-D 
, egarding the attributes of which God consists, they are nothing but F 
infmite substances, each of which must, of itself, be infinitely perfect. 
Clear and distinct reason conceives us that this must, necessarily, be so. 
Sofar, however, only two of all these infinite attributes are known to us 
through their essence: Thought and Extension. " (my italics) 
84 Spinoza, Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Welfare, Part 1, Chapter 1, [8], note. d in 
Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, pp. 63-64. The note continues as 
follows: 
"And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves that these would be the only ones of 
which this perfect being would consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which 
openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that there are infinite perfect 
attributes which must pertain to this perfect being before it can be called perfect. 
And where does this Idea of perfection come from? It cannot come from these two, for two 
gives only two., not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not from me, for then 
I would 
have had to be able to give what I did not have. From where else, then, than from the infinite 
attributes themselves, which tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what they are. 
For only of two do we know what they are" (my italics). 
85 Spinoza, Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Welfare, Part 1, Chapter VII, note. a in 
Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 88. 
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From the above passages, we can see that Spinoza claims that in the contemporary 
position we are not completely aware of some facts, but we may be able to know 
them in the future. By our knowledge up to the present day, we can grasp only two 
attributes of thought and extension and this knowledge does not lead to denying 
the existence of the other attributes; one day, we may be able to know what they 
86 
are (so, they are not unknowable). I believe that concerning our knowledge of the 
mind and the body, Spinoza takes the same kind of position: even tbou. gb we know 
the existence of both the mode of thought and the mode of extension, our 
temporary position does not permit us to obtain knowledge of the mind without 
relying on the knowledge of the body. Owing to the fact that science is not yet 
enough developed for us to know what the mind is, we have flrstly to gain access 
to the body in order to give access to the mind. 87 
Now, we can see that our understanding of the mind depends upon our 
understanding of the body as far as our gaining knowledge is concerned, more 
precisely, as far as our gaining knowledge up to the present day is concerned. Can 
or should we take this as a justification for materialism? Certainly not. This does 
not lead us to materialism since this dependence originates from our temporary 
understanding of the present day. It is certain that there is not, in reality, any 
priority or dependence between the mind and the body in Spinoza's theory. I shall 
confirm this by the following textual evidence: 
Between the idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because 
the one cannot exist without the other. For there. is no thing of which there. is 
not an Idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist unless the thing also 
+0 exists- 
86 11.11. Joachim and Erroll E. Harris observe this point, and they also present Letter 56 as textual 
evidence, but they are confined here to its unknown attributes; they do not apply this to the 
scholium of proposition 13, as I do (H. H. Joachim, Stuqý of Spinoza's Ethics [Oxford, 1901], p. 
39, note 5; Erroll E. Harris, "Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae, " Neue Hefte Fur Philosophie, 
vol. 12 [1977], pp. 17-20). 
87 in Spinoza's mind-body theory, it is certainly possible for us to know of the mind by reliance 
on the body, since the mind and the body are one and the same thing. 
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Further, the object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also changed, and 
vice versa, so that no third thing is necessary here which would produce the 
81 
union of soul and body. 
If we consider this statement with Spinoza's perspective of our provisional 
knowledge, we can confirm the view that the scholium of proposition 13 should be 
understood as indicating not that the physical explanation is, in effect, prior to the 
mental, but that the best way of discovering mental differences is by studying 
physical differences; that is, the body is prior to the mind as far as gaining 
knowledge is concerned. Therefore, Hampshire's argument that if the condition of 
the body is changed, the power of thought is also changed is contrary to Spinoza's 
real position, since for Spinoza the converse must be also true; '9 it follows that for 
Spinoza the relationship between the mind and the body should be described by 
either that "the changes in the mind are dependent on the changes in the body and 
vice versa" or that "the changes in the body come before the changes in the mind in 
our provisional understanding. " The dependence, here, however, is not causal 
" Spinoza, Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Welfare, Part 11, Chapter. Y. X, note c, # 10 in 
Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 136. The final statetnent in 
that note is as follows: 
"But it should be noted that here we are speaking of such Ideas as necessarily arise in God from 
the existence of things, together with their essence, not of those Ideas which things now actually 
present to us* [or] produce in us. Between these two there is a great difference. For in God the 
Ideas arise from the existence and essence [of the things], according to all they are-not, as in us, 
from one or more of the senses (with the result that we are nearly always affected by things only 
imperfectly and that my Idea and yours differ, though one and the same thing produces them in 
US. ). " 
*Curley informs us that the phrase is treated as "things, actually existing, present to us" by the 
Pleiade editors, and as "things, as they now exist, present to us" by Gebhardt (Curley, ibid. ). 
89 1 shall offer Spinoza's other statements on this point: 
"As thought and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the 
modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body" (E, V, 
Prop 1). 
"Therefore, as the order and connection of the ideas in the mind is according to the order and 
connection of the modifications of the body (Prop 18, pt. 2), it follows, vice versa (Prop 2, pt. 3), 
that the order and connection of the modification of the body is according to the order and 
connection in the mind of thoughts and ideas of things" (E, V, Prop 1, Demon). 
62 
dependence but a consequence of the truth of parallelism: that is, given parallelism 
of explanation, to change one order of explanation is to change the other. The 
present point, then, is that given parallelism of explanation and the imperfect state 
of our knowledge of mental explanation, our knowledge of physical explanation 
may give us an entry into mental ones. Hampshire misses or ignores the point that 
this explanatory dependence occurs only in our provisional understanding. 90 Even 
if Spinoza argued that we will -never 
know, this would not be regarded as a 
justification for materialism in so far that this is within our understanding. 
Furthermore, if it is a provisional dependence in our understanding, there is no 
room for us to treat it as an argument for materialism. 91 
Hampshire seems to regard "modified materialism" as an illustration of 
Spinoza's own point of view. However, in my opinion, "modified materialism" can 
only be viewed as a development from Spinoza's miind-body theory, especially 
since in Hampshire's essay he does not give a full range of Spinoza's statements aus 
the reason or ground for his interpretation, Hampshire should have adduced 
Spinoza's statements to support his interpretation and to make his point of view 
clearer, when be advocated his tnodified materialism. However, we can assume 
92 that he relies on the scholium of proposition 13 in part 2. 
90 It might be argued that common sense is closer to Hampshire than Spinoza. However, more 
precisely speaking, I think that common sense of the present day is closer to Hampshire than 
Spinoza. Hampshire says that: "He [Spinoza] is modern, in the smse that he thinks principally L -1 
about the future applications of the physical sciences to the study of personality" ("A Kind of 
Materialism, " p. 210). Blut, we could say that Snipo7a was even more modern than Hampshire 
thinks of him. 
-- in the art-- 
91 In fact, with reference to this issue, Hampshire's position irle, "A Kind of 
Materialism" is different from his position in the book Spinoza. Hampshire (, ýpinoza, p. 68) states 
that "A human mind has greater or less power and perfection in so far as the body, of which it is 
the idea, has greater power and perfection; the converse must also be true" (my italics, ). This is 
different from his later position (in "A Kind of Materialism"). However, I have. argued this issue 
on the basis of his later position. 
92 Curley also interprets Spinoza as a materialist. He states as follows: "Illf we follow out the L-J- ' 
details of Spinoza's treatment of the mind, as it develo-ps in the course of Part 11,1 do not see how 
we can characterize it as anything but a materialistic program. To understand the mind, we must 
understand the body, without which the mind could not function or even exist. In spite of all the 
parallelistic talk, the order of understanding never proceeds from mind to body" (Behind the 
Geometrical Method., A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988], p. 78), and also states that "the existence of the mind is tied, in the most intimate way 
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It is clear that Hampshire's r-n-odified materialism digresses from the double 
aspect theory as well as strict materialism. Hampshire should have made explicit 
the crux or key point as to how the two perspectives, the double aspect theory and 
materialism, are related. 
At this stage, we need to grasp the definition of double aspect theory so as 
to consider its compatibility with materialism. With respect to the definition of the 
double aspect theory, Richard Taylor states as below. 
Still others, finding the same diffficulty in the idea of the body's 
acting upon the mind as in the idea of the mind's acting upon the 
body, have suggested that there is really only one kind of substance, 
and that what we call "mind" and "body" are simply two aspects of 
this. This is called the double aspect theory. 9' 
Within the above definition, I hold the view that the main points are in the terms 
"one kind of substance" and "two aspects of this. " The something (a single 
substance in Spinoza) which underlies the two aspects includes both the immaterial 
process and the material one. Therefore, this thing is regarded as a reality more 
flundamental than the mind and body, and the mind and the body are regarded as 
the aspects of this reality which itself is not solely mental nor solely material but 
both. Modified materialism falls within the realm of the double aspect theory. 
However, modified materiiialism, is really a kind of materialism -and therefore this 
doctrine emphasises materialistic aspects such as the view that the brain is the 
machine for producing thought. Hampshire thinks that physical descriptions are 
more widespread than mental, -and more easily regarded as self-contained. 
Therefore, we can say that he has a "onte-and-a-half aspects theory, " with the 
possible, to the existence of the body' (p. 75). In this way, along with Hampshire, he also relies 
on an asymmetry (in the scholium to proposition 13) between the mind and the body in arguing 
his materialistic interpretation. Hence, Curley's materialistic interpretation is also implausible as 
an interpretation of Spinoza by the same points in the criticism of Hampshire, as I mentioned, 
Baker's epiphenomenalistic interpretation (in the previous section) also relies on an asymmetry in 
this scholium apart from the scholium of proposition 2 in Part 111. Thus, we can clearly confirm 
that epiphenomenalism should be dismissed from interpretations of Spinoza. 
9' Richard Taylor, op. cit., p. 17. 
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mental aspect less prominent. Here, a problem arises, since it is contradictory to 
Spinoza's view of equality between the mind and the body. The first premise in this 
chapter is that the weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore we 
can give greater weight neither to the body nor to the mind. Materialism, even 
Hampshire's modified version, is thus dfflicult to consider as an adequate 
interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
From my point of view, Spinoza tries to keep a clear course between 
materialism and idealism; -and this course 
is posited on a reality comprising an 
order which is both material and mental, both having equal weight. In other words, 
there is only one and the same reality which is both the mind and the body, and this 
reality is a single substance. For Hampshire, the physical aspect is more coherent 
and Riller than the mental; he sees Spinoza as a (non-reductive) materialist. 
Therefore, it is problematic to adopt Hampshire's interpretation as Spinoza's mind- 
body theory. 
For Spinoza, both thought and extension are legitimate, so that we should 
not underestimate or abandon one or the other. Spinozistic identity between the 
mind and the body should be found in that which encompasses both the mental and 
physical; we should say that one thing is describable either as mental or as physical. 
I think that this is what Spinoza means when he says that the mind and the body 
are one and the same thing. Since there is one thing with two Oferent descriptions 
in Spinoza's system and these descriptions do not have Merent power or weight 
but only different functions, Spinoza's theory should be regarded as monism 
without materialism or idealism, This kind of monism belongs to the realm of the 




One of the popular interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body theory is 
parallelism. Parallelism is based on the distinction between the mind and the body 
which results from the distinction between the attributes of thought and extension. 
I shall, in section 1, describe the general outlook of the traditional paraffelistic 
interpretation and compare it with Spinoza's parallelism, in order to show how 
Spinoza's theory differs from the former position. In section 2,1 shall explore 
Bennett's and Della Rocca's more sophisticated arguments in which parallelism 
can seem to entail identity of mind and body. The main issue I shall consider in 
section 3 is the problems of the parallelist interpretation by appeal to the identity of 
the mind and the body. I shall also refer to the problems of "the ideas of the mind" 
with which parallelism is confronted in interpreting the relationship between the 
mind and the body in Spinoza. 
1. Outlook of the Parallefist Interpretation 
(1) Traditional Parallelism and Spinoza's Parallelism 
Writing of parallelism, I Shaffer states: "[T]he mind and the body are too 
utterly different to be able to interact causally with each other. So the parallelist 
holds that the mind and the body are like two clocks, each with its own mechanism 
and with no causal connection between thein, yet always in phase keeping the same 
time. "I Literally, parallelism posits that the mind is parallel with the body because 
they are entirely different in nature and they have their own activities unfolding at 
the same rate. Therefore the basis of parallelism is that the mind is distinct from the 
body. 
At this stage, one may think that it is impossible to regard Spinoza's theory 
as parallelism owing to the fact that for him the mind and the body are identical. 
However, for Spinoza, parallelism ought rather to be argued within an identity 
doctrine. Unlike traditional parallelism, Spinoza's mind-body theory presents the 
1 Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosopkv ofMind (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-11all, 1968), pp. 37-3 8. 
67 
identity of mind and body. Spinoza does not conceive that the mind and the body 
are mysteriously unfolded inducing a parallel process with each other. There exists 
one process alone which appears to be thought (inwardly) and to be extended 
(outwardly). Whereas traditional parallelism argues that the mind and the body are 
parallel because they are entirely different in nature, Spinoza argues that the mind 
and the body are parallel becauve they are identical with each other. Parallelism 
arose from dissatisfaction with Descartes' interactionism. between mind and body, 
and is historically associated with a dualistic position. Thus, it is initially surprising 
that parallelism is argued for within an identity theory, and that it can be used to 
support an identity theory. 
The following problem may arise: parallelism has to be argued for as 
relating to two substances or two orders of events, but if the mind and the body are 
identical then there exists only one thing: how is it possible to argue parallelism 
while arguing an identity theory? It is clear that traditional parallelism needs two 
things or two orders of events. But in Spinoza's realm of thought, it is not 
necessary for parallelism to be argued in two substances or two orders of events. 
Although the mind and the body are one and the same thing, since they have their 
different properties or descriptions we can still argue the parallelistic relationship 
between these two concepts: one thing which is given a mental description and the 
very same thing which is given a physical, More significantly, the mind and the 
body must be identical for a parallel relationship to exist between them. For 
Spinoza's parallelism it is integral that the mind and the body are ontologically 
identical with each other, since their parallelistic relationship is derived from the 
fact that they are identical. 
As it is well known, Descartes' mind-body theory is of a substance dualism, 
which regards the mind and the body as two distinct substances. Descartes explains 
their relationship by interactionism, and by doing so, he tries to argue the union of 
the mind and the body. Owing to the fact that he regards the mind and the body as 
substances, he falls into difficulty in establishing the union of the two. Spinoza 
sees this problem in Descartes' mind-body theory, and establishes the relationship 
between the mind and the body in a different way. 
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Now we can see how Spinoza's parallelism differs from traditional 
parallelism. According to the traditional view, parallelism is basically a dualistic 
position, but in Spinoza's view, it is a monistic position. That is to say, traditional 
parallelism is substance dualism, while Spinoza's parallelism is conceptual or 
property dualism within substance monism. It follows that we ought not to 
consider Spinoza's parallelism in an ontological sense, but in a semantic sense, 
since for Spinoza the relationship between the mind and the body is ontologically 
one and the same and therefore we cannot claim that they are parallel. Spinoza's 
parallelism is derived from one substance and one order of events, so his 
parallelism should be understood in the sense that the mental description of one 
event is parallel to the physical description of the same event. 
(2) The Sources of the Parallelist Interpretation 
Some commentators understand that the relationship between the attributes 
of thought and extension in Spinoza is that they are strictly parallel to each otber. 
Hence, according to them, this implies that the mind and the body which are modes 
under the attributes of thought and extension respectively, are also parallel to each 
other. Joel Friedman describes Spinoza's mind-body theory by saying that 
"whatever happens modally in the physical world must have an exact parallel in the 
mental world, and conversely. 952 That is to say, he apparently takes it that in 
Spinoza's mind-body theory, the mental process is strictly (non-identical but) 
parallel to the physical process. This might suggest that the relationship 
between 
the mental realm and the physical realm in Spinoza's metaphysics is to 
be regarded 
as one of paralleliSM. 3 Now if this parallelism is taken to be an accepted 
fact about 
the world, it seems highly remarkable, a strange coincidence, which would need to 
be explained. 
Fundamentaffy, a paraRelist interpretation relies on Spinoza's assertion that 
there is no causal relationship between the mind and the body while there 
is a 
2 Joel Friedman, "Spinoza's Problem of Other Minds, " Synthese, vol. 56 (1983), p. 
103. 
1 in fact, Friedman is arguing for property parallelism. See below. 
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causal relationship within each of the mental and physical realms. The main theses 
of parallelism are that (1) there is no causal relation between mental events and 
physical events, (2) mental events exist in a causal relation with mental events, and, 
similarly, physical events with other physical events, and (3) there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between mental events and physical events. Spinoza's assertion of 
the causal relationship is compatible with points (1) and (2). Concerning this, 
Spinoza, states that "[t]he body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can 
the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be 
anything else" (E, 111, Prop 2). As to point (3), this interpretation is based on the 
following statements, which are not good sources in my view since the statements 
strongly suggest identity rather than mere parallelism. 
A mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and th., - same 
thing expressed in two different ways. (E, 11, Prop 7, Schol) 
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things. (E, H, Prop 7) 
The mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one 
time under the attribute of thought, and at another Linder that of 
extension. (E, HI, Prop 2. Schol) 
Let us consider the parallelist interpretation in relation to these quotations. 
Regarding the second and third statements, Hubbeling asserts that "This is rooted 
in his doctrine of parallelism. For although thinking does not influence extension 
and vice versa and the body does not influence the soul and vice versa the 
processes in each attribute (mode) run parallel, so that the quantitative magnitudes 
, -)4 
in the attribute of extension have their exact parallels in the attribute of cogitatio. 
This kind of interpretation might be correct if it were argued with the view that 
Spinoza's parallelism is rooted in the doctrine of identity between the mind and the 
body. 
H. G. Hubbefing, Spinoza's Methodology (Assen: van Gorcum, 1964), p. 25. 
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With respect to the first statement, Friedman does precisely this. He claims 
that "Given this passage, I argue that there can be no exceptions whatever to the 
parallelism. For there is only one substance, together with its modifications, each 
expressible in inf. initely many ways, i. e., under ininitely many attributes" (my 
italics). ' Thus the modification of substance, the set of events, which is expressed 
as my body is also expressed as my mind. However, some parallelistic interpreters 
merely ascribe parallelism to Spinoza without explaining the basis of the 
parallelism: identity. Further, they infer parallelism from statements in Spinoza 
which imply identity rather than simply parallelism, like Hubbeling above. We can 
see that the third quotation explicitly asserts "identity" (mind and body as one and 
the same thing) and the first also talks of "one and the same thing. " The second 
quotation is perhaps more ambiguous, but compatible with there being one set of 
events. Furthermore, Spinoza mentions "identity" in many places in Ethics and in 
his other writings. Therefore, it is clear that parallelistic interpreters are confronted 
with strong evidence of Spinoza's belief in identity of mind and body, and they 
should not ignore it. If commentators assert parallelism without considering 
identity of mind and body, their interpretations are not adequate when applied to 
Spinoza's system. However, some commentators, like Friedman, explain the 
parallelism by appeal to identity (one substance doctrine). This seems to me 
correct. 
Traditional parallelism holds the view that the mind and body run parallel 
with one another and never converge nor diverge. However, when we consider 
Spinoza's mind-body theory we should do so along with his ontological theory. 
We should not discuss Spinoza"s mind-body theory without considering 
his whole 
metaphysical system, especially substance monism, and we should strive 
to make 
his mind-body theory compatible with his whole system. 
Ibid 
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2 Identity and the Separation ofAltributes 
There is, however, a problem about asserting identity, raised by Delahunty. 
This is the problem of whether an identity theory is compatible with the strict 
prohibition on causal interactions between the mental and the physical. Delahunty's 
argument, as expressed by Della Rocca, is this: 
(1) There are causal relationships between mental events, as there are also between 
physical events: a mode of thought causes another mode of thought and a 
mode of extension causes another mode of extension. In other words, mental 
"A" can be the cause of mental "B" and bodily "Aý' is the cause of bodily "B. 
(2) According to the identity interpretation, a mental event is identical with a 
physical event. Thus, for example, mental A is identical with physical Aý, and 
mental B with physical B'. 
(3) Hence, it follows that a mental event can be the cause of a bodily event (which 
=a mental event) and a bodily event can be cause of a mental event (which =a 
bodily event). Thus, for example, mental A can cause mental B which is the 
same as physical B: there is the causal interaction between the mind and the 
body. 6 
The above inference owes much to Donald Davidson's argument in Mental Events. 
To comment briefly on the above inference, it is a particular instance of the law of 
identity: i. e. if Fa and a=b, then Fb. ' Here, we can see that the conclusion that 
physical event Aý causes mental event B (= physical event B) is contradictory to 
Spinoza's denial of causal interaction between the mind and the body. Therefore, 
from this perspective, it is difficult to regard the identity interpretation as Spinoza's 
position. 
6 Rý J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 197; Michael Delta 
Rocca, "Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity, " History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 8 
(1991), p. 266. 
7 Let 'T" = "causes c. " 
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Bennett raises a more general objection. ' It is more or less along similar 
lines to Delahunty's; the difference between them is that Bennett argues that the 
relationship between mental and physical is from within the relationship between 
natura naturans and natura naturata, the attributes and their modes, whereas 
Delahunty argues it purely within natura naturata. Bennett's objection is as 
f0flows: 
(1) The mind involves the attribute of thought and the body involves the attribute 
of extension. 
(2) On the identity interpretation, the mind is numerically identical with the body. 
(3) Hence, it follows that the mind involves extension and the body involves 
thought; then therefore every mode involves every attribute. 
In this case, conclusion (3) is incompatible with Spinoza's position that each mode 
involves the concept of its own attribute, but not of another one; that mind cannot 
involve extension and the body cannot involve thought. This argument can be 
expressed formally in the same manner as Delahunty's argument: if a=b and a is F 
(mental, say) then b is F, and there can not be strict separation of mental and 
physical. Again, we can see the problems concerning the identity interpretation and 
its place in Spinoza's theory. 
(1) Bennett and the Separation ofAttributes 
Bennett thinks that mind-body parallelism needs justification. If mental 
events and physical events are distinct and not causally linked, however, what 
keeps them in step? Why assume that mental events and physical events are 
synchronised, unless we can show causal connections between them? If they are 
not kept in step by causality, it seems to be a huge coincidence; it is easier to deny 
the synchrony or to assume that there is causal interaction. However, Bennett 
Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 
14 1, and 'Tight Questions about Spinoza, " in Yirmiyahu Yovel (ed. ), Spinoza on 
Knowledge and 
the Human Mind (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 18; Ntichael Della Rocca, "Causation and 
Spinoza's Claim of Identity, " pp. 269-270 
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thinks that Spinoza's theory offers a better justifleation of parallelism. Let us 
examine the most iirnportant steps in his interpretation. 
There are three theses which Bennett takes as central in Spinoza's theory. 
They are (A) the one-substance doctrine, (B) the mode identity thesis, and (C) 
parallelism. (A) is based on the statement that "substance thinking and substance 
extended are one and the same" (E, 11, Prop 7, Schol). (B) is based on the 
statement, "a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same 
thing" (E, 11, Prop 7, Schol)-which Bennett thinks cannot be taken at face value. 
(C) is based on the statements, The order and connection of ideas is the same as 
the order and connection of things" (E, 11, Prop 7), or "whether we think of 
Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought, ... we 
shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes" 
(E, 11, Prop 7, Schol). 9 
Bennett argues that Spinoza used (A) substance monism and (B) the mind- 
body identity thesis-suitably interpreted-to explain (C) parallelism. In other 
words, for Spinoza, the reason why (C) is true is because (A) and (B) are true. 
Bennett infers this argument from the following passage. 
For example, the circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of 
an existing circle are one and the same thing which is manifested 
through different attributes; and, therefore [ideo], whether we think of 
Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought 
or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the 
same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in 
every case the same sequence of things. (E, H, Prop 7, Schol) 
According to Bennett, the term "ideo "10 suggests that Spinoza is offering an 
explanation of parallelism from the identity thesis (and substance monism), since 
the statement before this term stands for the doctrine of identity, the statement 
9 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, p. 142. 
10 Bennett takes "ideo " as meaning "for that reason" or "on that account" so that his translation 
of it is -that is why" (ibid. ). 
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after this term implies parallelism and this term links the two doctrines, the former 
being the reason for the latter. It seems that Bennett treats paranelism. as being 
derived from identity of mind and body (together with one substance doctrine), and 
thus his interpretation explains the above three doctrines in a reconcilable manner. 
In this context, Bennett is more progressive than some commentators who 
interpret Spinoza's theory as either parallelism or identity theory. In my view, since 
Spinoza claims both identity theory and paraflelisyn, we should interpret Spinoza's 
mind-body theory as retaining both doctrines rather than as dropping one or the 
other. Bennett seems to interpret Spinoza as retaining both doctrines and also 
argues that one substance doctrine is related to mind-body theory as Spinoza 
argues. But Bennett finds this defence of paraflelism. implausible and (B) the mind- 
body identity above incredible, taken at face value, and thinks it needs a better 
justification. Bennett in effect rejects the mind-brain identity doctrine and claims a 
partial qualitative identity. He rejects numerical identity of mind and body in 
Spinoza, on the grounds that such an identity would threaten the separation of 
attributes: I submit that that is Spinoza's doctrine: his thesis about the identity of 
physical and mental particulars is really about the identity of properties. He 
[Spinoza] cannot be saying that physical P, = mental Mi; that is impossible because 
they belong to different attributes. "' 1 
Bennett hopes to provide a better justification for identity and parallelism 
by introducing the term "trans-attribute differentiae" which are the most 
fundamental modes. Now, I shall describe Bennett's interpretation, as I understand 
it. 12 
(1) The most basic properties of the one substance are not attributes 
but the trans- 
attribute modes, since the attributes do not constitute the essence of substance 
but merely express it. 
(2) Trans-attribute modes are combined with the attributes. Consequently there are 
two kinds of modes, i. e. trans-attribute modes and attribute-confined modes. 
11 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, p. 14 1. 
12 See ibid., pp. 143-15 1. 
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(3) The former are modes which are not modes of extension, of thought or of any 
other attribute; that is to say, trans-attribute modes are combinable with the 
attribute of extension and are also combinable with the attribute of thought. 
(4) Therefore, according to Bennett, if a trans-attribute mode, F, combines with 
extension, it becomes "extension and P: a mode combined with the attribute 
of extension. And if a trans-attribute mode, F, combines with thought, it 
becomes "thought and P: a mode combined with the attribute of thought. 
(5) Consequently, the mind is "thought and P and the body is "extension and F. " 
Mode-identity turns out to concern identity of properties. " Here, it comes out 
that F not only explains the identity of the mind and body but also gives the 
reason why attribute-confined modes i. e. "thought and F" (mind) and 
"extension and P(body) are parallel to each other. There is a common 
property possessed by the underlying reality, substance, which keeps them in 
step. 
(6) It is impossible for any mind, however powerful, to have the concept of F, a 
trans-attribute mode, in abstraction from thought or extension or any other 
attribute. No-one can grasp or conceive the trans-attributive differentiae. 
In this way, Bennett considers parallelism, in terms of modes confined within 
attributes, whereas he considers the explanation of the parallelism of the mind and 
body to lie in the trans-attribute modes. As to the problem of the attributes and 
parallelism, he resolves it by treating trans-attribute modes (rather than the 
attributes) as the basic properties of substance, due to his view that the distinct 
attributes do not constitute the essence of substance but fix and express it. He says, 
"I say that Nature really has extension and thought, which really are distinct from 
one another, but that they are not really fundamental properties, although they 
must be perceived as such by any intellect. " He offers an analogy. A circle is a 
figure whose points all lie equidistant ftom a central point (property F) in two 
dimensions. A sphere is the same property F in three dimensions. The different 
dimensions constitute the different attributes; the common F the trans-attribute 
mode. (In the analogy, but not in reality, F is knowable). 
13 Ibid., p. 14 1. 
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For Spinoza, each mode must be, as we have seen, conceived through each 
attribute, so how can there exist such a trans-attribute mode? Bennett was aware 
of this problen-4 but he argues that if we ascribe this concept to Spinoza, we can 
get an advantage, that is, we are able to remove conflict between identity between 
the mind and the body and the separation of the attributes. 
However, even though we ascribe the concept of trans-attribute mode to 
Spinoza, this cannot justify Spinoza's claim of identity: since no one can grasp the 
trans-attribute modes, there is no possible concept of any such mode, and so they 
cannot mediate a connection between mind and body. Therefore, it seems that 
Bennett's interpretation can explain Spinoza's argument that the mental and the 
physical modes are one and the same thing, but only by appeal to unknowables. 
That is to say, since no one can have the concept of F, F cannot be applied to 
(mental) a and (physical) b where a=b. 
Even if the mental and the physical are involved with the same trans- 
attribute mode,, they cannot be numerically identical (one and the same thing) 
through the trans-attribute mode, since neither the mental nor the physical is 
identical to the trans-attribute mode. At best, as Delia Rocca points out, this offers 
only a partial identity between the mind and the body. 14 Bennett takes the mind and 
the body to be attribute-confined modes and thus the mind is "thought and P and 
the body is "extension and F. " This does not give sufficient reason for their 
identity. The mental and the physical are still different kinds of attribute-confined 
mode, even if not fundamental properties. The fact that they have 'T" in common 
does not lead to their identity but only to their partial identity. 
One may argue, in favour of Bennett, that the common properties are not 
so much meant to secure identity between the mental and the physical properties as 
to keep them in step with each other and that the mental and the physical 
properties do not have to be numerically identical in property parallelism (which 
requires one thing or one event with two sorts of properties, m-properties and p- 
properties). But, this is not Bennett's case: he does not argue for identity between 
14 Delia Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 160. 
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the mental and the physical events. Bennett regards modes as Properties of 
substance. Since Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are modes and that 
they are identical (Bennett accepts this), we have to explain identity in sucb a way 
that these two modes are identical. Now for Bennett's Spinoza, modes are 
properties. If, as Bennett claims, the mental properties and the physical properties 
(the mind and the body) are not identical, then Spinoza's argument that the mental 
and the physical modes are identical to each other cannot be justified by Bennett's 
interpretation. 
Bennett's perspective is criticised by many commentators as being alien to 
Spinoza's thinking. For example, according to Edwin Curly, "I find his [Bennett's] 
explanation of the mind-body identity extremely implausible, "" and he goes on to 
say that "Bennett thinks he can explain why Spinoza affirms this identity, but I find 
his explanation (§§ 34-36) incredible. I cannot see Spinoza granting the existence 
of trans-attribute differentiae which cannot be grasped by any inteRect"--even 
God. 16 Even if Bennett's concept of trans-attribute differentiae were compatible 
with Spinoza's position, this would not explain Spinoza's argument that the mental 
and the physical modes are one and the same, but would only explain a partial 
identity, as we have just seen. 
Bennett's interpretation, that of a partial identity of properties, has another 
problem. Although Bennett's alternative identity of mind and body can explain the 
three doctrines (one substance doctrine, identity of mind and body, and parallelism) 
in a reconcilable manner, I do not think that it can be taken as Spinoza's real 
intention. Bennett's account of such an identity is textually problematic. To 
establish his interpretation of identity, Bennett asserts that for Spinoza mind-body 
identity is not inferred from one-substance doctrine by treating the Latin word sic 
as not "therefore" or "thus" but as "likewise. " Let us consider the relevant passage. 
[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same 
substance,, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now 
15 E. M. Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 158, note 38. 
16 Ibid., p. 156, note 26. 
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under that. Sic [ThuslLikewise], also, a mode of extension and the idea 
of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different 
ways. (E, H, Prop 7, Schol) 
Since Bennett translates sic as "likewise, " he takes the above passage not as 
inferential but as comparative. This allows him to argue that Spinoza's claim of 
identity of mind and body is not the claim of a numerical identity but that of a 
partial qualitative identity. 
However, even if Bennett is right in reinterpreting "sic" as "likewise, " there 
is an obstacle to Bennett's interpretation of a partial qualitative identity. That is, 
Bennett's interpretation cannot justify Spinoza's usage of the tenns "one and the 
same" and "thing" in the above passage. He may treat the term "thing" not as 
meaning "particular" but as an otiose word. But, Spinoza later informs us that the 
term "thing" in this context means "particular. " Spinoza writes: "[T]he mind and 
the body, are one and the same individuaP' (E, 11, Prop 21, Schol; my italics). 
Secondly, Bennett's partial qualitative identity is not enough to justify the term 
44one and the same. " And thirdly, on Bennett's reading, Spinoza's comparison 
between substance identity and mode identity as similarly seems strained because 
the two cases are very different. So, Bennett would have to argue that Spinoza 
expresses himself very badly concerning the terms "one and the same" and "thing. " 
But I would rather say that Bennett digresses from the text in order to make sense 
of Spinoza. It is implausible to argue that Spinoza expresses himself badly to such 
an extent. 
According to Bennett, instead of his partial qualitative identity, we might 
treat the above passage as follows: "[WIhen he [Spinoza] said that my mind and 
my body are one and the same thing he had forgotten that my mind and my 
body 
are modes, iý17 and Bennett rejects this assumption saying that 
it should not be 
entertained "unless we run into disaster by interpreting the texts, as 
I am doing, in 
a less intrusive and more accepting manner. "" But, Bennett's 
interpretation has the 
same problem. Since Bennett regards modes as properties, 
he would have to 
17 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, p. 14 1. 
18 Ibid. 
79 
suppose that when Spinoza said that my mind and my body are one and the same 
thing he had forgotten that they are only partially identical and that modes are only 
properties; this is why Spinoza says the mind and the body are one and the same 
thing. This is an implausible position. 
The reason that Bennett interprets Spinoza's identity of mind and body as a 
partial qualitative identity is to save Spinoza from the threat of collapse of attribute 
dualism. However, there is no reason to suppose that Spinoza saw any such threat. 
Although his interpretation can hold a kind of identity without collapsing the 
separation of the attributes, it has costs: Spinoza's claim that the mode of 
extension and the idea of that mode are the same becomes difficult to interpret and 
justify. To say mode identity is property identity makes Spinoza's mind-body 
theory worse, not better, from Bennett's point of view. One way of maintaining 
identity could be to argue that thought and extension are not really distinct, but just 
mistakenly different ways of seeing the one F. This is what Wolfson thought, but 
Bennett specifically rejects this, and insists on the reality of the attributes. Bennett 
argues that mind and body must be kept causally distinct because causation implies 
an intellectual grasp of a connection. 19 
As we shall see at some length later, if we regard modes as things or events 
rather than properties, we are able to explain Spinoza's argument that the mental 
and the physical modes are one and the same without collapsing the separation of 
the attributes. In that case, event-identity covers the fact that the mental and the 
physical modes are identical, and properties do not have to be identical: properties 
should not be identical, as the attributes are really distinct. This gives a version of 
the double aspect theory in a sense of token identity theory, as we shall see in 
chapter flive. 
(2) Delia Rocca on Identity and Parallelism 
There is another account which attempts to explain Spinoza's concept of 
identity through his parallelism and the separation of attributes. Nfichael Della 
19 Ibid., p. 145. 
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Rocca has recently claimed that Spinoza's denial of the transparency of causal 
context provides support for the identity interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body 
theory. On the basis of this argument, he attempts to find this identity in the 
concept of a neutral property based on Spinoza's argument of parallelism; he labels 
this identity "trans-attribute mode identity. " Della Rocca's concept of neutral 
property has basically a similar format to Bennett's trans-attribute modes. 
However, in my view, unlike Bennett's trans-attribute modes, Dena Rocca's 
"neutral properties" point to a better case for making the mind and the body 
identical, Let us consider how he holds the concept of a neutral property and 
formulates trans-attribute identity between the mind and the body; by doing so, we 
can determine whether or not his arguments would be acceptable to Spinoza. 
a. Referential Opacity 
As we have seen, objections have been raised to the identity interpretation 
of Spinoza's mind-body theory. The objections assert that this interpretation is 
incompatible with his belief in a non-causal relationship between the mind and the 
body. If so, and given the firmness of Spinoza's rejection of mind-body causation, 
it seems scarcely possible to hold the identity interpretation as presented by 
Spinoza. However, Della Rocca claims that the above problem can be solved. 
Let us, firstly, consider Delahunty's argument (given on p. 72) and Della 
Rocca's suggested solution. A shared basic premise is that it is clear that Spinoza 
denies causal interaction between the mind and the body (and, more generally, 
between thought and extension). But, according to Delahunty, we cannot hold the 
identity interpretation because it turns out that this interpretation is incompatible 
with the denial of mind-body causation. However, Della Rocca attempts to solve 
this obstacle to the identity interpretation. His argument relies on the concept of 
"referential opacity" which we must now explain. 
We can characterise referential transparency by saying that F is transparent 
if, if Fa and a=b then Fb. Thus "is red-headed" is transparent, as are most 
predicates. On the other band some predicates, sucb as "is 
believed by Tom to be 
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red-headed" are not transparent, but opaque. The above inference does not carry 
through in such cases. For example, if Nigel is believed by Tom to be redheaded 
and Nigel is Mary's bother, then it does not follow that Torn believes Mary's 
bother is red-headed: Tom might not realise that Nigel is Mary's brother. Since 
Delahunty's objection to identity theory is posited on the basis that causal contexts 
are referentially transparent, it follows that if there is no referential transparency in 
Spinoza's causal contexts then Delahunty's objection to the identity interpretation 
can be dismissed, and then the view that identity holds between the mind and the 
body is still available . 
20 Let us consider Della Rocca's arguments concerning 
Spinoza's denial of referential transparency. 
With respect to causation, substance as thinking causes mode of thought x, 
while substance as extended cannot cause mode of thought x, even if the thinking 
substance is identical with extended substance. Likewise, regarding transitive 
causation, extended mode x causes extended mode y, while thinking mode w 
cannot cause extended mode y, even if thinking mode w is identical with extended 
mode x. From these explanations, Della Rocca draws the conclusion that Spinoza 
denies referential transparency in a causal context, so that we can resolve 
Delahunty's objection. Thus, the numerical identity interpretation is, he argues, still 
acceptable within Spinoza's theory. 21 Della Rocca says that from the separation of 
causal relations and explanatory relations, we could say that Spinoza does not deny 
causation, but he denies there are explanations between the mind and the body: 
"The idea would be that a mode considered as physical must be explained only in 
terms of other modes considered as physical, whereas that same mode considered 
as mental must be explained only in terms of other modes considered as mental. 
According to this view, then, explanatory contexts are opaque, but causal contexts 
are not. For this reason, on this view the explanatory separation of the mental and 
the physical does not by itself commit one to the denial of causal 
interaction 
20 Della Rocca mentions another option to deal with Delahunty's objection. 
We can treat 
Delahunty's objection as recognising inconsistency in Spinoza; for example, 
"Spinoza did not 
realise that there is such a conflict. " However, Della Rocca 
does not accept this option (Della 
Rocca, "Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity, " pp. 266-267). 
21 Ibid., pp. 268-269. 
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between the mental and the physical; even if there are no explanatory relations 
between the mental and the physical, there can still be causal relations. "" But Della 
Rocca argues that this is not acceptable to Spinoza, because Spinoza did not 
distinguish between these two relations. 
Della Rocca turns to Bennett's argument (given on p. 73) and offers a 
rebuttal of Bennett's objection to the numerical identity interpretation. It is also 
made on the basis of the concept of "referential opacity. " Beforehand, Dena Rocca 
needs to develop one more aspect in relation to Bennett's use of the term "involve" 
in step (1) of his argument (on p. 73): "[T]he mind involves the attribute of 
thought and the body involves the attribute of extension. " Dena Rocca points out 
that for Spinoza, with respect to attributes, "the notions of x involving the concept 
of y" is equated to "x being conceived through y"; for example, saying that the 
body (or the substance) involves the attribute of extension is the same as saying 
that the body (or the substance) is conceived through extension. 23 Then, Della 
Rocca regards the term "x is conceived through y" as implying causation by 
attributing the proposition "x is conceived through y only if x is caused by Y" to 
Spinoza; i. e. "only if x must be conceived through y, does y cause x. " 
Subsequently, the argument of the denial of referential transparency of causal 
context can also be used in Bennett's objection; in other words, the opacity of 
causal context is also available regarding Bennett's objection. Speaking in detail, to 
rebut Bennett's objection, we have to show that the context "x is caused by y" like 
the context "x is conceived through y" is opaque. As Dena Rocca argues, given 
that the context "x is caused by y" is opaque, and given that the proposition "x is 
conceived through y only if x is caused by y" is true, it follows that the context "x 
22 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, P. 124. 
21 This proposition is inferred from the following statement of Spinoza's: 
"Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through 
one another be mutually understood, that is to say., the concept of the one 
does not involve 
the concept of the other" (E, 1, Ax 5). 
"Each attribute is conceived by itself and without any other (Prop 10, pt. 
1). Therefore the 
modes of any attribute involve the conception of that attribute and of no other, 
and 
therefore (Ax 4, pt. 1) have God for a cause in so far as He is considered under 
that 
attribute of which they are modes, and not so far as He 
is considered under any other 
attribute" (E, 11, Prop 6, Demon). 
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is conceived through y" is also opaque; the opacity of the causal context is 
transmitted to the opacity of the other context if the latter entails the former. 24 
Thus, events are conceived as thought or conceived as extension. Although they 
are the same events, they are not conceived as being the same. This fact underlies 
DeRa Rocca's attempt to defend the numerical identity interpretation from 
Bennett's objection. 25 
In this way, against Delahunty's and Bennett's objections, Della Rocca 
holds that the identity between the mind and the body is compatible with the 
separation of attributes if we do not attribute referential transparency in a causal 
context to Spinoza; he plausibly argues that Spinoza denies referential transparency 
in a causal context; so that we can resolve Delahunty and Bennett's objections. On 
the basis of the argument of opacity, Della Rocca further unfolds his arguments 
concerning numerical identity in Spinoza's theory. 
b. Neutral Properties 
On the grounds of referential opacity, Della Rocca divides properties into 
intensional properties and extensional properties. The former are properties which 
have opacity in attribute context, and the latter are all other properties which have 
transparency. Being thinking and being extended are opaque (intensional): even 
though the thinking substance = the extended substance, it does not follow that 
being thinking = being extended. He tries to ground the mind-body identity in the 
24 Della Rocca makes this more formally, and he calls it "the Opacity Transmission Principle": 
if 
(i) for any term "t, " "F(t)" entails "G(t)" 
(ii) there are possible situations in which G(t), t= t*, and -G(t*), and 
(iii) in at least some of those situations F(t), 
then 
there are possible situations in which F(t), t= t*, and -F(t*) 
From this, we can confirm that the context "t is conceived through extension (thought)" and the 
context "t is extended (thinking)" are opaque, since for Spinoza those contexts entail 
"t is caused 
by the extended substance (the thinking substance)" and in at least some situations t 
is conceived 
through extension (thought) or t is extended (thinking)"; the entailment of causal context 
is found 
in E, 11, Prop 6, and its demonstration. 
25 Della Rocca, "Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity, " pp. 270-271. 
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transparent properties. To support this, be applies Leibniz's principles: one 
principle is "if a=b, then they have all their (transparent) properties in common, " 
and the other converse principle is "a =b if a and b have al-I their (transparent) 
properties in common. 9926 
What are the transparent properties for Spinoza? They must be, first of A, 
neutral, which does not presuppose either being thinking or being extended. We 
can discover, according to Della Rocca, what these properties are and why the 
mind and the body share them in ten-ns of Spinoza's paraffelistic argument, which is 
"the order of connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" 
(E, 11, Prop 7). Further we can derive neutral properties from the fact that the 
order and connection in the two series are the same. It seems to me that he regards 
the neutral properties as something which suffices to make these orders the same; 
one example of the neutral feature is "having five immediate effects. " It follows 
that if the mind and the body, which are the parallel counterparts of each other, 
have the same order and connection, the mind and the body share an the neutral 
properties. The parallelism of the modes reflects the sameness of order and 
connection, the neutral properties, which are shared by the parallel modes. 
Therefore, he argues that we can infer mind-body identity in terms of his Leibnizian 
principle that, if all (transparent) properties are the same, then a=b. In this way, 
Della Rocca finds the identity thesis in Spinoza's parallelism; Della Rocca states 
that "[Spinoza] would have to see the sharing of these neutral properties as a 
sufficient basis for determining that these modes are identical. "2' He calls this 
trans-attribute mode identity. To sum up the argument of this identity: 
(1) There are the neutral properties F by virtue of the sameness of the order and 
connection of parallel modes. 
(2) The mind and the body share F, so that F is seen in two different ways (haNe 
different opaque properties) 
26 Della Rocca, "'Spinoza's Argument for the Identity Theory, " Philosophical Review, vol. 102 
, pp. 
195-196. (1993), 
27 Jbid, p. 207. 
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(3) It follows that the mind presents F taken as tbinking, and the body presents IF 
taken as extended. 
28 
(4) Therefore, the mind is identical with the body, but seeing something as mind is 
distinct from seeing it as body. 
Della Rocca also mentions another neutral property, which is, the property 
of "being a complex individual. " Owing to the fact that certain modes unite into a 
single individual in both mental and physical realms, mind and body share these 
neutral properties. This fact is also, according to Della Rocca, based on parallelism, 
for example, if the human body is composed of several parts, then the idea of that 
body is composed of these several ideas of the parts (E, 11 Prop 15, Demon). 
3. The Problems of Identity in Parallelism 
(1) Trans-Attribute Modes and Neutral Properties 
Apart from Bennett's and DeRa Rocca's arguments on paral-lelism, I shall 
consider whether Bennett's concept of trans-attribute modes and Della Rocca's 
concept of neutral property are compatible with Spinoza's doctrine of identity 
between the mind and the body. Bennett's and Della Rocca's position is that we 
can better explain Spinoza's doctrine in terms of the concept of trans-attribute 
modes and the concept of neutral property, even though Spinoza did not mention 
28 Since it is not clear for Della Rocca whether all properties are neutral or not, his position might 
be that there are specific mental and physical properties, as well as neutral ones. This depends on 
whether the intensional properties are real or unreal; if it is the former, there are distinct 
intensional properties. However, an overall picture of his argument is that intensional properties 
are not real enough since those properties are the properties when neutral properties are seen in 
the mental way and in the physical way. Thus, there is identity between the mental and the 
physical properties and there is also identity between the mental and the physical events. I shall 
consider the problem of his concept of intensional properties in chapter five. In this chapter, I 
deal with his argument on the basis of the view that intensional properties are unreal and thus 
that there are not specific intensional (mental and physical) properties. 
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those concepts. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the features of their 
concepts, as Della Rocca himself points out: 
Although there are no trans-attribute modes on the numerical identity 
interpretation, there are ways of describing modes in neutral terms, that is, 
terms that do not presuppose any particular attributes. ... But the 
possibility of such descriptions does not make the modes trans-attribut[ive] 
in the sense that they would be neither modes of extension nor modes of 
thought. On the numerical identity interpretation, the same mode that is 
neutrally specifiable is identical with a mode of thought as well as identical 
with a mode of extension. 29 
The difference is that Bennett thinks that trans-attribute modes have to exist 
separately from the mental and the physical in order to make the mind and the body 
parallel, whereas Della Rocca thinks that this kind of mode does not exist. I think 
that my earlier statements in the discussion of Bennett and Dena Rocca give help 
on this point: for Bennett, the mind is "thought and P and the body is "extension 
and F, " whereas for Della Rocca, the mind presents F taken as thinking, and the 
body presents F taken as extended. For Bennett, there exist the trans-attribute 
modes which cannot be spoken of But for Della Rocca, there exist only the neutral 
properties (those which are notspecifically thought or extension). 
Both Bennett and Della Rocca are trying to see how Spinoza could both 
accept mind/body identity and also treat mind and body as both causally and 
conceptually separate. They are trying to explain how given identity, we can keep 
the attributes as distinct as Spinoza wants; that is, bow we guarantee that 
parallelism holds without the collapse of the attributes, as identity threatens to do. 
Spinoza may not have even seen the problem, so we have to guess how he would 
have handled it or even could have handled it, ( if be was not just inconsistent). 
Although, both their attempts to get Spinoza out of trouble are ingenious and 
worthwhile, I think that Della Rocca's argument is more compatible with Spinoza 
in arguing that trans-attribute modes do not exist and that there is not a partial 
29 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 159. 
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identity but a numerical identity between the mental and the physical modes 
(things). However, I do not think such a compatibility leads to an accurate 
interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine. The problem arises from the fact that he 
attempts to infer identity from parallelism. 
(2) The Relationship between Identity Theory and Parallelism 
Della Rocca holds that Spinoza is committed to identity. For Della Rocca's 
Spinoza, (1) parallelism entails "sharing the neutral properties" and (2) "sharing the 
neutral properties" entails the identity theory. Here are Della Rocca's statements 
concerning these: (1) "Spinoza explicitly claiirns that parallelism guarantees that 
modes of extension and modes of thought, share a wide range of neutral 
properties. ýý30 (2) 'Tor this sharing of all neutral properties to guarantee that 
parallel modes are identical, we need to show that the, neutral properties 
encompass all the extensional properties. , 31 Consequently, he says that "[flor 
Spinoza to treat parallelism as entailing the identity thesis, he would have to see the 
sharing of these neutral properties as a sufficient basis for determining that these 
*de 'cal. iý32 Della Rocca states: modes ar %W-ý a are J. nt-i- 
But parallelism goes well beyond such a claim [one-to-one 
correspondence]. For Spinoza, the fact that the order and connection 
within the two series is the same entails that certain neutral 
properties are shared by parallel modes. " (my italics) 
In this way, Defla Rocca argues that. Spinoza would have to accept- that parallelism 
inn-plies the identity theory (given Leibniizz's law), One of DelLa Rocca's aims in his 
article is to show that we can argue the identity between the mind and the body in 
30 Ibid., p. 199. Della Rocca also writes that "All of these neutral features are, by virtue of 
parallelism, shared by each mode and its parallel counterpart" (ibid., p. 198). 
31 Ibid., p. 203. 
32 Ibid., p. 207. 
33 Della Rocca, "Spinoza's Argument for the Identity Theory, " p. 198. 
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Spinoza's theory without relying on his one substance doctrine. Thus for Della 
Rocca, Spinoza would have to see in parallelism the implication of identity. 
Parallelism can-not be the reason for identity, since the sameness of the 
order and connection in two series, the sharing of the neutral properties does not 
guarantee identity. Suppose there are two clocks which indicate the same time, at 
every moment, the order of connections within clock A being the same as the order 
of connections within clock B. However, this sameness of order and connection 
does not imply the identity of clocks A and B, but only offers the fact that the two 
orders are parallel to each other and A and B have a one-to-one correspondent 
relationship. It might be objected that Spinoza's doctrine is not the case of two 
clocks, but one, clock, so that the case of two clocks ought to be ruled out. 
However, when one infers identity from parallelism, one can-not presuppose that 
there is one clock. Since the conclusion one wants to prove is the. existence of one 
clock (identity), one cannot presuppose this fact as the premise of the inference 
without circularity. 
Della Rocca gives us two examples of the neutral properties, which are, 
"having five immediate effects" and "being a complex individual. " Without 
parallelism those properties cannot be shared by the mind and the body, since they 
are derived -from the sameness of the order and connection. 
However, even if the, 
neutral properties are such as are mentioned above, I do not think that they can 
provide identity; they are --merely a repetition of parallelism- Even if the sameness of 
the order and connection in two series provides the fact that two modes share all 
the -neutral properties, 
this does not provide identity, but only indicates that the 
order and connection in two series are parallel and that they correspond to each 
other. it does not follow that. there is one order of events. DeLla Rocca argues thaA 
Spinoza regards the sameness of order and connection between the mental and the 
physical as providing a sUfficient ground for the claim of identity, and that this is 
why parallelism guarantees the argument of identity. But, the sameness of order 
and connection only provide a sufficient ground for parallelism, and identity 
theory makes parallelism necessary, since the sameness of order and connection is 
inferred from the fact that the mental and the physical events are one and the. same 
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thing and that the mental and the physical properties express the so-me essence of a 
thing (the essence of the same thing) in an orderly way. 
Considering this explanation and the clock analogy above, it is evident that 
we cannot infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism without presupposing identity, 
whereas we can infer parallelism from identity without presupposing parallelism. 
The reason why we can infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism (property 
parallelism) is because -his parallelism is derived from his identity theory i. e. 
because identity is already presupposed in his parallelism. We cannot infer identity 
theory from parafleffism in Spinoza without circularity; for Spinoza, identity theory 
is prior to parallelism since parallelism is the coin-sequence of identity theory. It 
follows that we can-not explain Spinoza's mind-body identity without relying on his 
one substance doctrine. The claim that we can infer identity from- parallelism still 
looks suspect, unless we can see how Spinoza might have inferred identity from 
parallelism. 
One. 
-may argue that we can 
infer identity from paraflelism, so long as the 
identity of indiscernibles holds. And, as Della Rocca argues, 34 Spinoza seems to 
say that where there are two things there must be a difference in quality between 
these two things: the identity of indiscernibles. Thus, if the only real qualities are 
the neutral ones, then identity follows from conceptual parallelism. Hence, we can 
infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism in conjunction with the identity of 
indiscernibles, whereas we cannot do this from traditional parallelism alone. This is 
why Della Rocca argues that identity follows -from conceptual parallelism. 
However, even if by assuming the identity of indiscer-nibies Della Rocca can. 
go from parallelism- to identity, for Della -Rocca's 
Spinoza-, we can also go ftom 
identity to parallelism: the inference between them is reciprocal. Della Rocca 
complements his argument in his book Representation and the Mind-Body 
Problem in Spinoza a few years later. He alleges, in his book, that Spinoza also 
infers parallelism from identity, so that for Della- Rocca's Spinoza, the inference 
between identity theory and parallelism is reciprocal. This reciprocity is dependent 
upon the equivalence between parallelism and identity. Della Rocca writes: 
"Here 
34 Ibid., pp. 194-207. 
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Spinoza seems to regard the thesis of parallelism as equivalent to the claim of 
identity of modes across attributes. ýý35 Thus he argues that "[s]o the equivalence 
between parallelism and mode identity puts Spinoza in a position to infer 
parallelism from mode identity and to infer mode identity from paraRelisM. "36 
Be this as it may, some passages strongly suggest that the inference goes 
from identity to parallelism: 
[T]he mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one 
time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of 
extension. For this reason, the order or con-catenation of things is one, 
whet-her Nature be conceived under this or under that attribute, and 
consequently the order of the state of activity and passivity of our body 
is coincident in Nature with the order of the state of activity and 
passivity of the mind. (E, HI, Prop 2, Schol; my italics) 
The passage supports identity as prior to parallelism. We should pay attention to 
the fact that Spinoza begins with identity and derives one order and concatenation 
of things -from 
it, and also to his use of the term "consequently": the fact that the 
order of the body is parallel to the order of the mind is consequent upon the 
identity (one order of things). Thus, we can see that for Spinoza, the doctrine of 
identity is more fundamental than parallelism, and that Spinoza's mind-body theory 
35 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 13 8. The source of this 
equivalence is the following statement of Spinoza: "[W]hether we conceive nature under the 
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of Thought. or under any other attribute, we shall 
find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i. e. [hoc est], that the 
same things follow one another" (E, 11, Prop 7, Schol). * Della Rocca's argument that the 
inference between identity and parallelism is reciprocal relies on the term hoc est. The inference 
from the same order to the same things ordered looks a bit quick. 
* This passage is quoted from Edwin Curley for the sake of clarity (The Collected Works of 
Spinoza, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 451). James Gutmann's translation is 
as follows: "... that is to say [hoc est], in every case the same sequence of things. 
" 
36 Ibid., p. 139. He also states: "The argument contends that, given other aspects of 
Spinoza's 
system, the fact that parallelism holds entails that the idea of a given mode of extension 
is 
identical with that mode of extension. And, of course, this entailment works in the other 
direction 




should be treated as an identity theory which leads to parallelism. Despite Della 
Rocca's excellent arguments, his attempt to derive identity from parallelism rests 
ultimately on the identity of indiscernibles, which is somewhat controversial. In 
fact, Della Rocca does not have to derive identity from parallelism, if the aim. is to 
rescue Spinoza. Tt is enough if he can show that Spinoza could consistently hold 
both identity of mind and body and the separation of attributes. That was the 
original objective of Della Rocca's argument. Della Rocca's attempt to show that 
we can explain Spinoza's mind-body identity without relying on his one-substance 
doctrine is unnecessary. 
There is another problem for Della Rocca concerning the argument of 
identity. For Della Rocca, since intensional properties are irrelevant in deciding 
identity, only extensional (neutral) properties are relevant to the issue of identity. 
As long as both the mind and the body have these extensional properties, the mind 
is identical with the body. Della Rocca argues that parallelism provides the fact that 
the mind and the body share these neutral properties, since the sameness of the 
order and connection within the two series entails that the neutral properties are 
shared by both the mind and the body. However, although it is true that both the 
mind and the body have the neutral properties by virtue of parallelism, in order to 
discover this fact we have to rest upon intensional properties, because the mental 
and the physical properties are intensional properties and they are our only access 
to neutral properties; we can only see neutral properties through intensional 
properties. Hence, we need to depend on intensional properties in deciding identity 
between the mind and the body. But, according to Della Rocca, intensional 
properties are irrelevant in deciding this issue. 
To sum up: in principle, the issue of identity between A and 13 should 
be 
determined by neutral (extensional) properties; they are only relevant 
in 
dete ii identity. To discover whether a neutral property, say, "having five rMMMg 
effects" is a property of A and B both have, we need to rest that 
A has, say, five 
mental effects and B also have five physical effects. But 
"having mental effects" 
and "having physical effects" are intensional and they are 
irrelevant to identity of A 
and B. In this way, for Della Rocca, without intensional properties we cannot 
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discover that neutral properties are shared by the mind and the body; but this is 
incompatible with the argument that intensional properties are irrelevant in 
determining identity. 
(3) Della Rocca and the Asymmetry in the Scholium of Proposition 
Thirteen 
It is clear that Spinoza holds both the identity doctrine and parallelism, and 
that parallelism of the mind and the body is derivable from his doctrine of identity. 
However, there is a problem with Della Rocca's account of the relationship 
between the mind and the body: that is, his treatment of the asymmetry which 
appears in the scholium of proposition 13 in Part 11. 
Della Rocca argues that according to parallelisný not only the fact that 
body has a certain degree of reality entails that mind has the same degree of reality, 
but also vice versa, and he treats this entailment as representing the structural 
similarity between the mind and the body. Thus, for Delia Rocca, this entailment 
which is one of the features in parallelism does not conflict with Spinoza's claim of 
the explanatory barrier. 37 
Next, Della Rocca considers the relationship between the mind and the 
body in the scholium. of proposition 13, and he admits an asymmetry as Barker, 
Hampshire, and Curley did (see earlier discussion in chapter two, sections 3 and 4). 
Nevertheless, he argues that it does not violate the explanatory barrier between the 
mind and the body in the following way: we can still hold Spinoza's clairn that the 
mind must be explained only by mental terms and the body must be explained only 
by physical terms in spite of the asymmetry that "our ability to assign a certain 
degree of reality to the mind is somehow posterior to our ability to assign that 
degree of reality to the body"; this asymmetry is compatible with Spinoza's claim. 
of explanatory barrier. " 
" Ibid., p. 20. 
38 lbid., p. 2 1. 
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Della Rocca may be right in maintaining both that the entailment does not 
conflict with the explanatory barrier and that the asymmetry does not damage the 
explanatory barrier. However, I think that his treatment of this asymmetry does not 
solve the problem; that it conflicts with parallelism. Although there is no conflict 
between the entailment and the explanatory barrier nor between the asymmetry and 
the explanatory barrier, there is a conflict between the symmetry of the entailment 
in parallelism and the asymmetry in the scholium of proposition 13. Della Rocca 
seems to be aware of the latter problem. He says, "by virtue of parallelism, we can 
also say that the fact that a mode of thought has a certain degree of reality entails 
that the parallel mode of extension has the same degree of reality. , 39But, Dena 
Rocca admits that this is not possible according to the scholium of proposition 13: 
"However, what Spinoza says in 2pl3s does point to some kind of asymmetry 
between modes of thought and modes of extension. 900 He goes on to say, 
"[a]lthough Spinoza says here that in order for us to assign a certain degree of 
reality to the mind, we must know the degree of reality of the body, it does not 
seem that he would also say that in order for us to come to know the degree of 
reality of the body, we must know the degree of reality of the mind. Thus, Spinoza 
seems in 2p 13 s to claim that our ability to assign a certain degree of reality to the 
mind is somehow posterior to our ability to assign that degree of reality to the 
body. 9ý41 
In this way, Della Rocca realises the problem, but he does not attempt to 
solve it. He merely goes on to explain that the asymmetry does not violate the 
explanatory barrier. Presumably, since Della Rocca was concentrating on the 
problem of the explanatory barrier, he failed to see another problem; or he seems 
to think that if he shows that the asymmetry is not a problem in the explanatory 
barrier, then it does not conflict with parallelism. But, although the asymmetry is 
not a problem for the explanatory barrier, the asyrnmetry may still be problematic 
in his parallelistic interpretation of Spinoza. As we saw in the previous chapter, 





but do see it as leading to a materialistic interpretation. So, the more important 
task is not to solve the problem of the explanatory barrier, but to solve the problem 
of mind's dependence on the body in the sense that physical explanations are prior 
to mental ones, since the latter is a crucial point in defending parallelism from the 
materialistic interpretation of Spinoza. 
Since Della Rocca admits this asymmetry, what he should have shown is 
not only that this asymmetry does not damage the explanatory barrier, but also that 
this asymmetry does conflict with parallelism. To complete the latter task, Della 
Rocca has to know the reason why Spinoza argues this asymmetry, but he does not 
have the answer to this: "What remains unclear, however, is why Spinoza asserts 
this asyrmnetry. That is why does Spinoza claim that our grasp of certain features 
of minds requires our prior grasp of certain features of body? I do not know the 
answer to this question and, fortunately, my purposes in this chapter do not require 
that I venture a solution to this perplexing problem. 9542 
Since Della Rocca does not know the reason for it, he cannot be sure that 
this asymmetry does not conflict with parallelism, and moreover, if he cannot show 
the compatibility between them, it is then difficult for him to maintain a parallelistic 
interpretation. He says, "my purposes in this chapter do not require that But, I 
do think that Della Rocca is required to solve this problem, since even though the 
asymmetry is not the problem in the explanatory barrier it is a problem in 
parallelism, and since he is, in this chapter, 43 unfolding Spinoza's theory as 
parallelism. 
When I criticised the materialistic interpretation in the previous chapter 
(see, pp. 59-63), 1 argued that this asymmetry does not lead to materialism, since 
this asymmetry is an accident of history and that one day we shall have just as good 
mental explanations as physical ones. So, the asymmetry should be treated as the 
asymmetry in our temporary position which does not, in effect, imply the body's 
dominance over the mind: it follows that the asymmetry does not damage the 
parallelism. I argued there that this apparent asymmetry was not genuine and that 
Spinoza is claiming that our understanding of the mind is secondary to our 
42 Ibid., p. 22. 
43 The title of the chapter is 'Tarallelism and Individuals. " 
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understanding of the body as far as our gaining knowledge up to the present day is 
concerned. This asymmetry exists only in our temporary understanding of the 
present day because our provisional understanding of the body is better than that of 
the mind owing to the fact that science is not yet enough developed for us to know 
what the mind is. For Spinoza, in reality, there exists a symmetry between the mind 
and the body: "[T]he object cannot be changed unless the idea is also changed, and 
vice versa. ý04 In this way, we should treat this asymmetry as saying that the best 
way of discovering mental Merences now-though not necessary always-is by 
studying physical differences, and therefore we can still argue for parallelism 
without the obstacle which Della Rocca has. 
(4) The Idea of the Mind and the Mind 
If the idea of the mind is identical with the mind, and it is the very same 
relationship as between mind and body, then we can make an argument for 
supporting identity of mind and body by using what Spinoza says about the idea of 
the mind. In this section, I shall show how this may be done. 
The main theses of traditional parallelism are, as we have seen in section 1, 
that (1) there is no causal relation between mental events and physical events, (2) 
mental events do exist in a causal relation with other mental events, and, similarly, 
physical events with other physical events, and (3) there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between mental events and physical events. But these explanations 
conflict with Spinoza's "the idea of the mind" argument. 
Spinoza holds that "[flhis idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same 
way as the mind itself is united to the body"' (E, 11, Prop 21). Just as the body is the 
object of the mind, so the mind is the object of the idea of the mind. The 
relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind must be the same as the 
relationship between the n-find and the body. In the theory of parallelisrn, the mind 
is the counterpart of the body and vice versa., therefore, the mind and the body 
44 Spinoza, Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Part H, Chapter XX, note c, # 10 in 
Edwin Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 136. 
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correspond to each other. If so, the relationship between the idea of the mind and 
the mind is also a one-to-one correspondence, since for Spinoza their relationship 
is the same as the relation of the mind to the body. It follows that the one mental 
event has correspondence to the other mental event. If we regard the relationship 
between the mind and the body as parallelism, the relationship between the idea of 
the mind and the mind must also be regarded as parallelism. 
We have seen that mental events exist in a causal relationship with other 
mental events. But, for Spinoza, if there is no causal relationship between mental 
events and physical events, there is also no causal relationship between the mental 
events constituting the mind and idea of those mental events, the idea of the mind. 
Paraflelists cannot say that the mind causes the idea of the mind, given E, 11, Prop 
21. There seem to be two other possible responses. 
Firstly, one might treat I(I(b)), the idea of idea, as the mode of the 3rd 
unknown attribute, and treat (I(I(b)) as the mode of the 4th unknown attribute and 
so on ad infinitum. Or, secondly, one might distinguish different levels of mental 
event; the level of I(b) and of I(I(b)). The same consequences follow from both 
hypotheses: there is no causal relation between b and I(b) or between I(b) and 
I(I(b)), etc., since they are all either in different attributes or on different levels, 
whereas things in the same attribute or on the same level are causally related, for 
instance, b, causes b2 , I(b), causes I(b)2 , and I(I(b)), causes 
1(1(b))2 etc. It follows 
that ideas cause other ideas, but not ideas of ideas. This argument is consistent 
with the theses of parallelism (1) and (2) above, and consequently one can 
integrate Spinoza's argument concerning "the idea of the mind" into parallelism, 
thus making parallefistic interpretation still valid. 
Of these two arguments, the first is not plausible. The mode of the 3rd 
unknown attribute cannot be mental, but I(I(b)) must be mental. For Spinoza, 
I(I(b)) is a mode which is conceived under the attribute of thought like I(b) is. Of 
this, Spinoza states as follows: "[T]he idea of the mind, therefore, and the mind 
itself are ... considered under one and the same attribute, that of thought" 
(E, 11, 
Prop 21, Schol). Hence, it is evident that we cannot regard I(I(b)) as the mode of 
the third unknown attribute. 
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The second argument, claiming a one-to-one correspondence between ideas 
and ideas of ideas, is more plausible. However, it is ruled out by the full statement 
of the passage above: "[T]he idea of the mind, therefore, and the mind itself are 
one and thesame thing, which is considered under one and the same attribute, that 
of thought" (E, 11, Prop 21, Schol; my italics). He goes on: 
it follows,, I say, that the idea of the mind and the mind itself exist in 
God from the same necessity and from the same power of thought. For, 
indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing 
but the form of the idea in so far as this is considered as a mode of 
thought and without relation to the object, just as a person who knows 
anything by that very fact knows that he knows, and knows that he 
knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum. (E, 11, Prop 2 1, Schol) 
This makes it plain that there is no real difference between the idea of idea and the 
idea, just a difference in the way it is conceived, and Spinoza, as we have seen, 
clearly holds that the relationship between the idea of the idea and the idea is the 
same as the relationship between the idea and the body. If this is an example of 
how the relationship between mind and body should be conceived, then Spinoza is 
claiming that mind is identical with body. 
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Chapter Four 
One Single Substance and Two Attributes: 
the Subjective and the Objective 
Interpretations 
Before we decide which interpretation is the most adequate one to 
represent Spinoza's mind-body theory, we need to work on Spinoza's conception 
of the attributes. Without discussing the notion of the attributes, we can hardly 
define the relationship between the mind and the body in Spinoza: the attributes are 
closely related to the mind-body theory as, for instance, the mind (thinking mode) 
is the mode of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body (extended 
mode) is the mode of the substance under the attribute of extension. Therefore it is 
necessary to discuss the notion of the attributes. 
1. The Subjective and the Objective Interpretation 
ofAttributes 
There have been basically two kinds of interpretation of Spinoza's position 
regarding the attributes in relation to substance which have remained controversial 
in the history of philosophy. In Spinoza's works, the status of the attributes could 
be explained in terms of a subjective interpretation, which is based on the view that 
attributes are in intellectu, or in terms of an objective interpretation, based on the 
view that they are extra intellectum. 1 The former view is emphasised by H. A. 
Wolfson, and the latter by F. S. Haserot, A. Wolf, and most commentators. 
Discussion of this issue is one of the central tasks in any treatment of Spinoza's 
viewpoint on attributes, and is, as was said above, divided into two groups; the 
subjective and the objective interpretation. 
Each interpretation, of course, has a rationale and validity based on 
distinctive passages in the text, and provides advantages as well as disadvantages in 
attempting to explain Spinoza's metaphysical system as a whole and in connecting 
with other important doctrines. Although it is quite right to say that these 
interpretations are incompatible with each other, it is necessary to identify their 
advantages and disadvantages within Spinoza's system. Thus I intend to explore 
' FL A. Wolfson, The Philosophy ofSpinoza, vol. I (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 146. 
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these two interpretations regarding the attributes, and to consider their merits and 
defects. In outlining the possibilities, I shall follow Haserot's discussion of the 
text. 2 In so doing, I hope to arrive at a clearer understanding of Spinoza's notion 
of the attributes. 
(1) Th e Status of th eA itrib utes 
I shall begin by describing the subjective argument. The main assertion of 
the subjective interpretation is that the attributes are nothing but a concept of the 
human intellect which we ascribe to substance as if they constituted its essence; as 
is argued by H. A. Wolfson. This subjective interpretation emphasises Spinoza's 
claim made on the basis of the Ethics part 1, demonstrations of Proposition 4 and 
of proposition 15-that the only things extra intellectum are substances and 
modes. It is posited on the view that the attributes are in intellectum, having no 
existence outside the mind. 3 
With this interpretation, there are no independent attributes. There is only 
our conceptions of essence. That is to say, attributes exist as concepts, while 
essence (of substance) exists as the reality which these concepts pick out. 
Accordingly, as to the distinction between the attributes of extension and thought, 
the subjective interpretation disposes of the distinction by explaining that our 
thought-concept differs from our extension-concept, although they do not differ 
from each other in reality due to the fact that they are our illusion of the essence of 
substance. Furthermore, Wolfson claims that Spinoza is in favour of the subjective 
position held in the medieval period which "endeavour[s] to reconcile the apparent 
contradiction between the plurality of attributes and the simplicity of essence, " by 
reducing "all the different attributes to one. '4 Wolfson's perspective on the 
subjective interpretation can be well presented by the following statements: "The 
2 Francis S. Elaserot, "Spinoza's Definition of Attribute, " 
Spinoza (London: University of California Press), pp. 28-42 
3 ibid., p. 146. 
4 Ibid, p. 154. 
in S. Paul Kashap (ed. ), Studies in 
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two attributes must therefore be one and identical with substance, "5 "The two 
attributes appear to the mind as being distinct from each other. In reality, however, 
,, 6 they are one. 
It is, therefore, clear that subjectivists are not obliged to establish 
whether substance is identical with all its attributes or not, since the attributes are 
concepts which originate in our mind. Instead, they can argue that substance is 
identical with its attributes in the sense that substance is the objective reality or 
essence of our concepts of the attributes, and they can further argue that substance 
is different from its essence only in the sense that "substance" suggests a thing, and 
"essence"' the defining properties of that thing. 
Next, the objective interpretation, in contrast to the subjective one, is 
posited on the view that attributes for Spinoza are extra intellectum: they exist 
outside the mind. 7 According to this interpretation, Spinoza argues that substance 
has a plurality of attributes and that this is reconcilable with the position that the 
totality of attributes is identical with substance. Thus the attributes of intellect and 
extension are "ultimate characteristics of reality, in the sense that neither can be 
reduced to the terms of the other. "' This interpretation, therefore, is characterised 
by saying that each attribute constitutes the essence9 of substance and it has real 
existence. 'O Now, let us examine the above-mentioned two kinds of interpretation 
in some more detail with respect to the definition of the attributes. 
5 Ibid, p. 156. 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid., p. 146. 
8 H. H. Joachim,, A Study ofSpinoza's Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), p. 22. 
91 shall consider the relation between the attribute and the essence and substance in some length 
later. 
10 Further, the objective interpretation holds that even though attributes are defined with respect 
to what the intellect perceives, according to definition 4 of Ethics part 1, they are still objectively 
related to substance and each other. 
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(2) The Issues in Relation to Definition Four 
The two interpretations exist due to some ambiguities in the use of the 
terms in the definition of the attributes in Ethics. 
By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance 
as (tanquam) constituting its essence. (E, 1, Def 4; my italics) 
From this, some ambiguities which can arise are as f6flows: 
(1) The problem of the correct translation of the Latin word "tanquam" which 
could be translated as either "as if' or "as. " 
(2) The problem of the weighting between the two phrases "which the intellect 
perceives of substance" and "constituting its essence"; does the former 
outweigh the latter or vice versa? 
(3) The issue of the meaning of the term "intellect"; what does the "intellect" refer 
to? i. e. does it mean "human intellect" or "the infinite intellect of God"'? 
I shall deal with these three issues in turn. 
lReegarding the first problem, the objectivist and subjectivist views rely upon 
the translation of "tanquam" (either by "as" or "as if "). If it is translated as "as if, " 
it supports the subjective interpretation, because it is suggested that the intellect 
does not perceive substance as it is in itself, and that attributes are not real but 
merely concepts to the intellect. If, on the contrary, it is translated as "as, " it could 
be understood that the attributes really do constitute the essence of substance and 
they exist in reality. They are not merely thought to constitute the essence of 
substance. They do constitute the essence. The translation of tanquam as "as, " 
therefore, tends to the objective interpretation. " 
However, whenever the term "tanquam" is translated as "as if' or "as, 15 
each is an accurate translation from the grammar of Latin, since "tanquam" has a 
dual use in Latin. Hence, the task of translating this term as one or the other is not 
conclusive, compared with the task of examinmg whether the attributes have reality 
11 The translation "as" would not rule out the subjective interpretation, whereas the translation 
"as if' does rule out the objective interpretation. 
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or are merely concepts. The former task, of giving a good translation, is dependent 
on the result of the latter. According to the solution of the latter, it can be decided 
whether it is "as if' or "as. " Hence, we should pay attention to the task which 
reveals whether the attributes really exist or not rather than the problem of the 
translation of "tanquam. " 
Let us move on to the second issue. In definition 4, there are two main 
phrases; "which the intellect perceives of substance" and "constituting its essence. " 
Which one carries the greater weight? If the former is highlighted, the status of the 
attributes for Spinoza is interpreted as subjectivism, while, on the contrary, if the 
latter phrase is emphasised, it can be claimed that the attributes exist objectively. 
Wolfson comments on this as follows: 
If the expression "which the intellect perceives" is laid stress upon, it 
would seem that the attributes are only in intellectu. Attributes would 
thus be only a subjective mode of thinking expressing a relation to a 
perceiving subject and having no real existence in the essence. 12 
He further adds that "to be perceived by the mind means to be invented by the 
mind .... "13 In fact, definition 4 does not tell us whether Spinoza means that the 
attributes exist in the intellect, or outside the intellect. Wolfson, however, 
interprets the attributes of extension and thought as the "inventions" of the human 
intellect i. e. the mind, and not "discoveries" by the mind. He pays particular 
attention to the phrase '*hich the intellect perceives of substance" rather than "as 
constituting its essence. " And consequently, his translation of the term tanquam is 
not "as" but "as if7--"as if constituting it essence. " If the attributes were really 
constitutive of its essence, Wolfson argues, the simplicity of substance could not be 
saved. I shall discuss this point in the next section. 
On the other hand, the objective interpretation puts the emphasis on the 
phrase "as constituting its essence. " From this, it can be inferred that attributes 
have a certain kind of real existence in the essence of God. Hence, on this view, 
12 Ibid., P146. 
13 ibid. 
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definition 4 supports the view that the attributes, like substance, exist outside the 
intellect. And the objective interpretation treats the first phrase "which the intellect 
perceives of substance" as implying no more than the fact that each attribute 
constitutes the essence of substance and are not the modifications of substance. 
That is to say, in the objective interpretation, the first phrase does not give us any 
ground for thinking that attributes are illusory. 
In addition to definition 4, in Ethics there are some statements which can 
provide support for each of the interpretations. Regarding the subjective 
interpretation, we ought to consider the statement "[e]verything which is, is either 
in itself or in another" (E, 1, Ax 1). We can infer that the former is substance and 
the latter are modifications from the following statement of Spinoza; he says that 
"in Nature there is nothing but substances and their modifications" (E, 1, Prop 6, 
Corol), or repeatedly he states that "besides substances and modes nothing is 
assumed" (E, 1, Prop 15, Demon). These statements may be taken as clear 
evidence of the subjective interpretation, since attributes do not exist according to 
these statements. However, Spinoza sometimes identifies attributes with substance, 
we cannot take these as supporting the subjective interpretation. Once we believe 
the objective interpretation is the right one, we can use these statements as 
supporting the view that for Spinoza the attributes are, in some sense, the same as 
substance. We shaH shortly consider the relationship between substance and 
attributes. 
On the other hand, the fbHowing statement seems to support the objective 
interpretation: 
The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes 
belong to it. (E, 1, Prop 9) 
Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself (E, I, 
Prop 10) 
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By God I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, 
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence. (E, 1, Def 6) 
Taken together with definition 4, these different interpretations are still 
controversial. In this way, the above issues do not make any change to the 
argument of the subjective versus the objective interpretation, nor give any clue to 
this matter. In order to determine the status of the attribute for Spinoza, we need 
to concentrate on the third issue which I shall discuss next. 
The "intellect" in definition 4 is also controversial regarding whether it is 
referring to the infinite intellect of God, or the finite human intellect. H. A. 
Wolfson, who is a subjectivist, argues that the term "intellect" has to be regarded 
as the finite human intellect. Wolfson argues this point as follows: 
By the term "intellect' ' in this definition [definition 4, part 1] Spinoza 
means the finite human intellect. When he says in Ethics, H, Prop VII, 
Schol, that "we have already demonstrated, that everything which can be 
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance 
pertains entirely to one substance, and consequently that substance 
thinking and the substance extended are one and the same substance, 
which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that, " it 
is not to be inferred that an attribute of substance is that which can be 
conceived only by the "infinite intellect. " What the Passage means to say 
is that "everything which can be conceived by the infinite intellect as 
constituting the essence of substance"-and the infinite intellect can 
conceive of an infinite number of things as constituting the essence of 
substance-is only an attribute of substance and not a substance itself, 
and consequently extension and thought, which alone can be conceived by 
the finite human intellect as constituting the essence of substance, are 
only attributes of substance and not substance themselves. 
14 
14 H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 153, note 2 
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I take his argument (from the second sentence) to defend the subjective 
interpretation from the objection that one may raise by taking that passage of 
Spinoza's as the evidence of the fact that "intellect" in definition 4 is only "infinite 
intellect. " However, what Wolfson is actually obliged to do is not to explain why 
the term "intellect" in definition 4 is not only "infinite intellect" but to explain why 
the term "intellect" cannot include "infinite intellect" since he asserts, in the first 
sentence, that by the term "intellect" Spinoza means the finite human intellect. If it 
is not only the infinite intellect, it can be also the finite intellect. But I do not see 
why this fact is a justification for the interpretation of "the finite intellect"; it can be 
only a justification of the interpretation of "any intellect. " Thus, whether all the 
other sentences are the explanations of the first sentence or not, Wolfson does not 
have any justification for the interpretation of "finite intellect" (only), despite the 
fact that he claims it. 
In fact, for the subjective interpretation, it is integral to argue that it is the 
finite human intellect. If it is the infinite intellect, the subjectivists cannot argue that 
the attributes are mistakenly conceived by the intellect, since God (the infinite 
intellect) cannot be mistaken. Thus, the subjectivists have to offer a justification for 
the view that the term "intellect" means only the finite intellect. But, as we have 
just seen, Wolfson fails to offer it, and I do not see any reason for that. 
Rather, we can find a justification for the view that the term "intellect" 
means the infinite intellect as follows. It is clear that the finite intellect cannot 
perceive the other attributes besides thought and extension. But, Spinoza's 
definition 4 is not the definition of only attributes of thought and extension but the 
definition of the attributes in general, which are infinitely many. Thus, as long as 
the defirfition. talks about the attributes in general, the intellect has to be the infirlite 
one due to the fact that the finite intellect can only perceive only two attributes of 
thought and extension. it follows that the attributes are not an illusion but they 
really exist, since God cannot be mistaken. This is what the objectivists commonly 
argue against the subjectivists. " As long as the subjectivists cannot offer the reason 
" However, even if it was only the finite intellect, there would be no guarantee 
for supporting the 
subjective interpretation. There is only a possibility that the attributes could 
be the invention of 
our mind i. e. a belief in more than one attribute. In this case, there 
is also another possibility that 
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why it has to be the finite intellect, the subjective interpretation is not justified, and 
thus we should conclude that the objective interpretation is more plausible than the 
subjective one. 
2 Comparison between the Subjective and the 
Objective Interpretations 
(1) The Problems of the Different Interpretations 
As we have seen above, the interpretation of definition 4 is perplexing in 
understanding Spinoza's view of attributes. Moreover, with respect to the issue of 
the subjective and objective interpretations, it is also controversial. In both cases 
there are some difficulties in adducing their argument concerning the relationship 
between substance and the attributes, and each interpretation has advantages and 
disadvantages in explaining Spinoza's view. Now, I shall give an outline of these 
problems raised by many interpreters of each interpretation. 
Regarding the subjective interpretation, the problem is as follows. Spinoza 
says that bodies are modifications of the attribute of extension. If there are no real 
attributes, where do the modes come from? If the attributes of thought and 
extension are invented by the finite human mind as Wolfson argues, it is difficult to 
answer this question. If extension is only an "inventiod' of the human mind, the 
problem arises regarding the reality of a material world. Again, if there is only an 
invention of the human mind, how can the mind do that unless it in some way 
issued from substance? In this case, there is no mind nor body since mind and body 
cannot be distinguished from one another due to the fact that the attributes lose 
the attributes are not an illusion of our mind, as long as the human mind can have an adequate 
idea of the essence of God: `fhc human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and 
infinite essence of God" (E, H, Prop 47). Thus, I do not see why is it taken for granted that the 
attributes are an illusion of the human mind. Therefore, even if the intellect is the finite human 
intellect, this does not necessary support the subjective interpretation nor counts against the 
objective interpretation. 
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their reality. Furthermore, if the intellect in definition 4 is the finite intellect which 
can only perceive the attributes of thought and extension, we cannot explain 
Spinoza's doctrine that there are an infinite number of attributes. 
Next, in the objective interpretation, the problem arises of the compatibility 
between simplicity of substance and the plurality of attributes because Spinoza 
holds that substance is simple and indivisible (E, 1, Prop 13). Here we ought to 
notice the fact that if attributes have reality, then they are really distinct. Therefore, 
the following questions should be asked: 
If Spinoza's attributes are regarded as objective, how can the attributes 
constitute the nature of the substance which is single? i. e. how can one 
indivisible substance have many distinct natures which have real existence? 16 
(2) How can an objectivist explain the meaning of the phrase "which the intellect 
f5 perceives o 
It is difficult to answer the above questions under the objective interpretation. In 
addition to this, concerning the phrase "which the intellect perceives of substance, " 
I would ask an objectivist why Spinoza puts this phrase in definition 4 unless it 
means something. 
(2) Bennett's View on Attributes 
There is an interesting point of view on Spinoza's attributes presented by J. 
Bennett. He interprets the attributes from an objective perspective, but in another 
way. in Bennett's view, (i) the attributes of thought and extension are real, (ii) they 
are reaUy distinct from one another, (iii) the attributes do not reafly constitute the 
essence of substance. 17 The statements (i) and (ii) are the same as the other 
objective interpretations, but (iii) is different. Taken together with definition 4, 
16 There is a ftirther problem: how ultimately can a reality be one and indivisible if there are 
many attributes? I shall say no more about this, except that it is not obvious that Spinoza thinks 
all division is, as Wolfson argues, illusory: is the deceived mind different from the reality which 
it misunderstands? But this topic would take us beyond the scope of this thesis. 
17 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 
147. 
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proposition 9 of part I seems to imply that attributes do constitute the essence of 
substance: "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence" (E, 1, Def 4), and "[t]he more reality or being 
a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it" (E, 1, Prop 9). Bennett resists 
the implication. His reason for denying that the attributes constitute the essence is 
as follows: 
(1) The sense of Latin word "constituere"' does not always mean "constitute. " 
Bennett states that "Latin dictionaries permit this by associating the verb with 
'fix% 'define'. 'determine' and-almost-' stake out' " and it does not necessarily 
imply the sense of identity. " 
(2) The phrase "which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its 
essence" can be taken to suggest that the intellect is mistaken. Bennett seems to 
treat this phrase as if Spinoza puts it in in order to indicate that attributes do 
not actually constitute the essence of substance. Hence, he argues that 
attributes are not basic properties. This means that Spinoza does not think that 
the attributes constitute the essence but that theyfix the essence. '9 
Due to facts (1) and (2), Bennett prefers to use "express" instead of "constitute. " 
This interpretation promises a solution to the problem of the ontological status of 
attributes and modes. It maintains the objective interpretation, as well as also 
having the solution in relation to the problem of the compatibility of "one and 
many" because the attributes do not really constitute the essence in this 
interpretation. In spite of these advantages, however, Bennett's interpretation 
cannot be identified as Spinoza's view on the attributes. 
Bennett regards "the intellect" as referring to the infinite intellect as well as 
to the finite intellect. 20 Now one of the criticisms of Wolfson's view is that Spinoza 
states that "[a]H ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true"(E, 
11, Prop 
" Ibid., p. 65. 
19 Ibid., pp. 146-147. Spinoza's definition of essence is as follows: 
II[T]o the essence of anything 
pertains that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and, 
being taken away, the 
thing is necessarily taken; or, in other words, that without which the thing can neither 
be nor be 
conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the 
thing" (E, 11, Def 2). 
20 Ibid., p. 62; p. 146. 
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32). All of God's ideas are true and God cannot be mistaken about his own essence 
in Spinoza's theory, and therefore Wolfson is not accurate in his interpretation of 
Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes if Wolfson intends by "the intellect perceives 
of' to refer to infinite intellect. ObjectiVists criticised Wolfson's subjective 
interpretation on this ground. Bennett was aware of this, but does not seem aware 
of the danger to his own position. He states: "But the gunfire aimed at Wolfson's 
interpretation goes wide of mine. I say that Nature really has extension and 
thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not 
fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect" 
(my italics). 21 
It is clear from this that for Bennett, too, God has erroneous ideas, contrary 
to E. 11, Prop 32. God believes wrongly that thought and extension are 
fimdamental. For Wolfson, there might be an escape route in saying that the 
intellect has to be regarded as the human intellect, so that Spinoza's view that God 
cannot be mistaken about his own essence becomes irrelevant. Since Bennett says 
explicitly that "the intellect" includes the infinite intellect, there is no such escape. 
Further, there is the following problem: how could Spinoza (or Bennett) 
know that the attributes are not really fundamental, since they have to see them as 
fundamental?; can anyone both perceive attributes as fundamental and know that 
they are not? So, Bennett's statement is a little like saying: "that is the truth but 
nobody knows it. " Then, how does he know it? 
From the above criticisms, we can see that Bennett's interpretation is not 
sufficient to solve the problem. 
The Correspondence between De Vries and Spinoza 
As to the problem of the relation of the attributes to substance, 
Simon De 
Vries, who was a friend of Spinoza, brought this issue up 
in a letter to Spinoza. 
21 Jonathan Bennett, op. cit., p. 147. 
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Finally, at the beginning of P8S3 22 you write: 
From these [propositions] it is evident that although two attributes 
may be conceived to be really distinct (i. e., one may be conceived 
without the aid of the other), they do not, on that account, constitute 
two beings or two different substances. The reason is that it is of the 
nature of a substance that all of its attributes (I mean each of them) 
should be conceived through themselves, since they have [always] 
been in it together. 
In this way you seem, Sir, to suppose that the nature of substance is so 
constituted that it can have more than one attribute, which you have not 
yet demonstrated, unless you depend on the fffffi2' definition of an 
absolutely infinite substance, or God. Otherwise if I should say that each 
substance has only one attribute, and if I had the idea of two attributes, I 
could rightly conclude that, where there are two different attributes, 
24 there are two different substances . 
In this way, De Vries points out the problem of the compatibility between one 
substance and two attributes (at least two). Spinoza's view of this problem was 
that distinct attributes could constitute the same substance. De Vries seems to take 
attribute as essence; he perhaps relies on definition 4, without taking the phrase 
"that which the intellect perceives of' too seriously. 
Now let us consider how Spinoza replies to De Vries' question. 
Nevertheless, you want me to explain by an example how one and 
the same thing can be designated by two names (though this is not 
necessary at all). Not to seem niggardly, I offer two: (i) I say that by 
22 Scholium of Proposition 10 in Part 1; Curley offers the information that scholium of 
Proposition 10 in the Ethics is related to scholium 3 of proposition 8 of an earlier stage in the 
development of Ethics (Edwin Curley, Ae Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I [Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 192, note 62). 
23 DeRnition 6 in part 1; Curley also offers the information that the sixth definition of the Ethics 
part I was the fifth definition of an earlier stage in the development of Ethics 
(ibid). 
24 Letter 8 in Curley, ibid., p. 192. 
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. 1- - me name Israel I understand the third patriarch; I understand the 
same by the name Jacob, the name which was given to him because 
he had seized his brother's heel; (ii) by flat I mean what reflects all 
the rays of light without any change; I understand the same by white, 
except that it is called white in relation to a man looking at the flat 
[surface]. 25 
I feel these analogies are not sufficient in replying to De Vries' question. The 
reason is that as Donagan points out, the different names denote not attributes but 
modes. 26 But, the analogy has to be regarded as an analogy, so we should attempt 
to find the point which Spinoza wants to make by these examples. They imply that 
it is possible for substance to be conceived under the distinct attributes and that the 
attributes are related to a single subject in the sense that the names "Israer' and 
"Jacob" differ in sense, though both denote the same thing, the third Patriarch. 
However, all we can know from this letter is that many attributes can constitute 
one substance for Spinoza, and he does not offer in this answer whether this occurs 
in the manner of the subjective interpretation or the objective interpretation, or how 
it can occur on the objective interpretation. 
There is a possibility that we may infer the existence of distinct attributes 
from the letters. We can assume the following point. It is certain that De Vries 
raises the question from an objective point of view. In this case, if Spinoza thought 
that attributes did not really exist and did not really constitute the essence of the 
substance, he would inform De Vries of this rather than offering the analogies. If 
Spinoza had the subjective point of view, he would answer by saying that the 
attributes do not really constitute the essence of the substance rather than seeking 
25 Letter 9 in Curley, ibid., pp. 195-196; the square blankets are the translator's. 
26 Alan Donagan writes: "Yet in both Spinoza's examples, his different names designate modes, 
not attributes. In the first, being the third Patriarch, and grasping his brother's heel, are different 
modes of the man called 'Israel' and 'Jacob, ' and not attributes constituting his essence. The 
second example is in even worse case. For, taking plane as a mode of matter, and white as a 
mode of a perceiving mind, the names 'plane and 'white' cannot be supposed to designate even 
modes of the same substance" ("Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's 
Metaphysics, " in Marjorie Grene [ed. ], Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays [New York: 
Anchor Books, 1973], p. 168). 
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to explain how they constitute the essence of the substance. That is to say, because 
Spinoza has the view that distinct attributes exist, he attempts to explain the "one 
and many. " If so, this is a legitimate reason for denying that Spinoza held a 
subjective view. 
Nevertheless, the analogies are not still decisive as between the subjective 
and the objective interpretations. I think that from the analogies, it is hardly 
possible to decide which one is Spinoza's position; the analogies do not directly 
concern this matter. Thus, we ought to decide this matter from Spinoza's other 
texts, and we have seen that the objective interpretation should be ascribed to 
Spinoza. What we should concentrate on from the analogies is not to find whether 
Spinoza is a ob ectivist or a subjectivist, but to find how it is possible that there are j 
many attributes for one substance under the objective interpretation. That is to say, 
if the fact is true that Spinoza is an objectivist, we should treat the analogies as 
Spinoza's explanation, in the objective interpretation, of how it is possible that 
there are many attributes for one substance. Once we accept the objective 
interpretation, the analogies teach us in what sense we should argue an objective 
interpretation. 
In my view, the analogies tend to suggest that two attributes afford two 
different ways of referring to the same essence (two ways of picking out the same 
thing) and that the attributes do really exist, as affording Merent ways of 
conceiving the same thing; for example, "being the third patriarch" and "being the 
seizer of his heel" each exist in some sense and they express the same person 
in its 
own way. Spinoza's answer by the analogies is that although we 
have the idea of 
two attributes, it is not necessary that there are two substances, since the attributes 
express the same substance in its own way as the same person or the same thing 
is 
expressed in Oferent ways. What the analogies show us 
is how it is possible that 
many attributes express the same essence. 
In addition to this, I think De Vries is asking: "how can there 
be more than 
one essence of a substance? " He is claiming that two objects should 
imply two 
attributes, and vice versa. Wby-9 If he is thinking of attributes as essences 
then this 
makes sense. A thing cannot have two separate essences. 
He says "if I had the idea 
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of two attributes I should rightly conclude different substances. " If he is thinking of 
attributes as qualities in general, why does he ask this rather than, "if I had the idea 
of two attributes should I be committed to pluralityT But, Spinoza does not seem 
to treat attribute as the same as essence, since he treats attributes as ways of 
conceiving the essence of the same thing. However, since the analogies stiff do not 
supply a sufficient answer to the problem of "one and many, " we need to discuss 
further the relationship between substance and essence and attribute to solve this 
problem. 
3. A Proposed Solution to the Problems of the Objective 
Interpretation 
The arguments of the ob ective interpretation are mostly contained in the j 
following way: (1) the intellect in definition 4 cannot be the finite intellect because 
there are infinite attributes in Spinoza's doctrine (E, 1, Def 6; Prop 11) and the 
finite intellect cannot perceive them all (Letter 64); (2) the infinite intellect is not 
mistaken; all ideas in the infinite intellect are true (E, 11, Prop 32); (3) therefore, it 
follows that the attributes really exist and that they are really distinct. 27 In this way, 
the objective interpretation has textual backing unlike the subjective interpretation. 
Thus, in some ways, it is the obvious interpretation. However, as I have 
mentioned, there are two main problems in this objective interpretation which are 
commonly raised by Spinoza's commentators. Let us recall thern. 
(1) If Spinoza's attributes are regarded as objective, how can distinct attributes A 
constitute the nature or essence of the substance which is single? 
27 To support the objective interpretation, Delahunty informs us of the ten textual 
facts, which are 
pointed out by him and others. The facts are mostly related to proving 
the above points (1) and 
(2). See R- I Delahunty, Spinoza, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 
116-117. 
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(2) How can an objectivist explain the fact that Spinoza introduces attributes 
through the phrase "which the intellect perceives as (constituting the essence 
of substance)" in definition 4 of part 11 and elsewhere? 
I think that the above problems should not lead us to hold the subjective 
interpretation. If we succeed in solving them, we can hold that Spinoza's 
interpretation is coherent instead of holding together incoherent stands. I shall 
attempt to offer the solution to these problems. To complete this task, it is essential 
to consider the relationship between substance and essence and attribute from 
Spinoza's other statements. 
(1) The Problem of "One and Many" 
a. The Relationship between Substance and Essence and Attribute 
In order to achieve a clear understanding of Spinoza's notion of the 
attributes and to solve the problem of "one and many, " it is necessary to examine 
the relationship between substance and essence and attribute. With these terms, the 
following options are available to understand Spinoza's doctrine of attribute. 
(i) Substance, essence, and attribute are all identical with each other. 
(ii) Substance is identical with attribute, but essence is not identical with either of 
them. 
(iii) Neither substance, essence, nor attribute are identical with each other. 
(iv) Substance is not identical with either essence or attribute, but essence and 
attribute are identical with each other. 
(v) Attribute is not identical with either substance or essence, but substance 
is 
identical with essence. 
To decide which option is Spinoza's, I shall review some theses of attributes which 
are commonplace in the interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy. 
(1) Substance monism: there exists only one single substance. 
(2) Attribute pluralism: there are infinite numbers of attributes. 
(Attribute dualism 
is relevant to the mind-body theory) 
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I believe that it is beyond dispute that Spinoza holds the two doctrines above, 
whereas the relationship between substance and essence and attribute is still 
controversial. Now, from an understanding of the above two doctrines, we can be 
suspicious of a couple of the options - (i) and (ii). 
As to the first option, (i) "substance, essence, and attribute are all identical 
with each other, " it is hardly possible to ascribe this to Spinoza's system, since it is 
not compatible with the two doctrines, substance monism and attribute pluralism. 
If essence is identical with attribute as well as substance, it is apparent that the 
number of essences is self-contradictory. Given that substance monism and 
attribute pluralism is true, essence has to be either just one or more than two. That 
is to say, essence can only be identical with either substance or attribute, but 
cannot be identical with both of them at once. 
IR egarding the second option i. e. (ii) "substance is identical with attribute, -L, -%;; 
but essence is not identical with either of then-4" the problem of the incompatibility 
between the number of substances and the number of attributes stiH remains, so 
this, too, faUs. 
Before we examine the other options, we need to consider what the essence 
of substance is for Spinoza. By doing so, we can begin to determine the number of 
essences, so that we can come close to an understanding of the relationship 
between substance and essence and attribute. Spinoza's statements about the 
essence are as f6flows: 
To the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing 
itself is necessarily posited, and, being taken away, the thing is 
necessarily taken; or, in other words, that without which the thing can 
neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor 
be 
conceived without the thing. (E, 111, Def 2) 
By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or 
that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. (E, 1, Def 
1) 
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The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing does 
not involve existence. (E, 1, Ax 7) 
It pertains to the nature of substance to exist. (E, 1, Prop 7) 
Demonstration. There is nothing by which substance can be produced 
(Corol Prop 6). It will therefore be the cause of itself, that is to say (Def 
1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or, in other words, it 
pertains to its nature to exist. 
God or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. (E, 1, Prop 11). 
Demonstration. If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God 
does not involve existence. But this (Prop 7) is absurd. Therefore God 
necessarily exists. 
From the above statements, we can see that the essence of the substance involves 
its existence and that Spinoza's notion of essence is not different from the 
conventional notion: the essence is the most fundamental quality of a thing, or that 
which makes a thing what it is. It seems that there is only one essence for one 
thing; there is one essence for one substance, insofar as the essence is the most 
fundamental quality. So, for Spinoza, if there is one essence, there must be one 
substance, and vice versa. Therefore, it follows that we should not identify 
attribute with essence, whereas we should think that there is the one essence for 
the one substance and in this sense we can identify essence with substance. 
This line of Spinoza's thought on "essence" does not allow us to take (1) 
an argument that denies identity between substance and essence or to take (2) an 
argument that makes the number of essences plural by identffijing essence with the 
infinite numbers of attributes. Thus, we ought to turn down all the options (i)-(v) 
above except the fifth option that "the attribute is not identical with either 
substance or essence, but substance is identical with essence"; the option (i) entails 
the second argument, the options (ii) and (iii) entail the first argument, and the 
option (iv) entails both arguments. By substance monism and attribute pluralism 
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we can reject options (i) and (ii), and by Spinoza's assertion of the concept of 
essence, we can reject options (i), (ii), (m) and (iv). So, it appears that only option 
(v) is adequate as an understanding of the relationship between substance and 
essence and attribute. Since for Spinoza the attribute is not treated as the essence, 
it does not follow that there are many essences for one substance, but that there is 
the one essence and many attributes for the one substance. Thus, we are led to the 
view that there is, one single substance, one essence, and an infinite number of 
attributes in Spinoza's system. Bearing in mind this idea, we should consider how 
they are related to each other. 
b. An Implication ofIdentity in the Term "Constituere" 
If attributes are not essences as is concluded above, the problem of "one 
and many" seems to be solved. Insofar as attributes are not essences but qualities in 
general, it is not a problem to claim that many attributes constitute one substance. 
However, several passages of Spinoza's provide an obstacle to this conclusion. 
The problem passages are as follows: 
By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence. (E, 1, Def 4) 
The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes 
belong to it. (E, 1, Prop 9) 
It is far from absurd, therefore, to ascribe to one substance a number 
of attributes, since nothing in Nature is clearer than that each being 
must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality or 
being it has, the more attributes it possesses expressing necessity or 
eternity and infinity. (E, 1, Prop 10, Schol) 
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By Substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through 
itself, i. e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another 
thing. I understand the same thing by attribute, .... 
28 
We have already considered Bennett's reasons for resisting the conclusion that an 
attribute is that which constitutes the essence of the substance. Taken all together, 
the above passages apparently lead to the view that a substance can have many 
essences. One may identify essence with attribute while abandoning the standard 
meaning of the term "essence. " In this case, there can be many attributes (essences) 
for the one substance. Of course, the possibility of this depends on the concept of 
attribute. But at least there is not the problem derived from the doctrine that there 
must be one essence for one substance. It would follow that, for Spinoza, essence 
is nothing but attribute, but essence here is different from essence in the usual 
sense. However, it is very unlikely that Spinoza holds this position. Spinoza's 
assertion of essence which we have seen so far clearly conflicts with this. 
It is necessary to look more closely at the route taken by Bennett for us to 
avoid the conflict, at the translation of "constituere" and at the phrase "which the 
intellect perceives ... as. " But we shall not be taking Bennett's route out, of 
supposing that there are trans-attribute modes which cannot be comprehended in 
their pure form. Spinoza says that the attributes are what the intellect perceives as 
constituting the essence. In definition 6 of Part 1, he refers to attributes expressing 
the essence. 
The Latin term "constituere" means determine, arrange, and flx, and so on. 
Thus, Bennett suggests, we should say that the attributes fix or characterise the 
essence of the substance. Of course, we can translate this term into "constitute" in 
English, but we have to be wary that the English "constitute" has all the meanings 
which the Latin dictionaries indicate; the Oxford English Dictionary tells us that 
the term "constitute" has 7 kinds of meanings and that last is "make Up. q129 
Speaking briefly, the Latin term "constituere" should be translated to "constitute" 
28 Letter 9 in Curley, The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 195. 
29 The Oxford English Dictionary: A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, vol. 2 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933/1961), pp. 875-876. 
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in English. However, as there are many meanings for the Latin term, so there are 
many meanings for the English term; these two ten'ns are equivalent. It follows that 
there is no guarantee that the meaning is "make up. " Moreover, most Latin 
dictionaries do not say this term has the meaning of "make up. "'O In this 
circumstance, "constitute" need not be taken as implying identity. 
'0 According to the dictionaries, the literal sense of the term constituere, is "to settle, " 'to found, " 
or "to set up, " etc., and the transferred sense of this term is 'to appoint, " "Ifix upon, 1)" 44arrange, " 
"'establish, " 'to decide, " etc. However, they do not mention "constituere" as "constitute, " and 
there is not even a translation like "constitute" (i. e. " make up"). Moreover, English-Latin 
dictionaries inform us that when "constitute" means 'to make up, " this is translated as either 
componere or efficere in Latin, whereas when "constitute" means "to establish, " constituere is 
one of the terms which it can be translated as. In the discussion of Spinoza's doctrine of the 
attributes, however, "constitute" is universally translated and used in the sense of "to make up, " 
and in similar contexts in mediaeval philosophy it is the same. (Only one dictionary of those I 
consulted contains the meaning "make up" as well as the several other meanings: P. G. W. 
Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982. ) 
I searched the following dictionaries: 
D. P. Simpson (ed. ), Cassell's Latin-English-Latin Dictionary, Cassell Ltd., 1959. 
J. I-L Baxter and Charles Johnson (eds. ), Medieval Latin Word-List, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1934. 
Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (eds. ),, 4 Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879. 
William Smith (ed. ), Latin-English Dictionary, London, 1866. 
- The New Latin and English Dictionary, 1 st ed., London, 1770 
Elisha Coles (- 1640? - 1680), A Dictionary: "English-Latin and Latin-English" 9th ed., 
London, 1719. 
Thomas Holyoake (1616? - 1675), A Large Dictionary in Three Parts. 
Another way to confirm this fact is looking up the word "constitute" in English-Latin 
dictionaries. The dictionaries inform us that when "constitute" means the essence of a thing such 
as "to make up, " "form, " or "compose, " this is translated as either componere or efficere in 
Latin, whereas when "constitute" means "to establish, " "fix, " and so on, constituere is one of the 
proper Latin terms which it can be translated as. r1bat is to say, even though constituere can be 
translated as "to constitute" meaning "establish, " it cannot be translated as "to constitute" 
meaning "make up. " I shall adduce the definitions in the English-Latin Dictionaries: 
constitute, v. Transit. (1) = to form, make up, componere, efficere. (2) = to establish, arrange 
statuere, constituere, designare. (3) = to appoint, creare, jacere. - D. P. Simpson (ed. ), 
Cassell's 
Latin-English-Latin Dictionary (Cassell Ltd., 1959), p. 681. 
constitute: 1. To set, ffix, establish : consitituo statuo, instituo, ordino, designo : see TO 
ARRANGE, APPOINT. H.. To fonn or compose (the essence of a thing) : cmpono, conficio : 
V. To CONVOSE.. 111. To appoint: 1. lego, I: to appoint as a deputy: V. TO DEPUTE. 
2. Creo, facio : of elections : V. TO ELECT. - William Smith (ed. ), 
A Copious and Critical 
English-Latin Dictionary (London, 1870), p. 15 1. * my underlining. 
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Now, I shall consider the fact that Bennett runs into problems concerning 
"constituere. " 
(1) Bennett claims that "constituere" should be translated as "fix, " "define, " 
"determine" etc. 31 Therefore, for Bennett's Spinoza, the attributes do not 
constitute the substance, but theyfix the substance. 
(2) Bennett treats the phrase "the intellect perceives of' as if Spinoza uses it in 
order to indicate that attributes do not actually constitute the essence of 
substance. 32 
The above two points seem to be the plausible rationales or grounds for arguing 
that, for Spinoza, attributes do not really constitute the substance (the essence of 
substance), so long as we consider each point separately. However, if we consider 
two points together, there is a problem. 
Spinoza's claim in definition 4 of part I is that "the intellect perceives the 
attributes as constituting the essence of the substance. " Whether our or God's 
intellect is involved, Bennett takes it that there is an illusion here: the attributes do 
not constitute the essence of substance, although they are perceived even by God 
as doing so. The natural way to express this is to say that the attributes fix the 
essence but are taken to constitute the essence. But this implies that "constituere" 
is sometimes used to mean "constitute. " 
Bennett translates "constituere" as fix or characterise in scholium of 
proposition 10.33 But, in definition 4 he seems to translate "constituere" not as 
"fix, " but as "constitute" as in the ordinary translation. Bennett may claim that 
since the Latin term "constituere" has several meanings, we can or should translate 
it differently according to the context. However, both these statements have the 
same context concerning the translation. The statement which Bennett translates as 
"flx7' is that: "[I]t is evident that, though two attributes are conceived as distinct- 
that is, one without the help of the other-yet we cannot conclude from this that 
31 Jonathan Bennett, op. cit., p. 65. 
32 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
33 Bennett also regards "constituere" as "apply to" or "are instantiated by" ("A Note on 
Descartes 
and Spinoza, " Philosophical Review, vol. 74 [1965], p. 380). 
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they constitute two entities or two different substances .... It is ... far from an 
absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance" (E, 1, Prop 10, Schol; my 
italics). And, the statement which he seems to leave as "constitute" is that: "By 
attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as 
constituting its essence" (E, 1, Def 4; my italics). Bennett should translate 
"constituere" in both statements as either only "constitute" or only "fix. " 
(2) The Meaning of the Phrase " Which the Intellect Perceives of' 
Now, the problem is that although we solve the problem of "one and 
many"-one essence, many attributes-we are still confronted with solving the 
problem of the sense of the phrase " the intellect perceives of "I shall cite the 
definition, again. 
By attribute, I understand that which the inteflect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence. (E, 1, Def 4) 
Why does Spinoza put the phrase '*hich the intellect perceives ... as" in 
his 
definition of the attributes? In other words, by this phrase what does Spinoza want 
to ascribe to features of the attributes? We can say that the intellect's perception, 
whether it is infinite or finite, is somehow related to expression. Definition 6 uses 
"express" where definition 4 uses "constituere": "By God I understand Being 
absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each 
one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (E, I Def, 6; my italics). 
We can also infer this point from the following statements of Spinoza, 
which I have quoted once when I have explained the problem of "one and many" in 
the attributes. 
By substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through 
itself, i. e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another 
thing. I understand the same thing by attribute, except that it is called 
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attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and such a 
definite nature to substance. 
34 
Here, we can see that attribute is related to the intellect, which attributes such and 
such a definite nature to substance, and that this is the same meaning as what 
definition 4 offers: "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence" (E, 1, Def 4). 
In this way, if we take the phrase "which the intellect perceives of as 
constituting" along with "express,, " I believe we can explain Spinoza's doctrine. 
Furthermore, as I have mentioned earlier, we can make the definition more 
complete and comprehensive, since in this case, the defmition offers us sufficient 
information on what attribute is, which Spinoza asserts throughout Ethics. In fact, 
Spinoza informs us that definition 4 is related to the concept "express" when he 
uses this definition to demonstrate proposition 19 and 20 of part 1. He uses the 
term "express" or "manifest" instead of "which the intellect perceives of as 
constituting. " Here is the textual evidence: 
Again, by the attributes of God is to be understood that which (Def 4) 
expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is to say, that which 
pertains to substance. It is this, I say, which the attributes themselves 
must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (Prop 7). 
Therefore, each of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore all 
are eternal. (E, 1, Prop 19, Demon; my italics) 
Agair4 in the demonstration of proposition 20, he states as f6flows: 
God (Prop 19) and all His attributes are eternal, that is to say (Def 8), 
each one of His attributes expresses existence. The same attributes of 
God, therefore, which (Def 4) manifest the eternal essence of God, at 
the same time manifest His eternal existence, that is to say, the very 
34 Letter 9 in Curley (ed. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, P. 195. This is the third 
definition of an earlier stage in the development of Ethics. 
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same thing which constitutes the essence of God constitutes at the same 
time His existence, and therefore His existence and His essence are one 
and the same thing. (E, 1, Prop 20, Demon; my italics) 
I think that we have now arrived at the sense of the phrase '1he intellect perceives 
of. " In definition 4 and throughout Ethics, Spinoza's real intention about the 
concept of the attributes is that there are infinite ways of expressing the essence of 
the substance; attributes express the essence of the substance each in its own 
distinctive way. (How this is to be explained in detail will be taken up in chapter 
five and discussion will be deferred until then. ) 
(3) What Is Structurally Common to All the Attributes: Essence 
Now, the question is how we treat Spinoza's statement which identifies 
attribute with substance-1 understand the same thing by attribute. " There have 
been some suggestions about this point. Bennett regards the attribute as not 
constituting (as meaning "making up") but only expressing the substance, so there 
does not exist any sort of identity between substance and attribute. We have 
already seen that this interpretation runs into Miculties. Curley suggests that the 
substance is not identical with any one attribute, but must be identical with the 
totality of the attributes. " Wolf also suggests that "Substance (or Nature or God) 
is the unified totality of Attributes. , 36 But what I think Spinoza means is that the 
attribute itself is identical with the substance, so that any one attribute must be 
identical with substance. By solving this problem, we can arrive at a clearer 
understanding of how the attributes can constitute the essence of the substance (or 
the substance). 
35 Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method., A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 28. 
36 A. Wolf, "Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance, " in S. Paul Kashap (ed. ), 
Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1972), p. 17. 
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I think that we can argue some sense of identity between substance and 
attribute consistently with what Spinoza said. This depends on what kind of 
identity we argue. I claimed when arguing against Bennett that the substance (the 
essence) is not beyond each attribute, and this is why each attribute constitutes and 
expresses the essence of the substance. To explain Spinoza's view that attribute is 
identified with substance, we should bear this point in our mind: the essence of the 
substance is not beyond each attribute. 
If we take essence of the substance as "what is structurally common to all 
the attributes, " we can explain identity between substance and attribute. Since the 
attributes constitute and express the essence of the same substance (or the same 
essence of substance), there must be something common in all the attributes as 
there is what is structurally common in the ways of expressing the same thing; 
what is structurally common is expressed in all infinite numbers of attributes or 
ways. This common structure in all the attributes is nothing but the essence of 
substance. This is why it appears that the attribute is, on the one hand, the same 
thing as substance and on the other hand, all the attributes are different from 
substance for Spinoza. If what is structurally common to all the attributes is the 
essence and in each attribute there is this which is common, then the many 
attributes can constitute the essence and they (whether each attribute or many 
attributes) are, in some sense, identical with the essence of the substance (or the 
substance) . 
37 This can be understood in the following way: the numbers 1/ 2ý 2/4 ý 
3/6 
4 /8 ý ... can be regarded as 
different expressions of the same rational number. The 
same rational number can be expressed in any of these infinite different ways. For 
the purpose of rational numbers 4/8 is the same as '/10; they form an equivalence- 
set. 
37 Spinoza states once that attributes constitute the essence of the substance, and at another time, 
that attributes constitute the substance. However, I regard both statements in the same context. If 
the attribute constitutes the essence of the substance and the essence is the most fundamental 
property, we can say that the attributes constitute the substance. Strictly speaking, when 
Spinoza 
says that the attributes constitute the substance, he means, in fact, that they constitute the essence 
of the substance as Alan Donagan observes; he regards "constitute the substance" as a natural 
ellipsis for "constitute the essence of the substance" CA Note on Spinoza, 
Ethics, 1,10, " 
Philosophical Review, vol. 75 [1966], p. 38 1). 
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Again, a second analogy can help us to explain how each attribute 
constitutes and expresses the essence of the substance: let us suppose that there is 
a tune and that this tune can be played on the piano, hummed, whistled, written in 
musical notation, inscribed on bits of plastic, or fixed on tape by magnetism; it is 
clear that all of these media express the same tune. When we apply Spinoza's sense 
of the substance to the tune, there are infinite ways of expressing the tune; the 
essence of the tune is what is structurally common to all these ways, but is not a 
way of expression itself. Hence, the infinite ways of expression are one and the 
same, since they all express the same tune, and they are Merent since they have 
their own ways of expressing it. If we ask someone "what tune did she sing?, " that 
tune can be given in several ways. The differences between humming, written 
notation, etc., do not matter. They all give the tune. 
Just as in this example, in Spinoza's system, there are Mmite ways of 
expressing the essence of substance, and these ways are attributes which express 
the essence of substance in their own ways. I think that this is Spinoza's real 
intention. Furthermore, the above analogy does help us to solve the problem of 
"how many attributes can constitute the essence" by treating "essence" as "what is 
structurally common to all attributes. " Thus, if we consider both of them, we can 
better explain the relationship between the attributes and the substance in 
Spinoza's system. 38 
The perspective that what is structurally common in the ways which 
express the same tune is the essence of the tune (or the tune) gives a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between attribute and substance (essence). If the 
" Returning to the correspondence between De Vries and Spinoza. I think that De Vries 
understands Spinoza's concept of attribute as essence. That is why De Vries argues that each 
attribute has only one attribute and that if there are two different attributes there are two different 
substances. If De Vries was aware that for Spinoza the concept of attribute is not essence but the 
definite nature which the infinite intellect ascribes to the substance, he would not raise this 
question. Spinoza's position is, as we have seen, that any of the attributes (thought, extension, 
etc. ) are equivalent expressions of the essence, and all of them are basic expressions of the 
essence. There is only one essence for one substance, and that is what is structurally common to 
all infinite attributes. In this sense, attributes are identical with the essence, and that 
is why there 
can be many attributes for one substance. If De Vries understood Spinoza's system 
in the 
perspective in this section, he would not ask this question. 
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attributes express the essence of the substance, the attributes are each conceived as 
constituting the essence. How can many different things each constitute the 
essence? This is because the essence is what all these things have structurally in 
common. So, we cannot say what the essence is, but we can show what it is, just as 
we can display the tune by humming it, whistling it, writing it down, etc. Since the 
tune is not something beyond the humming and whistling, but it is in them as what 
they have in common, they can constitute the tune. 
As we have seen, Bennett thinks each of the attributes fixes or 
characterizes the essence, but for his interpretation of Spinoza, the real essence is 
beyond the attributes which are mistakenly seen (even by God) as fundamental. In 
contrast, my view is that the essence is that which is structurally common to all the 
attributes. Since the two positions are at first glance similar it might help to 
contrast thenL39 Bennett says that if P, is systematically linked with M, (a non- 
identity) then P, is extension-and-F, M, is thought-and-F, for some differentiating 
property F . 
40 He offers an analogy: a circle is two-dimensionality plus being- 
bounded-by-points-equidistant-from-one-point and a sphere is three-dimensionality 
plus that property. However, in the case of thought and extension, the common F 
is unknowable on its own, even by God4l-otherwise, Bennett thinks, the 
separation of attributes would be threatened. 42 In contrast, I hold that there is 
nothing unknowable here, though the essence cannot be grasped independently of 
any attribute. On the analogy of the tune, we cannot give the tune without giving it 
in some way-whistling it, writing it down, etc. The essence cannot be given 
without being expressed in some way. 
The perspective which I have suggested in this chapter may help us to 
understand better Spinoza's concept of the attributes. It allows for one essence, 
many attributes, no illusion while explaining how the attributes constitute the 
substance (the essence of substance), and also while explaining how they are 
identical to each other and how distinct from each other. It also allows us to 
'9 This is done more fully in chapter five (pp. 159-161). 
40 Betmett, A Study ofSpinoza's Ethics, p. 141. 
41 Ibid., p. 144. 
42, bid., p. 145. 
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answer the meaning of the phrase "which the intellect perceives of' and to answer 
the problem of "one and many, " while not making Spinoza self-contradictory and 
while holding the objective interpretation which is plausible and has more 
advantages. Thus, from this kind of interpretation, we achieve a better and clearer 
understanding of Spinoza's notion of the attributes. 
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Chgpter Five 
One Thing and Two Descriptions in 
Spinoza: the Double Aspect Theory 
I have explored, in chapters two and three, some interpretations and have 
pointed out that they are troublesome to apply to Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
Then, besides these, what is Spinoza's real tendency with respect to the 
relationship between the mind and the body? I would like to suggest the double 
aspect theory and representationalism as the interpretations which can be regarded 
as Spinoza's real thought. In the following two chapters, I shall consider those 
theories within Spinoza's realm of thought; I shall discuss double aspect theory in 
this chapter and representationalism in the next chapter. 
1. Statement of the Double Aspect Theory 
(1) One Thing Which Is Described Either As Mental or As Physical 
a. Textual Evidences concerning Double Aspect Theory 
I shall adduce some of Spinoza's statements with respect to double aspect 
theory. 
[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same 
substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now 
under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are 
one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, H, Prop 7, 
Schol) 
[T]he idea of the body and the body, that is to say (Prop 13, pt, pt. 2), 
the mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at one 
time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another under 
that of extension. (E, H, Prop 21, Schol) 
For example, the circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of 
an existing circle are one and the same thing which is manifested 
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through different attributes; and, therefore, whether we think of Nature 
under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or 
under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same 
connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of 
things. ýE, H, Prop 7, Schol)' 
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things. (E, H, Prop 7) 
All the above statements are encapsulated in the main point of the double aspect 
theory that the mind and the body are parallel manifestations of one and the same 
thing. The first and the second quotations establish that the mind and the body are 
one and the same thing manifested under the two different attributes (thought and 
extension, respectively). The third quotation tells us that since the mind and the 
body are one and the same thing, we shall find one and the same order or one and 
same connection of causes. Hence, it follows that since there is one order, Spinoza 
tells us, as in the last quotation, that the order and connection of minds is the same 
as the order and connection of bodies. 
Speaking briefly, (1) "identity in double aspect theory": the mind and the 
body are one and the same thing manifested in two different ways. Therefore, (2) 
there is one order and connection of causes. Consequently, (3) "parallel 
manifestations in double aspect theory": the order of the mind is the same as the 
order of the body. Here we can see that Spinoza's mind-body theory is nothing but 
the double aspect theory, which combines identity with parallel relationship. 
2 
1 Spinoza also states, in this scholium, that "when things are considered as modes of thought we 
must explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes 
by the attribute of 
thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of 
Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes" 
(E, II, Prop 7, Schol). 
2 For Spinoza, if the identity doctrine is not true, the other doctrine is also not true, because the 
latter relies on the former. Thus, identity is the most important argument in his theory. 
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b. Substance Monism and the Mind-Body Theory 
For Spinoza, identity between the mind and the body is inferred from the 
one-substance doctrine. The first quotation above initially informs us of how his 
substance doctrine is related to his mind-body theory; the quotation obliges us to 
infer his position on the identity of the mind and the body from his substance 
monism. If substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same thing, 
the mode mentally (the mind) and the mode physically (the body) are one and the 
same thing. Now, the question is: why substance thinking and substance extended 
are one and the same substance and consequently why the mind and the body are 
one and the same? The answer is rooted in the doctrine that there exists only one 
substance. Since the mind is a mode of the substance under the attribute of 
thought, and the body is the same mode of the substance under the attribute of 
extension, a single individual thing is at one time a mode mentally and at another a 
mode physically which both express the substance in a certain and determinate 
manner, just as a single substance is a substance thinking as well as a substance 
extended according to the attributes of thought and extension. The former 
relationship is only a special case of the latter. 
At this stage, we need to consider Spinoza's notion of "mode" in some 
more detail, since we are exammimig his doctrine of the relationship between the 
mind and the body and Spinoza regards the mind and the body as modes. Spinoza 
defines modes as follows: 
By mode I understand the modifications of substance, or that which 
is in another thing through which also it is conceived. (E, 1, Def 5) 
If we consider this definition with substance monism, both the mind and the 
body 
are modes of the same substance. However, the notion of the term 
"mode" is 
ambiguous due to the fact that Spinoza sometimes denotes the mind and the 
body 




Every mode which exists necessarily follow either from the absolute 
nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a 
modification which exists necessarily and infinitely. (E, 1, Prop 23) 
The modes of any attribute have God for a cause only in so far as He 
is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not 
in so far as He is considered under any other attributes. (E, U, Prop 
6) 
Individual things are nothing but modifications or modes of God's 
attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate 
manner. This is evident from Prop 15 and Def 5. (E, 1, Prop 25, 
Corol) 
The above three quotations lead to the thought that the mind is the mode of the 
attribute of thought and the body is the mode of the attribute of extension. In this 
case, the relationship between the mind and the body is not derived from there 
being one substance, but their relationship follows from the relationship between 
the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. 
However, when Spinoza says that the mind and the body are the modes of 
attributes, we should understand him as meaning that the mind is the mode which 
expresses the essence of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body 
is the mode which expresses the essence of the very same substance under the 
attribute of extension. Spinoza's definition of body makes clear this understanding. 
By body I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and 
determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered 
as the thing extended. (E, H, Def 1) 
Spinoza does not give a corresponding definition of the mind. However, Spinoza 
would have to define the mind in the same manner as the definition of the 
body. 
Considering this definition with there being one substance, we can see that the 
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mind and the body are not the modes of the attributes of thought and extension, 
but they are the modes of the one unique same substance through the attributes of 
thought and extension respectively. The mind is the mode of the substance in 
mental descriptions (attribute of thought), and the body is the mode of the same 
substance in physical descriptions (attribute of thought). Just as substance as 
thinking thing and substance as extended thing is one and the same substance 
which is comprehended under the two different attributes, so the mode of the 
former (mind) and the mode of the latter (body) are one and the same mode 
conceived in two different ways or descriptions. 
The fact that the mind and the body are modes of the one substance under 
the different attributes suggests that the relationship between the mind and the 
body follows the relationship between substance conceived under thought and 
substance conceived under extension. If the mind and the body are modes of the 
one same substance, we can hardly deny that the relationship between the mind and 
the body is derived from the substance as thing thinking and the same substance as 
thing extended. Humans are manifested in the mode of the mind through the 
attribute of thought as well as in the mode of the body through the attribute of 
extension. Since the mind and the body are not the modes of the attributes, but are 
modes of the one substance considered at one time under the attribute of thought 
and at another under the attribute of extension, it is clear that the mind (the mode 
of the one substance under thought) and the body (the mode of the one substance 
under extension) are identical. The mind is the modification of the substance 
conceived as thing thinking and the body is the modification of the very same 
substance as thing extended. Substance monism guarantees identity between the 
mind and the body, so mental events and physical events are not two different sets 
of events but are one set of events, differently described. 
Now we can see that since the mind is the mode of the substance under 
mental descriptions (attribute of thought) and the body is the mode of the same 
substance under physical descriptions (attribute of thought), they are one and the 
same thing. This should be considered as the core of Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
For Spinoza, the mind and the body are not two different things, but rather one 
135 
! -- AI muividual with two different aspects; it f6flows that there is one order of events, 
not two. 
c. Parallelism Between the Mental and the Physical 
As we saw in chapter three, Spinoza argues parallelism on the basis of 
identity between the mind and the body: for Spinoza, the mind and the body are 
parallel because they are identical with each other. But when Spinoza claims that 
the mind and the body are identical and that they are parallel, does he refer to 
mental and physical events or mental and physical properties? For Spinoza there is 
an identity between events whereas there is no identity between properties (unless 
the subjective interpretation of the attributes is right). 
The fact that there is an identity between mental and physical events is the 
reason that "the event under mental descriptions" (mind) and "the same event 
under the physical descriptions" (body) are parallel with each other. As I 
mentioned in chapter three, although the mental and the physical events are 
identical, since they have their different properties or descriptions, we can still 
argue a parallel relationship between these two sets of concept: one event which is 
given a mental description and the very same event which is given a physical 
description. This is Spinoza's conceptual parallelisn-4 or, if you like, semantic 
parallelism, since it is not argued in two substances or two different events but in 
two sorts of concept of one event. 
Apart from conceptual parallelism, there is property parallelism in 
Spinoza's system. We can simply explain that the reason why there is conceptual 
parallelism is because the two sorts of concept, mental and physical, pick out one 
set of events. But since the mental and the physical properties are not identical, this 
reason is not enough to explain the parallel relationship between properties. Then, 
why are they parallel to each other? We saw in the previous chapter that the 
essence is "what is differently expressed by all the attributes" (or "what is 
structurally common to all the attributes") and that there is one order and 
connection of causes due to the fact that there is one substance. It follows that the 
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mental and the physical properties express the essence of the same event (the same 
essence of the event) in an orderly way. This is why there is a systematic 
connection between the two properties. Since there is one set of events, there is 
one order of events? Then, the mental and the physical properties express the 
event according to one order and connection of causes. Thus, property parallelism 
is also argued on the basis of identity between mental and physical events. 
In this way, if the mental and the physical event are one and the same event 
conceived in two different ways and if there is a parallel relationship between the 
mental and the physical event as well as the mental and the physical property due 
to identity of events, we should regard Spinoza's doctrine as a version of the 
double aspect theory, since the double aspect theory entails both identity and a 
parallel relationship between the mental and the physical as we shall see as follows. 
(2) Double Aspect Theory Entailing Identity and Property 
Parallelism 
Spinoza's identity doctrine is different from identity theories in 
contemporary philosophy, in the sense that he avoids versions of materialism (and 
versions of idealism). 4 At first, I take this difference as being derived from the fact 
' Concerning this Spinoza's states as follows: 
"[Tlhe circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are me 
and the same thing which is manifested through different attributes; and therefore, 
whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of 
thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or 
one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of 
things" (E, II, Prop 7, Schol; my italics). 
"[T]he mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the 
attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. For this reason, the order or 
concatenation of things is one, whether Nature be conceived under this or under that 
attribute, and consequently the order of the state of activity and passivity of our body is 
coincident in Nature with the order of state of activity and passivity of our mind" (E, HI, 
Prop 2, Schol; my italics). 
4 Douglas Odegard points out the difference between the identity doctrine in Spinoza and 
contemporary identity theories ("The Body Identical with the Human Mind: A Problem in 
Spinoza's Philosophy, " in Eugene Freeman and Maurice Mandelbaum [eds. ], Spinoza: Essays in 
Interpretation [LaSalle: Open Court, 1975], pp. 61-83). Stuart Hampshire also talks about a 
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that his identity theory is a version of the double aspect theory. For any kind of 
contemporary identity theory alleges that there exist only physical events, whereas 
for Spinoza, there is one thing which can be described either as mental or physical: 
the same set of events admits of two equally good and equally comprehensive 
descriptions. The main point in Spinoza's identity theory is that the mind and the 
body are one and the same thing, and this theory does not fall into materialism or 
idealism because the thing can be described as mental or physical equivalently. This 
is why Spinoza's identity theory differs from contemporary identity theories. 
Speaking more accurately, since Spinoza's assertion of identity between the mind 
and the body is posited on the double aspect theory which holds not only identity 
but also parallel manifestations, his claim of identity is distinct from the 
contemporary one. It may be argued that there is another version of the double 
aspect theory (the one-and-a half aspect theory), posited in the view that there are 
two sorts of description, but the physical one is best, so that when one thing is 
described as physical it is better than when the same thing is described as mental 
(and some contemporary versions of the double aspect theory are also 
materialistic). However, the original version of the double aspect theory is posited 
in the view that both aspects are equal: the parallelistic double aspect theory, as I 
would call it. Whenever I use the term "double aspect theory" in my thesis, I mean 
the original version unless it is indicated. Now, let us consider the double aspect 
theory with respect to identity and parallelism. 
First of all, I would like to point out that the equivalence between the mind 
and the body in the double aspect theory indicates that the double aspect theory is 
closely related to property parallelism. From this indication, we can assume that 
similar point: "There are two respects in which Spinoza's doctrine is altogether different from 
that of the ordinary scientific materialist: first, Spinoza held that there was a peculiar feature of 
psychic causality, which sets it apart from physical causality, namely, that a man's thought about 
the causes of his thoughts modifies the original thoughts: secondly, that the operations of the 
mind, when employed on its proper business of pure thought, are not to be explained in the 
common order of nature and by transient causes; the mind is capable of following an entirely 
rational order of thought, and of being altogether independent of external causes" ("Spinoza's 
Theory of Human Freedom, " in ibid., pp. 44-45). 
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double aspect theory entails both identity and property parallelism. 5 If the 
fundmental. feature of the double aspect theory is identity, and identity theory 
entails property paraRelism, it follows that the double aspect theory entails not only 
identity but also parallelism. The following definitioný of the double aspect theory 
sheds light on this point. 
Double Aspect Theory: ... The theory of the relation of the mind and the 
body, which teaches that mental and bodily facts are parallel manifestations of a 
single underlying unity. (my italics) 
The double aspect theory acknowledges the incomparability of material and 
conscious processes, and maintains the impossibility of reducing the one to the 
other,, in terms either of materialism or idealism (spiritualism). It professes to 
overcome the onesideness of these two theories by regarding both series as only 
different aspects of the same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a 
curve (G. H. Lewes); or, according to another favourite metaphor, the bodily and 
the mental facts are really the same facts expressed in different language. The 
most characteristic feature of the theory is its strenuous denial of the possibility 
of the causal interaction between the body and mind, or vice versa, in deference 
to the supposed necessities of the law of the conservation of energy. For 
interaction it substitutes parallelism or concomitance. Each side seems to "get 
along by itself, " or rather, as Bain puts it, "we have always a two-sided cause. 
The line of causal sequence is not mind causing body, and body causing mind, 
but mind-body giving birth to mind-body" ( Mind and Body, 132). This doctrine 
of "a double-faced unity, " as Bain calls it, has more recently appropriated to itself 
the name of MONISM. 
5 Parallelism can be the doctrine that mental events are distinct from, but run in step with, 
physical events. This is not a plausible interpretation of Spinoza (see chapter three, pp. 
67-71 
above). Property parallelism involves one set of events, equivalently describable. 
6 James Mark Baldwin (ed. ), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. I (New York: 
Macmillan, 1901), p. 295-296. 
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If identity theory is connected with parallelism (or vice versa) then that identity 
theory is the double aspect theory. 7 If one has a proper understanding of what the 
double aspect theory is, one can hardly fail to ascribe this theory to Spinoza. We 
should ascribe the double aspect theory to Spinoza while being aware that double 
aspect theory is the identity theory with (conceptual or property) parallelism. 
(3) Spinoza as a Double Aspect Theorist 
a. A Numerical Identity ofEvents: One Event with Two Properties 
Spinoza's claim of the numerical identity between the mind and the body 
can be understood either as clafinffig (1) the mental and the physical event are 
identical (are one and the same event), or (2) the mental and the physical property 
are identical (are one and the same property differently grasped). 
If we put these claims in terms of his metaphysics, (1) is that "the thinking 
substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, " and (2) is 
that "the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension are one and the same 
property. " In the case of (2), to argue the numerical identity, we would have to 
hold a somewhat sub ective view of the attributes: the difference between the 
mental and the physical property only reflects differences in our belief-contents, not 
in the facts targeted by those beliefs, and thus they are different ways of describing 
one property. Moreover, we cannot ascribe a real existence to these ways of 
conceiving the property. Thus, these ways in the case (2) are treated as being 
derived from a subjective view. This argument is simply that in order to explain 
that identity between the mental and the physical property a subjective 
interpretation of the attributes must be given. We saw, in the previous chapter, that 
7 The French and German equivalents of the term "double aspect theory" show some connection 
with identity and parallelism, respectively. "Ger. psycho-physischer Parallelismus [psycho- 
physical parallelism] (not an adNuate Nuivalent, unless connected with the identfty them o 
mind and )ody-K. G. ); Fr. Theorie de Punite a deux faces [double aspect unity theory]; Ital. 
teoria del doppio aspetto [double aspect theory]" (ibid., p. 295; my underlining). However, the 
terminological problem of the term "double aspect theory" is only a minor one. The important 
thing is to be aware of the fact that the double aspect theory denotes "the identity theory with 
property para e sm. 
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Spinoza does not hold the subjective interpretation of the attributes and thus that 
for Spinoza there is no (numerical) identity between the attributes of thought and 
extension. It follows that we have to take Spinoza's claim of identity between the 
mind and the body as presenting only an identity between the mental and the 
physical event. In my view, the relationship between the substance and the 
attributes of thought and extension is the same as the relationship between event 
(or individual) and the properties of mental and physical. This leads consequently 
to the perspective that the mental and the physical event are one and the same 
event with different properties or descriptions, just as the thinking and the 
extended substance are one and the same substance with different attributes of 
thought and extension. 
Spinoza regards the mind as the mode (the modification) of the substance 
under the attribute of thought and the body as the mode (the modification) of that 
substance under the attribute of extension. Namely, the mind is the modification of 
the substance conceived as a thinking thing and the body is the modification of the 
very same substance as the thing extended. If the mind and the body are not the 
modes of the attributes of thought and extension, but the modes of the one same 
substance through the attributes of thought and extension respectively, we can 
argue identity between the mind and the body while holding an objective 
interpretation of the attributes. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are not two 
different things, but rather one thing with two different properties or descriptions. 
In my view, the identity which Spinoza wants to claim is not type identity 
but token identity. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are identical to each other 
because they are one and the same individual while the mental and the physical 
properties do not count against an identity; we just leave them as different types. 
To discuss this issue, a comparison between type identity and token identity should 
be considered. A reductive type identity claims initially that: 
(1) There is one and the same individual (event) apparently having both mental and 
physical properties. 
(2) There is a systematic connection between these two apparent sorts of property. 
it is subsequently argued. 
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(3) We can reduce mental properties to physical properties. 
(4) So, there is only one sort of property, the physical. 
To be any kind of type identity theorist, it is integral to hold (1), (1), and in 
addition to hold that there is one sort of propriety. If a type identity theory is 
physicalist one it maintains (3) and (4) in addition, and if it is subjective one' it 
holds (1), (2), and (4) which is modified: (4)1 there is only one sort of property 
which can be seen as mental or physical. 
To be a token identity theorist, it is necessary to deny (3) and (4), but to 
hold (1). As to point (1), it is not necessary for a token identity theorist to deny 
this point; it is compatible with token identity. Although Davidson's token identity 
theory (anomalous monism) does not maintain point (2), it is not integral for token 
identity to deny those points. 
Spinoza's mind-body theory maintains points (1) and (1), and denies (3) 
and (4), and thus his theory can perhaps best be classified as a token identity 
theory, 9 Spinoza's argument of a systematic connection between the mental 
property and the physical property may lead us to think that his theory is a kind of 
type identity theory. However, that argument is irrelevant to such a type identity 
theory, since the reason for a systematic connection is not on account of the 
reduction of the mental to the physical property as type identity argues. For 
Spinoza, there is no such identity between them. 
The fact that Spinoza holds substance monism and property dualism 
(attribute dualism) which is given an objective interpretation suggests that 
Spinoza's mind-body theory is a kind of token identity theory. Since Spinoza does 
not assert that the identity between the attribute of thought and the attribute of 
extension, but rather maintains the separation of the attributes, it is hardly possible 
to argue that the mental and the physical property are identical to each other. The 
8 By a subjective type identity theory, I mean the theory is presented by claiming that there are no 
mental nor physical properties, but there are only the (neutral) properties which are seen as 
mental or physical; if the subjective interpretation of Spinoza's concept of the attributes were 
right, we would have to interpret Spinoza as a subjective type identity theorist. 
9 If the subjective interpretation of the attributes were adequate, Spinoza's theory would be 
subjective type identity theory. 
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fact that Spinoza holds the objective interpretation implies that he argues identity 
between the mind and body not as the same type but as the same individual. 
Whenever Spinoza claims identity between the mind and the body, he 
suggests their identity as an individual or a thing and leaves the attributes as the 
different types: 
Tbus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one 
and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, 11, Prop 7, 
Schol; my italics) 
[T]he mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at 
one time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another 
under that of extension. (E, H, Prop 2 1, Demon; my italics) 
These statements make it quite clear that even though there are differences 
between the mind and the body, they are one and the same thing with two different 
aspects. In other words, the mental event and the physical event are one and the 
same event although the mental properties are different from the physical 
properties. In this way, if we argue the identity theory while holding the objective 
interpretation, our arguments should be tied up with the substance monism and 
property dualism. 
b. Token Double Aspect Theory 
I classify the above theory of Spinoza's as the version of the double aspect 
theory which maintains both an identity and a parallel relationship. However, we 
need to specify this double aspect theory if we are to entertain Spinoza's double 
aspect theory. We can think of two kinds of double aspect theory: 
(1) Token double aspect theory: this is posited on an objective interpretation of the 
attributes. The mental and the physical event are one and the same event 
expressed in the Merent aspects: here "aspect" is used as a metaphor for the 
properties or attributes which express or describe the essence. And there is a 
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parallel relationship between the (apparent) mental and the (apparent) physical 
event as well as the mental and the physical properties (two aspects): the 
former is conceptual parallelism in events and the latter property parallelism (or 
ontological parallelism in properties). 
(2) Type double aspect theory: this is posited on a subjective interpretation of the 
attributes. The mental and the Physical properties are one and the same 
property expressed in the different aspects: here "aspect" is used in the literal 
sense, a point of view. The one (neutral) property is seen as mental and 
physical. And the property seen as mental and the property seen as physical are 
parallel to each other (due to the fact that they are identical). This parallelism is 
not property parallelism (or ontological parallelism in properties), but 
conceptual parallelism in properties! 0 
Certainly, Spinoza claims the first one, token double aspect theory, as he 
holds an objective view of the attributes. Unlike Davidson's anomalous monism, a 
token identity theory, Spinoza's token double aspect theory argues not only an 
identity of individuals but also a systematic connection between the mental and the 
physical properties. (Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, Spinoza also 
claims representationalism in his mind-body theory). Unlike the reductive type 
identity theory (and the subjective type identity theory), Spinoza does not argue 
identity between the mental and the physical properties. He claims only a 
systematic connection between two properties. Before Davidson, Spinoza had 
already distinguished token from type identity and had claimed token identity 
(although he did not use the term nor did he formulate the concept clearly). In this 
way, Spinoza argues that there is one event with different sorts of mental and 
physical properties, and that these two sorts of properties are systematically 
connected. Thus, his mind-body theory should be regarded as the double aspect 
theory based on the token identity of events, and for this reason, if we need a label 
for his theory, I should like to call it a token double aspect theory. 
" 
10 Concerning events, it is also conceptual parallelism in events. 
11 Alternatively, we can call it a systematic token identity theory-, one might wish to call it a non- 
reductive type identity theory, but this is misleading. As we have seen, although 
for Spinoza there 
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2 Some Criticisms of the Douhle Aspect Interpretation 
There have been objections to the double aspect interpretation of the 
attributes and of the mind-body theory in Spinoza. In the following two sections, I 
shall consider those criticisms. In this section, I shall explore J. B. Bakker's 
objection which is raised in his article "Did Spinoza Have a Double Aspect 
Theory?, " and in the next section, I shall consider all the other criticisms which I 
have detected so far. Bakker's article is intended to raise two objections to the 
double aspect theory: firstly, an objection to the terms used in the argument 
("double, " "aspect") and secondly, to the argument itself. I shall, in subsection 1, 
describe Bakker's arguments, and in subsection 2,1 shall criticise some points of 
his argument. 
(1) Bakker's Rejection of the Double Aspect Theory 
a. The Terms "Double I't and "Aspect" 
In his article, Bakker asserts that the expression of attribute is the most 
important part in interpreting Spinoza's metaphysics and the mind-body theory. 
Following this, in section 11, he moves on to reject the double aspect theory by 
pointing out the inadequacy of the term "double" and "aspect. " 
First of all, he deals with the term "double. " He argues that the double 
aspect interpretation is misleading because Spinoza's attributes are not two but 
infinite. He tries to make this point clear by showing that even if humans know 
only two attributes of thought and extension and do not know the other attributes, 
we express more than two i. e. the infinite attributes (aspects). Due to the above 
fact, he claims, placing the double aspect label on Spinoza is mistaken, because 
"double" suggests only two aspects unlike the infinite aspects in Spinoza's 
is a systematic connection (a parallel relationship) between mental and physical properties, since 
one is not reduced to the other, there is no identity between two sorts of properties or types. 
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system. 12 This objection does not upset the basic strength of the interpretation; if 
anything it shows only that the label could be misleading if we are thinking of God 
rather than humans. Regarding the first problem of the terms, it seems to be right 
to say that the terms are misleading although it is, as Bakker admits, a minor point. 
Perhaps the term "double" is not compatible with Spinoza's claim that there are 
not two attributes but infinite attributes, and therefore it should be infinite aspects 
rather than two aspects. However, I think that since Spinoza mostly talks of just 
two attributes it is a permissible way of speaking. 
Next, he moves on to the more substantial point with respect to the term 
"aspect. " After he points out the term "aspect" is not used by Spinoza, he 
maintains that "aspect" is not an accurate term to explain Spinoza's metaphysical 
system. The reason is that the term 44aspect" cannot refer to "the whole" but refers 
only to "the part": Spinoza's attributes express the essence of the one substance 
while the term "aspect" implies that it cannot express the essence of that substance 
since it is only a partial appearance. " Thus, he states "it would be equally 
nonsensical to argue that one part of a thing could constitute its essence. , 14 AIS05 
just as it is not possible to regard the attributes as different aspects of one 
substance, so the mind and the body cannot be regarded as different aspects of a 
single human being. At this stage, Bakker is maintaining that a mode cannot be an 
aspect which is a partial appearance, because a mode is the complete expression of 
a substance within an attribute. " He recognises a possible objection to the above 
point: "[The mind and the body] do only imperfectly express the essence of 
substance. , 16 Against this, he defends his view by arguing that his point concerns 
not substance but person: either the mind or the body expresses the essence of the 
person, but if the mind and the body are aspects of the person, they cannot express 
the essence of the person because aspects are not an essential but merely a partial 
" Jonathan Bushnell Bakker, "Did Spinoza Have a Double Aspect Theory? " International 
Studies, vol. 14 (1982), p. 5. 
13 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
14 Ibid., p. 6. 
15 Jbidy pp. 6-7. 
16 Ibid., p. 7. 
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appearance. 17 In his words, "though the person, understood either as a mind or as a 
body, is, as a mode, an incomplete expression of substance, it does not follow that 
mind and body is an incomplete expression of what the person is. "" Therefore, his 
point is that with respect both to thought and extension of substance and to the 
mind and the body of person, the term "aspect" is not appropriate and should be 
avoided, since "aspect" is not a sufficient term to represent Spinoza's attributes- 
doctrine and the mind-body theory. 
b. Equivalence-Identity 
Bakker, in section 111, suggests that we should use the term "identity 
theory" as a substitute for the term "double aspect theory" as being a more 
appropriate term. His main argument for identity theories is as follows: in 
Spinoza's system, each attribute equivalently constitutes as well as equivalently 
expresses the essence of the one same substance, hence all the attributes are 
identical in substance. As with the attributes, the mind and the body are also 
identical with each other because they equivalently express the same person and 
also the same substance through the attributes of thought and extension. Thus, he 
designates this relation as an "equivalence-identity" and he emphasises that this 
identity is a non-reductive identity unlike traditional materialism and many other 
contemporary identity theories which hold that the mind is a part of the body. 19 
Regarding the theory of "equivalence-identity, " he states that "the mind and the 
body must be understood as independent, but nevertheless equivalent, expressions 
of the essence and existence of the person. 9120 
He tries to make clear the difference between the double aspect theory and 
the theory of "equivalence-identity" by using the analogy of a concavo-convex 
object. For instance, the concave surface and the convex surface of a lens are not 
the same surface although they are surfaces (aspects) of the same lens, whereas a 
17 ibid., pp. 7-8. 
18 Ibid., p. 7. 
19 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
20 ibid., P. i i. 
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curved line is one and the same line which is at once both concave and convex; 
therefore the concave is one and the same line as the convex .2' According to 
Bakker, the former is an analogy of the double aspect theory and the latter is an 
analogy of the equivalence-identity theory: "[A] concavo-convex line is therefore 
a good example of the identity of mind and body for which Spinoza argued. -)922 
From the analogies, I take his point as meaning that in the case of the former the 
concave and the convex are only partial characterizations of the same lens, while in 
the latter they are essential and complete expressions of the same line. With this 
analogy, he describes his perspective on Spinoza's theory as follows. 
Just as two different descriptions of the same concavo-convex line may 
appear to be descriptions of two different lines to someone ignorant of 
the nature of lines, in the same way mind and body appear to be 
different entities because we are ignorant of the nature of individual 
diings, what Spinoza called "modes. ,, 23 
In this way, Bakker argues that we should pay more attention to the concept of 
expression in Spinoza's system. We can summarise his claim as follows: Spinoza 
has an identity theory as to attributes and mind/body, and this theory is based on 
the concept of expression within which each attribute equivalently expresses the 
essence of substance. Thus according to Bakker, we should call this theory an 
equivalence-identity theory rather than a double aspect theory. 
(2) Remarks on Bakker Is Arguments 
Bakker claims that the term "aspect" is an inadequate word for explaining 
the essential expression, since this term refers only to partial expression of 
substance. Bakker says that this point is more substantial than the problem of the 
term "double. " However, even if he is right about the term "aspect, " it is not 
21 bid., P. 11-12. 
22 Ibid., P. 12. 
23 Ibid, P. 14. 
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substantial but still only a minor point. As long as it concerns merely the misleading 
choice of the term "aspect" it does not affect the theory as we have expressed it; it 
is only the problem of the usage of the term. 
Bakker speaks of two theories in his article, and these are as follows. 
(1) a double aspect theory: he criticises this for not expressing the essence of the 
substance but only referring to a partial aspect . 
(2) an equivalence-identity theory: he introduces this theory as a new interpretation 
of Spinoza or as an improvement of the double aspect theory, i. e. the 
equivalence-identity theory; which he thinks is an adequate interpretation of 
Spinoza's attribute-doctrine and mind-body theory since this theory refers to 
an essential expression of substance unlike the double aspect theory. 
However, the former is not the commonly-held version of the double aspect 
theory. Rather, the latter is what the double aspect theory holds. In fact, the former 
perhaps represents Bennett's position, whereby there are fundamental trans- 
attributive modes comb' i with thought and extension. The double aspect theory Ming 
as normally expounded does not argue for the partial appearance or expression of 
the basic properties of a person, but that the attributes express as well as constitute 
those basic properties, not partially but completely and equivalently. Thus, 
Bakker's equivalence identity interpretation is not a new interpretation but only the 
repetition of the argument of double aspect theory under another name. 
Indeed, the analogy of the concavo-convex line which Bakker uses is 
actually used in the definition of the double aspect theory, as by Baldwin. 
24 
Another point which Bakker stresses is the complete and essential expression of 
substance in each of the attributes. But we can find this point in the double aspect 
theory, too. W. von Leyden, who holds what he calls a double aspect interpretation 
of Spinoza, claims: "In its own sphere each of the two phenomena would seem to 
24 Baldwin writes: "[The double aspect theory] professes to overcome the onesidedness of these 
two theories [materialism and idealism] by regarding both series as only different aspects of the 
same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a curve (G. 
H. Lewes); or, according to 
another favourite metaphor, the bodily and the mental facts are really the same 
facts expressed in 
different language, (Baldwin [ed. ], op. cit., vol. 1, p. 295). 
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be a complete and true expression of one and the same underlying reality. "25 
Therefore, it is evident that Bakker's interpretation is nothing but the contents of 
the double aspect theory under another name. In fact, we entirely agree with the 
content of his article and take it (terminology apart) as supporting the double 
aspect theory. 
Wallace 1. Matson similarly criticises the term "aspect": 
The other label that one finds in the text books, "double aspect theory, " 
presumably derives from the remark just quoted, "one and the same thing 
expressed in two different ways" ("una eademque est res, sed duobus 
modis expressa"). But this says nothing of two aspects, only of two 
expressions. The difference is important. Two aspects require two 
observers, or at least two observation points; and what might those be? That 
is how mythological entities proliferate. 26 
From one point of view, Matson does not criticise the double aspect interpretation 
of Spinoza, but merely criticises the terminology of the double aspect theory; he 
interprets "aspect" very literally. As I have already argued in the last section, the 
term "aspect" is related to "expressions, " "explanations, " or "descriptions" in the 
argument of the double aspect theory of Spinoza. 27 In fact, one of the main 
concepts in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza is the concept of 
expressions. On the other hand, Matson may be indicating that there is no need to 
infer two sets of properties from two descriptions. This brings us on to the 
subjective interpretation of the attributes. 
25 W. von Leyden, Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1968), p. 193. 
26 Wallace 1. Matson, "Spinoza's Theory of Mind, " in Eugene Freeman and Maurice (eds. ), 
Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation (LaSalle: Open Court, 1975), pp. 55-56. 
27 The phrase "considered under the attribute of. . ." is another phrase which 
Spinoza uses. 
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3. Attributes and the Double Aspect Theory 
(1) The Subjective Interpretation 
Next, to the double aspect theory and subjective interpretation, which R. J. 
Delahunty briefly states as follows. 
On this interpretation, 'the double aspect theory "explains" psycho-physical 
correlations by saying that one and the same event, which is neither mental 
or physical, may be apprehended introspectively or perceptively: insofar as it 
is apprehended in the former way it is mental, insofar as it is apprehended in 
28 the latter way, it is physical' . 
We need not tarry long over this interpretation; it commits at least three 
straightforward errors, all of them involving the mistaken 'subjectivist' 
account of the attributes. First, in supposing that the attributes are 'aspect', 
it implies that they depend on being perceived (Yesey (1), 29 P. 146)-5 
second, it asserts that for Spinoza things in themselves are unknowable 
(which he denies) and neither mental nor physical (when he holds they are 
both); third, it takes Spinoza to claim that the 'mental' is the introspectible, 
and the physical the perceptible (which in Spinoza's terms would be to 
make the attributes derive from introspecting and perceiving, when these 
are only modes of thought). 30 
If the double aspect theory is held on the basis of the subjective interpretation of 
the attributes and the subjective interpretation is not an adequate point of view of 
Spinoza, as Delahunty states, it is hardly possible to regard Spinoza's theory as a 
double aspect theory. Now I shall deal with the above criticisms in turn. 
Among the above criticisms, the first point is more or less along the same 
line as Matson's criticism as to the requirement of two observation points. Here, I 
28This is Pap's double aspect interpretation of Spinoza. See A. Pap, The Elements of Analytical 
Philosophy (Now York, 1972), pp. 278-279. 
29 G. Vesey, "Agent and Spectator: the Double Aspect Theory, " in The Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Lectures, vol. 1 (London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 139-159. 
'0 Rý J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 194-195. 
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agree with Delahunty's statement regarding attributes and aspects within the 
double aspect theory. However, I would question the implication he draws from 
this, namely that they depend on being perceived as in the next phrase. In our 
ordinary sense of the term "aspect, " an "aspect" implies a point of view. On the 
subjective interpretation, the same is true, since the human mind perceives the 
attributes of thought and extension. However, the ordinary sense of the term 
44aspect" is not important in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza. We have 
to remember that the term "aspects" is a metaphor. W. von Leyden who holds the 
double aspect interpretation of Spinoza states 44[i]n its own sphere each of the two 
phenomena would seem to be a complete and true expression of one and the same 
underlying reality, "" and he also says: "We should now consider some of the 
details of the double-aspect theory. The doctrine is that an God's attributes, among 
them thought and extension, are irreducible aspects of one and the same real 
reality, and while each is always found together with the others they an express 
reality or any part of it in fiffl measure by themselves separately. "32 
Next, concerning the second criticism, I do not think that this point can be 
applied to the double aspect theory of Spinoza. Delahunty asserts that the point 
that things are neither mental nor physical is contrary to Spinoza's position because 
Spinoza holds they are both. However, this point does not belong to the double 
aspect theory of Spinoza. In fact, for Spinoza, things are both mental and physical 
as Delahunty states in the bracket, and this is what the double aspect interpretation 
holds. In different versions of the double aspect theory, things can be both mental 
and physical or neither mental nor physical; Delahunty assumes that a double 
aspect theory must hold the latter, but it is hard to see the reason why. It is 
certainly a misunderstanding of Spinoza's theory. It is evident that Spinoza holds 
that substance is mental as well as physical: "Thought is an attribute of God, or 
God is a thinking thing" (E, 11, Prop 1), "Extension is an attribute of God, or God 
is an extended thing" (E, 11, Prop 2). Therefore, even if some double aspect 
interpretations hold that things are neither mental nor physical as in Pap's point of 
31 W. von Leyden, op. cit., P. 193. 
32 Ibid., p. 192. 
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view cited by Delahunty, and even if some general definitions of double aspect 
theory also hold the same explanation, when we talk about Spinoza's case it has to 
be posited that things are both mental and physical. With respect to an inadequate 
double aspect interpretation, Delahunty's second criticism is right, but regarding an 
adequate interpretation, his criticism is not valid. " A more adequate interpretation 
is available as follows. 
We can find an adequate double aspect interpretation from Leyden's 
perspective. I shall quote his statements: "[E]very finite mode of substance, i. e. 
every individual object or person, must likewise be characterizable in terms of all 
the attributes of substance, certainly of the two known ones, thought and 
extension. ý134 He also states that "any of the finite things that make up reality must 
at one and the same time both have a mind, or at least be a thought or an idea, and 
also have a body, or at least be extended, , 3' and "every mode of existence must be 
characterizable by extension as well as thought. ýý36 Kenneth Blackwell also holds 
this point of view: "Thus what Spinoza holds is a double-aspect theory-as Russell 
says, every event is both a physical and a mental event, as well as an infinity of 
other kinds of events, since there are an infinite number of attributes (E 1P 11). iý37 
From the above statements, we can see that the second criticism cannot be applied 
to an adequate double aspect interpretation of Spinoza. 
As to the third criticism, that the introspectible and the perceptible are both 
only modes of thought, the same explanation can be attached. That is to say, it 
cannot be available within an adequate double aspect theory such as Leyden's 
interpretation. It is not the mode of apprehension, but what is apprehended that 
matters. The problem for Delahunty is that he only considers Pap's interpretation 
of the double aspect theory and does not address any alternative interpretation. 
33 Even though he mentions that there are more plausible double aspect interpretations such as 
Vesey and Leyden, he does not describe or criticize these interpretations but merely mentions the 
fact that "[t]here are, of course, forms of the Dual Aspect Theory which are more plausible than 
Pap's" (R- I Delahunty, op. cit., p. 195). 
34 W. von Leyden, op. cit., p. 192. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 Kenneth Blackwell, The Spinozaistic Ethics ofBertrand Russell (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1985), p. 86. 
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Due to this fact, all his three criticisms are very limited. But these criticisms apply 
only to Pap's (and related) explanations and not to other more valid explanations. 
When the double aspect interpretation is posited on the objective interpretation of 
the attributes, those criticisms are not valid. 
(2) The Compatibility between the Double Aspect Theory and the 
Objective Interpretation 
Is the subjective interpretation of attributes integral to the double aspect 
interpretation of Spinoza? I think not. The double aspect interpretation does not 
have to be posited on the subjective interpretation, according to which attributes 
are illusory and there is no real Merence between mind and body. 
Those who think that the double aspect theory must be given a subjective 
interpretation argue that the mental and the physical properties are identical to each 
other, whereas for Spinoza there is no identity between the mental and the physical 
property: for Spinoza what is identical is the mental and the physical event. This is 
compatible with the objective interpretation of the attributes. We should not 
confuse the property with the substance double aspect theory. The double aspect 
interpretation is compatible with not only the subjective interpretation of attributes 
but also the objective interpretation. 
Now, I shall give another approach to my explanation of this compatibility. 
Because the term "aspect" is regarded as a way of conceiving or looking at a single 
substance, this theory can be misunderstood if it is taken to be only posited on the 
subjective interpretation. However, I should like to recall the fact that this is a 
metaphor to explain that each attribute expresses the essence of substance in its 
own way. When we define the attributes as existing outside our mind in the 
objective interpretation, the double aspect theory can still be held. In this case, 
44aspects" are not the concept in our mind or the concept from our percelvmg, but 
what express the essence of substance. Therefore, whether the attributes are 
subjective or objective does not depend upon the double aspect theory; if one has 
the subjective point of view of the attribute one can claim the double aspect theory, 
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and if one has the objective interpretation, one can also claim the double aspect 
theory. The double aspect theory is compatible with the objective interpretation. 
The most common reason people do not take the double aspect theory as 
an adequate interpretation of Spinoza is because they think that this theory must be 
given a subjective interpretation. Why must this theory be given such an 
interpretation? The term "aspect" leads them to think so. Just as two aspects are 
posited on the subjective view, so are attributes of thought and extension, which 
are equivalent to the term "aspect, " posited on the subjective view. But the fact 
that the double aspect theory must be given a subjective interpretation cannot be 
derived from a literal meaning of the term "aspect, " since it is used as a metaphor. 
Thus we can interpret Spinoza as a double aspect theorist whilst holding an 
objective interpretation. 
The attributes in the double aspect theory under the objective 
mterpretation, can be explained from our familiar analogy of the tune, which is 
played on the piano, hummed, written in musical notation, inscribed on bits of 
plastic, or fixed on tape by magnetism. The infinite ways of expression are 
equivalent, since they express the essence of the same tune, and they are different 
since they have their own ways of expressing it. Just as in this example, so there 
actually exist infinite ways of expressing the essence of substance, and these ways 
correspond to the attributes. They exist not merely in our mind but exist outside 
our mind i. e. exist objectively. The above explanation can be classified as the 
objective interpretation. And, the "aspects" in the double aspect interpretation 
should be understood in the same sense as that the attributes are the ways of 
expressing the essence of substance; therefore, we can designate these attributes as 
44aspects. " In this way, the double aspect theory can be posited on the objective 
interpretation. 
Consequently, if there is one substance and there are ways of expressing the 
essence of this substance as in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza, the 
ways can exist in our mind as in the subjective interpretation, and the ways can also 
exist outside our mind as in the objective interpretation. Hence, we can say that 
there is no problem in maintaining the compatibility between the double aspect 
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interpretation and the objective interpretation, and therefore the double aspect 
interpretation cannot be criticised in terms of criticisms of the subjective 
interpretation as long as it can hold the objective interpretation. 
4. Bennett and Delia Rocca 
(1) Properties and Events: Partial and Numerical Identity 
Apart from my view i. e. a token double aspect theory, the following 
interpretations are possible of Spinoza's claim of identity between the mental and 
the physical. 
(1) Bennett: there is (partial) identity between the mental and the physical property 
in terms of F, trans-attribute mode, and this is what Spinoza regards as identity 
between the mind and the body. 
(2) Della Rocca: there is a single set of transparent (extensional) properties which 
are conceived as mental or physical; the same properties (for example, "having 
five immediate effects" and "being a complex individual") are conceived in 
different ways. There is also a numerical identity between mental and physical 
events; the former identity i. e. identity between properties implies the latter 
identity i. e. identity between events, as type identity implies token identity. 
(This view can be regarded as a type double aspect theory). " 
Regarding Bennett's interpretation, the partial identity is not what Spinoza 
wants to claim. Of course, by partial identity through the concept of 'T, " Bennett's 
aitn is not to explain identity between properties but to explain property 
parallelism. But the problem for Bennett is that he does not claim a genuine 
identity such as a numerical identity between events or properties. As Della Rocca 
says in criticism, Bennett wrongly rules out event-identity, and he considers that 
the partial identity between properties is what Spinoza wishes to claim. However, 
38 The interpretations of Bennett and Della Rocca were examined in chapter three. 
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for Spinoza, the mind and the body are one and the same thing or individual, and 
thus we have to explain Spinoza's argument of identity in terms of some kind of 
numerical identity between events. 
Next, Della Rocca's numerical interpretation of both events and properties 
has the following problem. Della Rocca explains a numerical identity of properties 
by claiming that the mental properties are neutral properties seen as mental and the 
physical properties are the same properties seen as physical. If this is what Della 
Rocca claims, this is apparently no more than a subjective interpretation. In other 
words, he has to hold a subjective interpretation of the attributes, which is 
implausible in the interpretations of Spinoza. We cannot argue a numerical identity 
between the mental and the physical property without a subjective interpretation of 
the attributes. 
Could we regard Della Rocca as arguing that the intensional properties are 
real and distinct properties, but ones which do not count against an identity of 
events? In that case, Della Rocca need not be arguing for the identity ofproperties, 
since intensional properties would stiff be real properties although insignificant in 
claiming identity. 
Let us consider Della Rocca's problem in some more detail. In brief, the 
elements of Della Rocca's position are as follows: 
(1) Event-identity: there is an identity between mental and physical events. 
(2) Property-identity: there is an identity between mental and physical properties. 
(3) The objective interpretation of the attributes: each attribute distinctly exists. 
Now, as we have seen, Della Rocca's position on the reality of properties is 
ambiguous due to the fact that his treatment of intensional properties is unclear. 
His position could be explained in the following two ways. 
(A) There are only neutral properties, which can be approached in a mental way 
and a physical way: the mental and the physical properties are intensional 
properties. Intensional properties are not real properties and thus there are no 
real mental and physical properties. There are no mental properties as such: 
only mental ways of seeing the neutral properties. The mental and the physical 
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are but two ways of conceiving the same properties. The same properties are 
conceived in different ways. This is in effect what I have been caffing 
conceptual parallelism. 
(B) Not only extensional properties but also intensional properties (mental and 
physical properties) are real properties. But, these intensional properties are 
strange properties which do not count against the identity of things possessing 
one of those properties and not another: intensional properties do not affect 
the scope of identity between things or events. 39 
I think that Della Rocca is unclear and perhaps inconsistent concerning two 
positions, but in my reading of him, his intention is normaRy to maintain (A). 
'9 1 shall offer Della Rocca's statements concerning (A) and (B). Apart from Della Rocca's 
argument of "referential opacity" in causal context and of its transmission to attribute context, we 
can find the fact that he holds (A) from the following statements: "Throughout this chapter I have 
relied on the view that, for Spinoza, various kinds of properties are intensional. As I mentioned in 
the preface, this intensionality involves a kinds of relativity: An object has, for example, the 
property of being physical only relative to a certain manner of conceiving or describing it. This 
conception- or description-relativity of mental and physical properties in general is additional to 
the mind-relativity of content in particular" (Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body 
Problem in Spinoza, p. 139). 
On the other hand, the statements which lead us to thinking that Della Rocca holds (B) are as 
follows: "There are certain kinds of properties that are such that the fact that a has properties of 
that kind, and b does not, does not by itself undermine the claim that a=b. The properties not 
included within the scope of the above principle are, of course, the intensional properties" (ibid., 
p. 130), and again "According to Leibniz's Law, we can determine whether a mode of extension 
and the idea of that mode are numerically identical by determining whether they have all their 
extensional properties in common. Intensional properties are irrelevant in deciding the issue of 
identity" (ibid., p. 132). 
However, the last two quotations concerning (B) do not rule out the possibility of holding (A): we 
can still maintain (A) in these quotations, whereas we cannot maintain (13) in the first quotation. 
In the case of (A), if the neutral property is (say) "having five effects, " the intensional properties 
are (say) "having five mental effects" and "having five physical effects" since these properties are 
the neutral properties described in the mental and the physical ways, respectively. When the 
neutral properties are seen as mental or physical these properties are (become) intentional 
properties and thus they should not be included within the scope of identity-, they should be 
irrelevant in determining the issue if identity. When these mental or physical descriptions peel off 
the intensional properties are (become) the neutral properties and thus we can determine identity 
of the mind and the body by determining whether the mind and the body have all these neutral 
properties in common. Thus, the last two quotations can be understood as follows: 
in determining 
identity between the mind and the body, we have to rule out these properties when they are seen 




However, whether Della Rocca's position is (A) or (B), he has the following 
problems. In the case of (A), it is incompatible with point (3) i. e. the objective 
interpretation: the argument (A) has to be given a subjective interpretation of the 
attributes. And in the case of (B), it destroys point (2) i. e. property-identity. 
If Della Rocca's argument is that there is a numerical identity between 
events and properties, his interpretation ought to be regarded as a version of 
double aspect theory in the sense of type identity (which should be posited on the 
subjective interpretation of the attributes); and if his argument is that there is 
identity between events, and that there is no identity between properties, his 
interpretation is a version of a token double aspect theory, which should be given 
the objective interpretation, as does my interpretation of Spinoza. In both cases, 
there is a problem concerning the relation of neutral properties to essence of 
substance. Those two concepts are not argued in a consistent manner as we shall 
see in the following section, despite the fact that Spinoza's mind-body theory 
follows his one substance doctrine, and that Della Rocca accepts this view. 
(2) Trans-Attribute Modes, Neutral Properties, and "What Is 
Structurally Common" 
To consolidate a grasp of the Oferences among Bennett, Della Roeea, and 
my view, it is worthwhile to compare interpretations of essence in Spinoza's 
theory: trans-attribute modes for Bennett, neutral properties for Della Rocca, and 
"what is structurally common" for my view. Spinoza does not explicitly claim any 
one of those concepts. However, we have to infer some concept 
from the 
contextual sense, if we hope to make sense of Spinoza. Let us 
firstly compare 
Bennett's concept of "trans-attribute mode" with my concept of 
"what is 
structurally common. " 
a. Bennett 
Bennett claims the concept of trans-attributes mode on the basis of the 
fact 
that the essence (the most fundamental property) is not the attributes. 
This fact is 
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inferred from his reading of the phrase "which the intellect perceives of ' as 
referring to something illusory: consequently, the attributes do not constitute the 
essence of the substance and thus the essence is something beyond the attributes 
i. e. "the trans-attribute differentiae or modes. " 
The source of my concept of "what is structuraRy common" is somewhat 
like Bennett's F, trans-attribute Merentiae: both concepts rely on the fact that the 
most fundamental properties are not attributes but the essence. However, in my 
view, unlike that of Bennett, there is a sense in which the attributes constitute the 
essence; there is no illusion for the infinite intellect. The reasons why the attributes 
are disregarded as the essences in my view, as we saw in the preceding chapter, are 
as follows: firstly, Spinoza's assertion of essence does not allow us to consider 
many essences for one substance, and secondly, there is a sense in which the 
person humming and the person whistling are doing the same thing-they are both 
g lvmg . 
40 And the essence as what is structurally common to all the ii the same tune 
attributes is not beyond the attributes, but is in them, whereas Bennett's essence as 
trans- attribute mode is beyond essence owing to the fact that the attributes do not 
constitute the essence. The difference, consequently, makes the different fon-nats of 
the mental and physical property in the following way. 
We have already seen that Bennett introduces the concept of "trans- 
attribute mode" and tries to explain parallelism by means of these trans-attribute 
modes; in Bennett's interpretation, therefore, there are "thought + F, " and 
"extension +F. " Bennett tries to clarify this by means of an analogy. A circle is a 
two-dimensional figure having all its points equidistant from a given point; a sphere 
is a three-dimensional figure having all its points equidistant from a central point. 
On the analogy, the property of having all points equidistant from a given point is 
F, incapable of being grasped on its own. Circularity (two-dimensionality) and 
Sphericity (three-ditnensionality) correspond to the attributes, which are taken as 
fundamental (even by God) but are not really so. F guarantees a correspondence 
between circles and spheres. 
40 For the tune analogy, see pp. 127-128 in chapter four. 
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My view is, on the face of it, somewhat similar. The tune can be expressed 
on many instruments, or written down, or whistled. But there is nothing we fail to 
grasp. The tune is not something whose pure nature is hidden behind the hummed 
or trumpeted notes. We perceive what they have in common, a that there is to 
perceive, when we match these trumpeted sounds, these whistled sounds, these 
marks on paper, these grooves on plastic. It is true that in this analogy what these 
things share is obvious. Whereas parallelism of the mental and the physical is not 
(though Spinoza seems to have been conceived of it). Furthermore, in my view, the 
essence is shown in each attribute as the tune is in them, whereas for Bennett, the 
essence is a separate, indescribable property: F is in principle separable from the 
two-dimensionality and the three-dimensionality, though even God cannot separate 
it in thought. From this, we can consequently see that why Bennett presents the 
mental and the physical as "the attribute of thought-and-F" and "the attribute of 
extension-and-P to explain parallelism. In contrast with this, on my interpretation, 
there is nothing which God fails to do in separating the essence, any more that one 
fails if one cannot give a tune without humming it or writing it down, or whistling 
it, etc. The mental and the physical property correspond to the attributes of 
thought and extension, since my concept of essence is in them, as what they both 
express. We cannot say what that is, but we can show what it iS. 41 
b. Della Rocca 
Next, let us compare Della Rocca's concept of neutral property and my 
concept of what is structurally common. On interpretation (A) above, the 
difference lies in that Della Rocca's neutral property involves numerical identity 
between the mental and the physical properties, whereas for me "what is 
structurally common7' does not involve numerical identity (even partial identity) 
between them; it only covers identity between mental and physical events. In my 
interpretation, unlike that of Della Rocca, one property is not seen as a mental 
41 it is as if one could not state, but only show, what the circle and spherre have in common. 
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property or a physical property, although one event is seen as mental or physical. 
On interpretation (B) above, this difference would disappear, but others remain. 
Another difference is that I see "what is structurally commoW' as essence, 
while for Della Rocca, the relation of the neutral, transparent properties to essence 
is not clear: he does not seem to identify essence with these neutral, transparent 
properties. In my case "what is structurally common" is derived from the 
relationship between essence and attribute, whereas Della Rocca asserts the 
opacity of causality permits neutral properties. However, the difference concerning 
the source is not so important, if Della Rocca's concept of neutral property is 
compatible with Spinoza's position. The point is that although Della Rocca does 
not infer this concept from the relationship between essence and attribute (and this 
is his aim, to show identity between the mind and the body without relying on the 
one substance doctrine), this concept should be compatible with Spinoza's doctrine 
of essence. 
However, Della Rocca runs into trouble on this point, as follows. When 
Della Rocca interprets the mind-body theory of Spinoza, he argues that there is a 
neutral way to describe the substance and this is why there are neutral properties. 
He claims that "[a]lthough there are no trans-attribute modes on the numerical 
identity interpretation, there are ways of describing modes in neutral terms, that is, 
terms that do not presuppose any particular attribute. -A2 This leads us to think that 
the essence can be described in a neutral way. The individual is not confined to one 
attribute: there is mind-body identity. Hence, one would suppose, what it is to be 
an individual must be something not confined to the mental or the physical, and 
neutral properties seem to fit the bill. However, when Della Rocca considers the 
essence of the substance, he explains it not in terms of attribute-neutral properties 
but in an infinite way i. e. the way of having all attributes. He states: 
But there is an important way of describing God under which we have not as 
yet specified God's essence. Here God is not described as the thinkirýg 
substance in particular, or as the extended substance in particular, but rather 
42 Della Rocca., Representation and the Mind-Bocýy Problem in Spinoza., p. 159. 
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as God simpliciter. As ldef6 points out, God is defined as the substance of 
infmitely many (that is, all) attributes. Thus, to describe the substance simply 
as God is equivalent to describing it as the substance of infinitely many 
attributes. Under this description, God's essence cannot be constituted solely 
by thought or solely by extension. ... It seems, then, that under the 
descriptions "God" or "the substance of infinitely many attributes, " the 
essence of God is either constituted by all the attributes together or is not 
constituted by any of the attributes. 43 
He goes on: 
[I]t follows that the essence of God under this description is to be such that 
for each attribute X, God is describable in such a way that X constitutes that 
substance's essence. So the essence of God (simpliciter) is, in some sense, a 
second-order essence: an essence that makes reference to the essence of the 
substance (under other descriptions of the substance). 44 
In this way, Della Rocca does not regard essence as being described in the neutral 
way, but as being described in infinite ways i. e. the way of having all attributes. It 
is clear that for Della Rocca there is an essence for each attribute. The essence of 
God is to have an essence in each attribute but first-order essence is attribute- 
bound. Traditionally, "essence" is closely related to identity. Hence, if one and the 
same individual is both mental and physical it is hard to see how it could have an 
essence in each attribute. It would mean that one individual would have more than 
one essence, and we are back with De Vries' worry (p. 112). 
What applies to God presumably applies to humans: they have an essence 
in each of two attributes, thought and extension. It is not that the essence is made 
up partly of mental properties and partly of physical properties (as man was 
sometimes held to be rational and an animal), but each essence is complete on its 
own. If the essence says what it is to be an individual of a certain sort, attribute- 
43 Ibid., p. 167. 
44 ibid. 
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bound essences can only give what it is to be an individual looked at in a certain 
way. My view is that the essence of a human being is what is structurally the same 
in the mental and physical descriptions, and from this point of view Della Rocca's 
neutral properties look interesting. But Della Rocca's neutral properties can be 
stated; we have said that my structurally common properties cannot, but (like the 
tune) are seen in the different modes of expression. 
The neutral properties of Della Rocca are not the right sort of properties to 
pertain to essence. He instances "being at time C but Spinoza says that having a 
beginnmig in time is not part of a human's essence. The other properties: "having 
five immediate causes, " "having three immediate effects" would not seem enough 
to establish an identity. In any case, there is no general concept of causation in 
things only physical causation and mental causation from which these structural 
properties are extrapolated. So, while Della Rocca's neutral properties are similar 
to the essential properties in being structurally common, they are not the right sort 
of structural property. 
Why does Della Rocca confine essence to the attributes? Perhaps he 
realised the inadequacy of his neutral properties to serve as essence. In any case, 
even if it seems reasonable to define God as the being with infinite essences it is 
difficult to see how this can be extended to modes. Presumably humans are things 
(modifications of substance) with essences in thought and extension. 
5. The Douhle Aspect Theory, Determinism, and 
Morality 
(1) Determinism 
Spinoza's metaphysical determinism could open the way in seeking a 
solution to his account of the relation of the mind to the body. I have attempted, in 
chapter two, to rule out epiphenomenalism and hylomorphism as interpretations of 
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Spinoza's mind-body theory in terms of his metaphysical determinism. Now what 
else can be obtained from his determinism in seeking a solution to Spinoza's mind- 
body theory? I would suggest that his determmilism together with his monism can 
support the double aspect theory. Thus, after I describe Spinoza's metaphysical 
determinism, I shall then try to find a clue to the solution of his mind-body problem 
through his determniuism. 
a. The Outlook ofDeterminism in Spinoza 
Richard Taylor described determhuism as "... in the case of everything that 
exists, there are antecedent conditions, known or unknown, given which that thing 
could not be other than it is. That is an exact statement of the metaphysical thesis 
of determinism. More loosely, it says that everything is not only determinate but 
causally determined. "4' Further, he also defines this in Edwards' Encyclopedia: 
"[D]eterminism is the general philosophical thesis which states that for everything 
that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could 
happen. 9A6 
Where does Spinoza mention determinism? We can find determinism 
throughout his Ethics, especially in part 1, "Of God. " One of the most exemplary 
and strongest statements in Spinoza in relation to determhusm is as follows. 
in Nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined 
from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain 
manner. (E, 1, Prop 29) 
Things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in 
no other order than that in which they have been produced. (E, 1, 
Prop 33) 
45 Richard Taylor, MetaphYsics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 39. 
kv 0 46 Richard Taylor, "Determinism, " in Paul Edwards (ed. ), The Enývclqpedia ofPhilosop ,v1.2 
(New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 359. 
165 
It is, therefore, beyond doubt to say that Spinoza claims determinism in his 
metaphysics. It is further evident that one of the formulations of determinism is 
causality, 1. e. everything has its cause, even if the analysis of his notion of causality 
is controversial. For Spinoza, there is no doubt that all things have God, substance, 
as their cause. He states that "God is the immanent and not the transient cause of 
all things" (E, 1, Prop 18). Again, he reinforces this point, "God cannot be properly 
called the remote cause of individual things .... But all things which are in God, 
and so depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor be conceived" 
(E, 1, Prop 28, Schol). We can, therefore, see Spinoza's descriptions of strict 
determinist causality, and from this fact we can establish the presence of 
determi'mism. in Spinoza's metaphysical system. 
In Spinoza's metaphysical determinism, we should notice that God is 
substance consisting of infinite attributes and that humans can only know the 
attributes of thought and extension. When Spinoza says that the mind and body are 
determined by God, he means more precisely that the mind is determined in the 
attribute of thought and the body is determined in the attribute of extension; when 
Spinoza refers to "all things, " this involves not only bodies but also minds. 
Accordingly, Spinoza's metaphysics of determinism can be described as follows. 
There is only a single substance, which is dlvm*e. That substance is 
characterised by infinitely many attributes. And as to these attributes, we only 
know two, which are thought and extension. The modes follow on from each 
attribute, and these are either finite or hifinite. If they are infinite, then they are 
either immediate or mediate. The infinite immediate mode of extension is motion 
and rest, and its infinite mediate mode is "the face of the universe. " The infinite 
immediate mode of thought is the infinite intellect. Further there are the finite 
modes, minds and bodies which follow from the attributes of thought and 
extension. And all this, as we have seen above, happens in a certain and 
determinate manner. In other words, the causes of the mind and the body are the 
attributes of thought and of extension, yet their ultimate cause is God, namely 
substance, because God possesses the attributes of thought and extension. From 
this fact, we can see that Spinoza's determinism is encapsulated in both the mental 
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and the physical realm, and I believe that this kind of metaphysical deterrnmilism can 
offer some insights in relation to Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
b. The Mind and The Body Determined by One Substance 
In Spinoza's system, as we have seen above, only one substance determines 
both the mind and the body. Even if there are the attributes of thought and 
extension, since they proceed from a single substance, we should hold that the 
ultimate cause or source of both the mind and the body is one substance. We 
should note that there is only one order in Spinoza's deterministic system. This one 
order can be looked at 1rom two points of view. It can be conceived under the 
attribute of thought or under the attribute of extension. In other words, even 
though it appears that there are two orders and two chains of causality, in reality 
there is only one order and it can be conceived by us in two ways. Spinoza writes: 
"[Wlhether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the 
attribute of thought or any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the 
same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case 
the same sequence of things" (E, 11, Prop 7, Schol). 47 
The parallelism to be found in Spinoza's mind-body theory is property- 
parallelism. "Property-parallelism7' can be claimed as falling within the version of 
the double aspect theory. Once we establish the formulation that the mind and the 
body are both aspects of the same entity which is one substance, we need to ask 
what the relationship is between two aspects, and then our answer must be that 
there is a parallelism. Thus I believe that the version of the double aspect theory 
gives us the whole perspective of Spinoza's system. The double aspect theory of 
mind and body is consistent with his determinism, monism, and property 
parallelism. Spinoza's metaphysical determinism can support the double aspect 
theory. 
47 It is certain that one substance is the cause of the mind as well as the cause of the body, and 
therefore the ultimate source of them is God, substance. We can regard this as a version of the 
double aspect theory. Regarding substance monism, Spinoza states that "Besides 
God no 
substance can be nor can be conceived" (E, 1, Prop 14). 
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(2) Moral Theory 
Spinoza's determinism pervades his account of moral theory in part 4 of the 
Ethics. Thus I shall, in this section, draw out Spinoza's point of view on "human 
bondage, " and then move on to consider how the moral theory can provide insight 
into the relationship between the mind and the body. 
a. Human Bondage 
Bondage is, for Spinoza, "[t]he impotence of man to govern or restrain the 
emotions" (E, IV, Preface). That is to say, our lack of the power to moderate the 
emotions is caUed bondage, and Spinoza's assertion of this kind of human bondage 
can be found in the following statements. 
The force by which man perseveres in existence is limited, and 
infmitely surpassed by the power of external causes. (E, IV, Prop 3) 
It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he 
should suffer no changes but those which can be understood through 
his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause. (E, IV, 
Prop 4) 
Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions, 
and that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, 
accommodating himself to it as far as the nature of things requires. 
(E, IV, Prop 4, Corol) 
In the scholium to proposition 18, we can see Spinoza's transition 
from the 
discussion of bondage to the exposition of the virtuous life. This doctrine of virtue 
leads us to the understanding of moral freedom. Spinoza equates virtue with 
endeavour and with happiness. Our happiness depends upon things external to us 
because we are finite modes. This is not explored in detail in proposition 
18, but 
further on; Spinoza argues concerning virtue ftom proposition 23. 
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Spinoza holds that we can only be said to possess virtue to the extent that 
we form adequate ideas and preserve our being under the guidance of reason, but 
what we essentially endeavour (in accord with reason) is to understand. Since 
reason considers nothing as being good except understanding, true good and evil 
are what aid or detract from the exercise of understanding, respectively. Spinoza 
echoes this discussion of virtue again as follows: "There is no single thing in 
Nature which is more profitable to man than a man who lives according to the 
guidance of reason" (E, IV, Prop 35, Corol 1). Therefore, for Spinoza, a free man 
is "a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone, [and] is not led by 
the fear of death (Prop 63, pt. 4), but directly desires the good (Corol Prop 63, pt. 
4), that is to say (Prop '74, pt. 4), desires to act, to live, and to preserve his being in 
accordance with the principle of seeking his own profit" (E, IV, Prop 67, Demon). 
Thus, we can call him free if he is led by reason alone. 48 
b. Moral Theory and Mind-Body Theory 
Now, I shall try to consider the relationship between the above account of 
Spinoza's moral theory and Spinoza's account of the relation of the mind to the 
body. We have seen in section I that for Spinoza, humans are regarded as a part of 
Nature and nothing besides. When Spinoza says that we are a part of Nature, he 
does not refer merely to the physical world, but his term "Nature" is also related to 
the mental world, since Nature is God possessing the mental as well as the 
physical. Therefore, under the attribute of thought, the mind follows mental laws, 
just as under the attribute of extension the body follows physical laws. Spinoza 
writes: 
All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to 
understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges 
48 The following questions can be raised with respect to the connection between determinism and 
morality. is it predetermined who is good and who is not? if I have got the right 
kind of 
contemplative mind I seek wisdom: but if I do not have it how do I get 
it? Would someone 
deserve punishment for doing wrong, if determinism is true? But this topic takes us 
beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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nothing as profitable to itself except that which conduces to 
understanding. (E, IV, Prop 26) 
We do not know that anyfl-ýing is certainly good or evil except that 
which actually conduces to understanding, or which can prevent us 
from understanding. (E, IV, Prop, 27) 
In part 111, proposition 6-8, Spinoza claims self-preservation: "Each thing, in so far 
as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its being" (E, 111, Prop 6). Therefore, 
we can see that Spinoza has two kinds of concept regarding endeavour: one is 
"persevere" and the other is "understand. " That is to say, in Spinoza's theory, there 
are "the endeavour to persevere" and "the endeavour to understand"; the former 
refers to the body and the latter to the mind. Hence, it comes out that we 
endeavour to preservere as well as understand. Now, I shall consider what these 
concepts refer to and how they are related to each other by following J. Thomas 
Cook's perspective. 
When Spinoza holds self-preservation, he means a human being's 
endeavour to Persevere in its being and this endeavour is the very essence of the 
individual . 
49And, it is clear that for Spinoza man is a physico-psychical organism. 
On the one hand the human body is, on the physical side, characterised by the 
tendency to maintain its physical integrity through being affected in various ways 
by things in the surrounding environment. On the other hand, this same individual 
is, on the mental side, a complex idea made up of the ideas of those many extended 
things which constitute the human body. And this mind is characterised by the 
tendency to understand, which consists of its power to form what Spinoza calls 
"adequate ideas" or "common notions" which are ideas of things which all bodies 
have in common and which are equally in the whole and in the part of all extended 
things. The mind's endeavour to understand is an endeavour to form such adequate 
ideas. " 
" Concerning this, Spinoza states that "the effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in 
its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thin(. ), itself ' (E, HI, Prop 7). 
'0 1 Thomas Cook, "Self-Knowledge as Self-Preservation" in Marjorie Grene and Debra Nails 
(eds. ), Spinoza and the Sciences (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 193-209. 
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Therefore, a man endeavours to maintain his integrity as a complex physical 
organism when viewed as a body under the attribute of extension, and he also has 
the endeavour to form adequate ideas when viewed as a mind under the attribute of 
thought. Hence it follows that a man's endeavour not only to persevere but also to 
understand are under the attributes of extension and thought, respectively. Now I 
can suggest that the body's endeavour to maintain its integrity as a complex 
physical organism can be equated with the mind's endeavour to form adequate 
ideas. That is to say, the body's endeavour to persevere and the mind's endeavour 
to understand are one and the same endeavour, conceived under the two attributes, 
extension and thought. " 
I take this formulation as the same paradigm as the version of the double 
aspect theory of the relation of the mind to the body. in parts 11 and 111, Spinoza 
states that "substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same 
substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that" 
(E, 11, Prop 2, Schol). Further he also states that "the mind and the body are one 
and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at 
another under that of extension7 (E, 111, Prop 2, Schol). Here, we can see that 
Spinoza's version of the double aspect theory is consistent with his metaphysical as 
well as his moral theory, in particular his account of our endeavour. And 
subsequently, this account can offer some insight in interpreting his mind-body 
theory as the double aspect theory. 
I believe that the double aspect interpretation gives us a whole perspective 
on Spinoza's system. The double aspect theory as the mind-body theory is 
consistent with Spinoza's metaphysical monism and determnifism, with his concept 
of the attributes, with his explanations of identical and parallel relationship between 
the mind and the body, and with his account of morality. Spinoza's mind-body 
theory should be considered within the version of the double aspect theory. Thus, 
we can say that the double aspect interpretation can be attributed to 
Spinoza's 
mind-body theory more successfully than the other interpretations. 
51 Ibid., p. 194. 
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Chapter Six 
The Problem of Representation in Spinoza 
We have seen, in the previous chapter, that Spinoza's account of the mind 
and its relation to the body can be explained by means of the double aspect theory, 
which is based on substance monism and attribute dualism. However, by relying 
only on the double aspect theory, we cannot sufficiently explain Spinoza's account 
of the relationship between the mind and the body. So, what other kind of concept 
or theory should we ascribe to Spinoza? When I criticised, in chapter two, the 
interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body theory, I indicated that the role of 
representation is overlooked in the interpretations of hylomorphism, 
epiphenomenalism and idealism. Especially concerning the idealistic interpretation, 
I pointed out that the role of representation is misunderstood and misinterpreted by 
it; the ground that this interpretation really rests on is no more than 
representationalism, and this concept of representation is based on "the mind as the 
idea of the body. " It follows that Spinoza's mind-body theory involves both the 
double aspect theory and representationalism. The former, it seems to me, involves 
an ontological thesis about the mind-body theory, the latter an epistemological one. 
Thus, in this chapter, I intend to examine these two theses concerning the mind- 
body problem, especially the concept of representation, -and to explore the relation 
between them. In so doing, I hope to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
The exploration of the concept of representation is one of the important 
tasks to be undertaken in order to understand Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
However, there have been some different accounts of Spinoza's concept of 
representation, so that it is difficult to identify the genuine tendency in his concept 
of representation. Recently, Defla Rocca has elucidated Spinoza's theory of 
representation. Thus I shall, in section 2, explore Defla Rocca's arguments and 
point out some problems in his arguments after describing the general outlook of 
Spinoza's notion of the representation in section 1. Then, in section 3,1 shall move 
on to consider the compatibility between paraflefism and representationalism. 
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1. Spinoza on Representationalism 
(1) The Outlook of Spinoza's Concept of Representation 
Spinoza's concept of representation is differently understood by the 
commentators due to the problems of its compatibility with the parallel relationship 
between mind and the body derived from their identity. The basic issue is Spinoza's 
claim that the mind is the idea of the body. From this, the following problems arise: 
(1) whether the object of the idea constituting the human mind is only its body or 
both its body and other affecting external bodies, (2) the distinction between "the 
object of the idea" and "the object which that idea represents, " (3) whether 
Spinoza was confused between the parallel and the representational relationship. 
However, we ought firstly to grasp the outlook of his representationalism without 
considering the compatibility with the other doctrine. Then, we can explore 
problems (1) to (3) and redefine his representationalism. 
Spinoza claims that the mind is the idea of the body, and the object of the 
idea is the body and nothing else: "The object of the idea constituting the human 
mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing 
else" (E, 11, Prop 13). If the object of the idea is what is represented by it, this 
appears on the face of it matffestly false, since we think about other things than 
our bodies. However, other passages suggest his overall view is not that a person's 
mind is an idea of only his or her body. Spinoza also holds that the human mind 
can be aware of external bodies but only through their effects on the perceiver's 
body, the human body. In Spinoza's representationalism, the relationship between 
the human body -and the external 
bodies as the objects of the human- Mind is qn 
undetachable connection by means of what he terms "modification7 i. e. the way in 
which the human body is affected by external bodies. 
Regarding the external bodies, firstly, the human mind can have knowledge 
of external bodies only by means of their effects on the human body. The human 
mind, therefore, "perceives no external body as actually existing unless through the 
ideas of the modifications of its body'(E, 11, Prop 26; my italics). Hence, in so far 
as the human body is affected by any external body the human mind perceives the 
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external body and in so far as the human body is not affected in any way the human 
mind does not perceive any external body. 
The same applies to a human mind's knowledge of its own body. When its 
body is affected by the external body, the human mind can perceive its body. 
Without the external body's effects on the human body, the human mind does not 
know its own body: "The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor 
does it know that the body exists except through ideas of modifications by which 
the body is affected' (E, 11, Prop 19; my italics). That is to say, the way in which a 
human mind perceives its own body is available through the external body's effects 
on its own body. Hence, it follows that the human mind is not able to have a 
knowledge of the human body without an external body, and also is not able to 
perceive the external body itself or the affecting external body without its own 
body. A human mind knows neither the human body nor the affecting external 
bodies without the modifications on the human body. Regarding this point, 
Spinoza writes as follows: 
If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of 
any external body, the human mind will contemplate that external 
body as actually existing or as present, until the human body be 
affected by a modification which excludes the existence or presence 
of the external body. (E, 11, Prop 17) 
Now, from this it appears that the object of the mind is not only the human body 
but also the affecting external body, so that the mind represents or perceives the 
nature of both the affected human body and the affecting body at the same time. 
Spinoza repeatedly reminds us, in Ethics part II propositions 14-29, of this 
point, that firstly, the human mind has knowledge of the human 
body as well as 
external bodies only through the modification by which the 
human body is affected 
by the external bodies. The following statements of Spinoza make this point clear: 
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The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external 
bodies [modification] must involve the nature of the human body, and at 
the same time the nature of the external body. (E, H, Prop 16)1 
Hence, it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the 
nature of many bodies together with that of its own body. (E, 11, Prop 
16. Coro] 1) 
Thus it seems that, for Spinoza, the human mind perceives two kinds of bodies- 
the human body and external bodies-at the same time; the ideas of the 
modification of the human body also involve the nature of external bodies. 
Let us consider the relationship among the three concepts as the object of 
the idea: the human body, external bodies, and modifications. Here, I argue that the 
concept of modifications (affections, states) plays an important role in Spinoza's 
representationalism, since without the idea of modification of the human body, the 
human mind cannot have an idea of nor represent the human body itself or the 
affecting external bodies. In Spinoza's words, a modification is "every way in 
which the human body is affected by external bodies, " so that the meaning of 
"modification of the human body" is what happens in the human body when it is 
affected by the external body; that is to say, events or changes in the human body 
affected by the external bodies. Now, I shall consider the process of representation 
concerning the modification of the human body. When the human body is affected 
by the external bodies, we perceive, in the first place, the modification before we 
perceive either the human body or the external body. That is to say, the human 
mind perceives the modification at the first stage, and then perceives the human 
body and the external body at the second stage. Hence, it follows that the human 
mind cannot represent either the human body or the external body before it 
Spinoza repeats this in the Ethics: 
"There are in truth (Prop 16, pt. 2) the ideas of modifications of the human body which involve 
its nature as well as the nature of external bodies" (E, 11, Prop 18, Schol). 
"The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and 
of the human body itself' (E, H, Prop 2 8, Demon). 
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represents the modification of the human body. As to this point Spinoza states as 
follows: 
The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know 
that the body exists except through ideas of modifications by which the 
body is affected. (E, H, Prop 19) 
The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing unless 
through the ideas of the modifications of its body. (E, H, Prop 26) 
Now, we can see that for the human mind to represent the human body and the 
external body it has to firstly represent or have ideas of the modifications of the 
human body. But, the processes are not entirely distinct: one and the same idea 
which represents the modification of the human body also represents the human 
body and the external body. In the order of explanation, the modification comes 
first before the human body and the external body. 2 
In fact, however, once one idea represents the modification, since this idea 
involves the nature of the human body and of the external body, this idea 
represents both the human body and the external body (E, 11, Prop 16). 
Representing the human body and the external body depends on representing the 
modification of the human body. For example, when I perceive John, there is the 
way in which my body is affected by John's body i. e. the modification of my body. 
At the first stage, my mind perceives this modification (the event in my body) and 
at the second stage my mind perceives both my body itself and John's body. That is 
to say, without having the idea of the modification of my body, we can represent 
neither my body nor John's body. 
The following statement of Spinoza's confirms this two-stage process of 
representation. 
Spinoza wants these stages to be logically distinct, but not distinct in time. 
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[T]he human mind perceives these modifications and, consequently 
(Prop 16, pt. 2), the human body itself actually existing (Prop 17, pt. 2). 
The human mind, therefore, perceives the human body, etc. (E, H, Prop 
19, Demon) 
Although Spinoza does not mention the external body, the same argument should 
be applied to it, since the idea of the modification entails the nature of not only the 
human body but also the external body and thus 'the human mind perceives the 
nature of many bodies together with that of its own body" (E, 11, Prop 16, Corol). 
Thus, it is clear that by virtue of the fact the mind has the idea of the modification 
of the body, ideas in the human mind can represent the human body and the 
external body. 
From the exposition above, in Spinoza's representationalism, we can see 
that there are the following four items. 
(1) The human body, which is the object of the human mind and is affected by 
external bodies. 
(2) External bodies, which affect the human body: "The individual parts composing 
the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by 
external bodies in many ways" (E, 11, Post 3). 3 
(3) Modifications (affections, states) of the body, which involve the nature of the 
body as well as of the external bodies affecting it. 
(4) The human mind, which is the complex idea composed of the ideas of the body 
and of the affecting external bodies: "The idea which constitutes the formal 
being of the human mind is not simple, but it is composed of a number of 
ideas" (E, 11, Prop 15). 
(5) The ideas which represent both (1) and (2) by means of representations of (3). 
Now, we can conclude that for Spinoza, the cognitive situation requires the 
presence of ideas, which are contained in the mind, and these ideas represent the 
nature both of its own body and of external bodies. In other words, there is a 
Before proposition 14 in part 11, there are six postulates. 
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representative relationship between the human mind and its body or external bodies 
through the medium of ideas which represent those objects. 
(2) The Problems of Spinoza's Representationalism 
One problem is that there is apparently a glaring contradiction between 
propositions 13 and 16 in part 11. Spinoza alleges that the human mind is the idea 
of the human body alone in proposition 13, he claims that the human mind 
represents not only the human body but also the external body from proposition 
16. 
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a 
certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing eZve. (E, H, 
Prop 13; my italics) 
The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external 
bodies [modification] must involve the nature of the human body, and at 
the same time the nature of the external. (E, H, Prop 16) 
Is Spinoza really intending to say in proposition 13 that the object represented by 
the human mind is only the human body? If so, how can we account for the later 
shift in proposition 16, that is, the idea in the human mind represents both the 
human mind and the external body? 
Some commentators such as Pollock, Barker, and Taylor argue that the 
problem arises owing to the fact that Spinoza is confused between the parallel and 
the representational relationships concerning the term "idea. 51 
Pollock, for example, recognises that Spinoza uses the one term idea in the 
two kinds of relation and complains that Spinoza is confused between these two 
relations: the representational and the parallel relation. Pollock states: 
But, Spinoza makes use of the one term idea to denote the two kinds of 
relation, and we have to find out by the context which he means. If I think of 
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Peter, the state of my consciousness in an idea of Peter according to Spinoza's 
first usage of term. But according to his other usage, it is the idea, not of Peter, 
but of the corresponding state of my own brain and nerves, or such parts of 
them as are, in modem language, the organs of that particular phase of 
conscious thought. In the one sense the object of the idea is Peter, in the other 
it is the bodily organism correlated to the thinkýg mind. And it is important to 
observe that in this other sense idea has a far wider application than in the first 
and more familiar sense. The material correlate which is called the object of 
the idea may be a living organism, but also it may not. The idea may coincide 
with a concept in a conscious mind, or with a conscious mind forming 
4 concepts, but also it may not . 
He also states that "[n]ow a man can easily think that of his own body, but he is 
not always doing so, and when he does his thought will not be accurate unless he 
has learnt something of physiology. And even if every human being were an 
accomplLshed. physiologist, the constant relation of the mtind as a whole to the body 
as a whole would still be something different ftom the relation of the knowing to 
the known. "' 
A. E. Taylor also argues the similar point- "It is this neglect to insist on the 
unique character of all -knowing as an apprehension of an object 
by a subject which 
explains the standing and apparently unconscious Spinozistic. equivocation by 
which 'the idea of Peter' may mean either 'the mental complex which corresponds 
to Peter's brain and nervous system, the mind of Peter', or 'the mental complex 
which exists when Paul thinks of Peter', Paul's 'idea' of Peter, or -may -mean 
both 
in the same breath, if it is convenient for the argument that it should. ý16 
Barker, following Pollock, argues the similar point, and points to the 
contradiction between propositions 13 and 16 as the result of Spinoza's confusion. 
4 Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1899), p. 125. 
5 Ibid., p. 124. 
6 Taylor, "Some Incoherences in Spinozism (1), " in S. Paul Kashap (ed. ), Studies in Spinoza 
(Berkeley: University of California Press., 1972), p. 206. 
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Such a case presents itself in 11,13. Spinoza there says, in terms which seem 
to admit of no dubiety, that the object of the mind's knowledge is the body, 
and nothing else than the body. ... [I]t is contradicted by Spinoza's own 
statements, for example, in 16 CI (where he says that the human mind 
perceives plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura 7), 
and in 17 (where he says that, when the body is affected by an external body, 
the mind idem corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut sibi praesens 
contemplabitur 8) . How, then. could he assert the et nihil aliud 
9 of 13? 10 
Barker's answer is that "[flhere must, then, it would seem, be some serious 
confusion in Spinoza thought, if his assertion of our proposition is to be 
explained. "" Spinoza's confusion is, according to Barker, as follows: 
Spinoza uses offectiones to denote the bodily process or facts, and speaks 
of the ideae affectionum, but he fails apparently to see that the ideae which 
occur in the mind when the affectiones occur in the body need not have the 
affectiones or the body for their object. Ideae affectionum may mean either 
ideas which correspond to the affectiones, or ideas which are aware of or 
know the affectiones, but Spinoza apparently identifies the two meanings, 
that is, identifies correspondence and cognition, but now from a 
physiological rather than an epistemological point of view. 12 
Thus, Barker concludes that I think, then, that we must agree with Pollock that, 
when Spinoza- speaks of the mind as idea sive cognitio corporis [idea or 
knowledge of the body], he is confused and is using the word idea in a new and 
strange way. "" 
7 "the nature of many bodies together with that [the nature] of its own body" 
8 "will contemplate that [the same] external body as actually existing or as present" 
9 "and nothing else" 
10 H. Barker, "Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics, " in S. Paul Kashap (ed. ), Studies in 
Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 136-137. 
11 Ibid., p. 137. 
12 Ibid., P. 142. 
13 Ibid., p. 143. 
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Now,, we can see that some commentators argue that owing to the fact that 
Spinoza uses the ten-n "idea7' to present the parallel relationship between the idea 
and the human body as well as to present the representational relationship between 
idea and the external bodies, he was confused between the two relations. As a 
result, Spinoza confusedly regards the term "idea7 used in the parallel sense, as 
presenting the representational relationship. This is why Spinoza thinks that the 
idea in the human mind also represents the human body. 
2 Della Rocca's Interpretation of the Concept of 
Representation in Spinoza 
Della Rocca refuses the interpretation which ascribes a confusion to 
Spinoza, since be thinks that this attribution underestimates Spinoza's intelligence. 
An important point for him in solving the problem is the mind-relativity of content, 
that is, ideas insofar as they are in the human mind are confused and the same ideas 
insofar they are in God's mind are adequate. Let us consider his argument in detail. 
(1) Parallelism and the Concept of Representation 
Della Rocca divides parallelism into "bare parallelism" and 
"representational parallelism, " and ascribes the latter to Spinoza; the former is 
parallelism (in the semantic or conceptual sense) without representation, and the 
latter is parallelism with it. Della Rocca's tendency is to combine two theories: 
representationalism and parallelism. According to him, Spinoza's parallelism, with 
respect to the notion of minds, requires the following claims: "(1) The idea of the 
effect depends on the idea of the cause (2) There is an idea of each physical object 
(3) There is a physical object for each idea (4) There are no causal relations in 
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thought in addition to those that mirror the causal relations in extension. ýi]4 
Therefore, we can see that there are, in Spinoza's theory, ideas and the objects of 
these ideas, and that they are parallel to each other. However, Della Rocca treats 
the object of the idea constituting the human mind as not both the external body 
and the human body, but as only the human body, although he argues that the idea 
in the human mind represents both the human body and the external body. It 
follows that the ideas which are contained in the human n-dnd are not "ideas that 
are parallel to other [external] bodies, " but "ideas that are parallel to each part of 
the human body. "" 
Next, Della Rocca moves on to explain that this sort of collection of ideas 
is a single individual or a mind instead of a hodgepodge of ideas. Owing to the fact 
that Spinoza does not explain complex mental individuals, he depends on Spinoza's 
account of complex physical individuals. Thus by virtue of the fact that Spinoza's 
parallelism entails a mirroring of complex individuality across attributes, Dena 
Rocca argues that we can infer the human mind's individuality from the body's. 
Therefore, there is a hierarchy in thinking individuals, as in extended individuals: 
just as the infinite extended mode which is motion and rest (the immediate in-finite 
mode) and the face of the universe (the mediate infinite mode) is a complex 
physical individual, so the infinite intellect is a complex mental individual. In other 
words, from the fact that Spinoza regards the whole universe as "an all-inclusive 
extended individual, " we can infer that the infinite intellect is an all-inclusive 
thinking individual. 
(2) The Containment Thesis and the Mind-Relativity of Content 
In this way, we have just seen that Della Rocca regards the infinite intellect 
as the totality of all finite modes of thought and claims that this totality is not a 
hodgepodge of ideas but a complex individual like a human mind. 
16 Hence we can 
14 Michael Delia Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23. 
15 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
16 Ibid, pp. 30-40. 
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see that the human mind is a part of God's mind just as the human body is a part of 
the whole extended individual. The human mind is contained in God's mind, and 
accordingly ideas in the human mind are identical with certain ideas in God's mind; 
Della Rocca names this "the containment thesis": he states that "we can consider 
an idea insofar as it is in God's mind and that same idea (qua particular mental 
state or event) insofar as it is in my mind. 5117 However, the contents of this same 
idea are different in each case: the content of the idea in the human mind is 
different from the content of the very same idea in God's mind. Thus we can see 
that there is a difference between representation in God's mind and representation 
in the human mind; Della Rocca names this "the mind-relativity of content. "" 
Della Rocca unfolds his own views as follows. Representation in God's 
mind easily explains representational parallelism, since each idea in God's mind 
represents its extended counterpart. Unlike representation in God's mind, each idea 
in the human mind represents not only its extended counterpart, i. e. the parts of the 
human body which are causally parallel to each idea, but also the cause of that 
extended counterpart, namely the external cause of that counterpart. 19 Points to be 
noticed are: 
(1) He combines the fact that the idea in the human mind is parallel to its extended 
counterpart e, with the fact that the human mind represents e, so that "the idea 
parallel to e is what represents e in the human mind"; 20 this combination is on the 
basis of his view that the concept of representation is better understood in terms of 
parallelism. 
(2) An idea in the human mind represents not only e, its extended counterpart, but 
also c, the cause of that counterpart. 
(3) However, the fact that an idea has two objects (e and c) does not imply two 
different senses of representation nor two different ideas of two objects. 
17 Ibid, p. 40. 
18 Ibid., p. 44. 
19 Ibid., pp. 44-47. 
20 Ibid., p. 47. 
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(4) Therefore, a single idea represents both extended counterparts and external 
bodies in the same sense of representation. 
The points from 2 to 4, Della Rocca argues, are explained by a confusion of the 
human mind. One and the same idea is in God's mind as well as in the human mind, 
but the content of this idea is Merent in each case since the content is relative to 
the two minds and there are some differences between God's mind and the human 
mind. One difference is that the idea in the human mind represents both e and c, 
and another is that the idea in the human mind is confused; these notions are 
coextensive. Hence, the fact that the idea represents its object confusedly is 
associated with the fact that the idea represents both e and c, and that the idea 
cannot distinguish these objects. It follows that the idea represents two different 
objects without distinction between them. Therefore, in this case, the mind cannot 
have the idea of e or c alone, but can only have a blend of these two, namely a 
confused idea. 
In this way, he appeals to distinction between adequate ideas in God's mind 
and inadequate ideas in the human mind, to explain why there is the duality of 
represented ob ects, (that is, why the ideas insofar as they are in the mind represent j 
both the human mind and the external bodies). 
(3) The Probleinfor Della Rocca's Interpretation 
Della Rocca introduces the existing interpretations of Spinoza's concept of 
representation and attempts to solve the problems revealed by the interpretations 
by offering his own interpretation. In his treatment of Spinoza's term "idea of' as 
possessing both the representational and the parallel feature and his attempt to 
integrate the concept of representation into parallelisn-4 he is more advanced than 
the previous interpreters. However, problems still remain. 
In order to make representationalism compatible with parallelism, Della 
Rocca seems to appeal to the distinction between adequate ideas in God's mind 
and inadequate ideas in the human mind. According to him, a representational 
parallelism does not occur in the human mind, but only in God"s mind, and there 
185 
occurs only a bare parallelism in the human mind, since the ideas in the human 
mind are inadequate whereas ideas in God"s mind are adequate. Thus, 
representation in the human mind i. e. the fact that one idea represents two objects 
does not violate parallelism, since it is not the plain truth: in principle, one idea 
(which is adequate) represents one object. The imbalance between parallelism and 
the concept of representation in our inadequate ideas does not violate the truth of 
parallelism. 
Even though we can save Spinoza from the incompatibility between 
parallelism and representationalism by appealing to inadequacy and confusion of 
our ideas (rather than confusion and inadequacy in Spinoza), this cannot help us to 
save Spinoza ftom another incompatibility between propositions 13 and 16, since 
the term Spinoza uses in proposition 13 is "the human mind. " According to Della 
Rocca's appeal to inadequacy of our ideas, since ideas in the human mind are 
inadequate there does not occur a representational parallelism in the human mind 
and thus one idea represents two objects, whereas since the ideas in God's mind 
are adequate there occurs a representational parallelism and thus the parallel 
relationship always runs together with the representational relationship in God's 
mind. If so, Della Rocca cannot explain Spinoza's argument in proposition 13: 
"The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the human botýW' If the 
ideas in the human mind are inadequate, the object of those ideas should be both 
the human body and the external body as they represent both. The terms "human 
-mind"' together with 
"the (human) body" in proposition 13 tell us that we cannot 
appeal to a distinction between adequate ideas in God's mind and inadequate ideas 
in the human mind, in order to solve the problems. There is still the problem of 
reconciling proposition 13 and proposition 16. r, 
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3. Parallelism, Representationalism and Proposition 
rlr 1 11 
I hirteen 
Are there alternative readings of proposition 13 which would avoid the 
problems raised so far? Here are some suggestions. 
(1) "A Body" Instead of "the Body" 
The Latin word "corpus" in E, 11, Prop 13 allows us two possible 
translations which are "the body" and "a body"; it means the human body in the 
case of "the body, " and some other body in the case of "a body. " 
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body [a 
body], or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing 
else. (E, H, Prop 13) 
If we treat "the object of the idea constituting the human mind" in proposition 13 
as "a body" instead of "the body, " we might make it fit with proposition 16. The 
reasoning is as follows. If the object is "a body, " the object confusedly represented 
is both human body and the external body. Thus, Spinoza might regard the external 
body as well as the human body as the object of the idea in the human mind in 
proposition 13 and thus when he says that the human mind represents not only the 
human body but also the external bodies in proposition 16, there is no clear 
contradiction. Let us examine whether we can regard "corpus" as "a body" (both 
the human body and the external bodies). 
Della Rocca supports the definite article translation, "the body, " -as most 
commentators do. The reason for him is that firstly, the term "nothing else" 
in 
proposition 13 of part 11 seems to indicate that it is the human body (the 
body of 
the person having the idea), since if it is some other body, the term "nothing else" 




body in some statements aner proposition 13 can make proposition 13 refer to the 
human body in particular, and this indicates a definite article translation. 
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However, I think that the first indicator (the term "nothing else") is not 
sufficient in supporting the definite article translation, '1he body, " although I agree 
with this translation owing to the second reason. If Spinoza's usage of the term 
"nothing else" means "nothing else but the (human) body, " the reason that Spinoza 
uses this term is to exclude external bodies from the object of the human mind. 
However, if it does not, would this term be otiose or unjustified, as Della Rocca 
argues? I think that it would not. For there could still be a reason for using this 
term. Besides the attributes of thought and extension, there are infinite numbers of 
unknown attributes, so that there are unknown modes besides the mind (the mode 
of thought) and the body (the mode of extension). It follows that if the term 
"nothing else" means "nothing else but a body, " the reason that Spinoza uses this 
term is to exclude these unknown modes from the object of the human mind; what 
Spinoza would then be taken as saying in this proposition is that besides the mode 
of extension, nothing else can be the object of the idea constituting the human 
nind, Therefore, the term "nothing else" does -not rule out the possib of "a r 
ility 
body. "' 
in in fin Furthermore, we can &--d a possibility of interpreting it. as de ite 
body, "a body, " in the second half of the demonstration of this proposition: 
Again-, if there. were also any other object of the mind besides [all 
body, since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow 
(Prop 36, pt. 1), the idea of some effect produced by this object 
would necessarily exist in our mind (Prop 11, pt. 2). But ( A-x 5, pt. 
2) there is no such idea [i. e. no idea of unknown modes], and 
therefore the object of our mind is [a] body existing, and nothing L 
else. (E, 11, Prop 13, Demon; my italics) 
Where Spinoza says that "there is no such idea" he means that "there is no such 
idea except for ideas of bodies and of minds": 'No individual things are felt or 
perceived by us except bodies and modes of thought" (E, 11, Ax 5). Here, we can 
see the possibility that Spinoza is excluding the modes of unknown attributes 
from 
the object of the idea constituting the human mind, and this is the reason why 
he 
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uses the term "nothing else, " That is to say, since there are no such ideas of modes 
of unknown attributes, the object of the idea constituting the human mind has to be 
"a body". The demonstration can be restated as follows in the case of "the body": 
If there were any other object of the human mind besides the human 
body, the idea of that object would have to exist in our mind. 
However, there are no such ideas except the idea of the human 
body [i. e. there are no such ideas of external bodies], and therefore 
the object of our mind is the human body existing and nothing else. 
This would support the claim that the object of the idea constituting the human 
mind is not the human body but a body (the human body and the external body). 21 
However, despite the possibility of this interpretation, Spinoza's later 
statements concerning proposition 13 make clear that the term "corpus" refers to 
the body of the person having the idea. Also, in proposition 13 "... or a certain 
mode of extension ... " does not fit the interpretation "a body, " and does -fit "the 
body. " Let us consider some statements concerning this point. 
The idea which constitutes the formal being of the -human mind 
is the 
idea of [the/a] body (Prop 13, pt. 2) which (Post 1) is composed of a 
number of individuals composite to a high degree. (E. H, Prop 15, 
Demon; 22 my italics) 
In the quotation, the phrase "[the/a] body (Prop 13, pt, 2) which (Post 1) is composed 
of' indicates that "corpus" in proposition 13 is no more than "corpus" in- postulate 
1, and the postulate specifically states that "corpus" is the human body: "The 
human body is composed of a number of individual parts of diverse nature, each of 
which is composite to a high degree" (E, 11, Post 1; my italics). 
21 Here, I am not supporting the interpretation of "a body, " but only indicating that we cannot 
take the term "nothing else" as a sufficient justification for the interpretation of "the body. " 
22 The proposition is as follows: "The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind 
is not simplel, but is composed of a number of ideas" (E, 11., Prop 15). 
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There is more evidence to clarify the interpretation of "the body. " When 
Spinoza uses proposition 13 to demonstrate proposition 19 and 26 of part 11, he 
informs us that "corpus" in proposition 13 is not "a body" but "the body. " He 
makes clear this point by using the term"the human body. " 
The human mind is the idea itself or the knowledge of the hiiman body 
(Prop 13, pt 2). This knowledge (Prop 9, pt. 2) is in God in so far as He 
is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing. (E, 11, 
Prop 19, Demon; my ita-lics) 
Again, in the demonstration of proposition 26, he states as Mows: 
If the -human 
body is in no way affected by any extern- a! body,, then 
(Prop 7,, pt. 2) the idea of the human body, that is to say (Prop 13, pt. 
2), the human mind, is not affected in any way by the idea of the 
existence of that body, nor does it in any way perceive the existence of 
that external body. (E, H, Prop 26, Demon; my italicls) 
I think that those -statements are enough evidence to support the interpretation of 
"the body. "23 The interpretation of "a body" can only rely on one indicator in the 
demonstration of proposition 13, that is, Spinoza's appeal to axiom 5. But, it is 
quite likely that his reference was the sign that his argument is confused here. 
If the term "corpus" means "the human body, " we can hardly avoid making 
Spinoza inconsistent. The reason is that when Spinoza explains the concept of 
representation in proposition 16, he argues that an idea in the human mind 
represents both e and c, and thus this idea has two objects. Either Spinoza should 
have regarded the term "body" as not only the human body but also the external 
body as long as he argues that the human mind represents both e and c, or that he 
should have held that the human mind represents not the external body but only the 
human body (insofar as he regards the object of the idea constituting the human 
" The corollary of proposition 13 and the demonstration of proposition 21 in part H can also be 
taken as textual %-,, %4der. ce. 
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mind as only the human body). It is clear that Spinoza maintains these two 
doctrines which are difficult to make compatible. The problem may be connected 
with the fact that Spinoza is trying to establish the human body as the object of the 
human mind in the first place (up to proposition 13), and then-after breaking off 
to discuss the motion of bodies-from proposition 14, onwards he starts to 
address our knowledge of the external world. Interpretations of Spinoza are 
confronted by an apparent contradiction. We should try to interpret Spinoza in a 
consistent manner before we conclude that Spinoza is committed to a self- 
contradiction. Otherwise, we would have to conclude that Spinoza was confused 
between the parallel and the representational relationship as some commentators 
claim. Here are some further suggestions for resolving the problem. 
(2) The Distinction between the Parallel Object and the 
Representational Object 
There is the possibility that we could argue that the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is the human body while arguing that the idea 
represents both the human body and the external body. We could distinguish "the 
object of the idea" from "that which is represented by the idea. " Thus, "the 
relationship between the idea and its object" is different from "the relationship 
9ý24 between the idea and the thing represented . It 
f6flows, that "what the idea is of' 
is the human body and "what the idea represents" is both the human body and the 
external body; the parallel object of the idea is the human body and the 
representational object of the same idea is both the human body and the external 
bod Y. 25 This distinction between "the parallel object of the idea" and "the 
24 This is Daisie Radner's distinction ("Spinoza's Theory of Ideas, " The Philosophical Review, 
vol. 80 [1971], p. 346). 
25For Radner, the parallel object of the idea is the human body the representational object of the 
same idea is only the affecting external body, since for her interpretation of Spinoza the human 
mind does not represent the human body. But this is misleading: Spinoza attaches the same terms 
such as 'ýperceiving" and "knowing" to both the human body and the affecting external body, and 
thus if the external body is represented by the human mind, so is the human body. Therefore if 
there is this distinction for Spinoza, what the idea represents is not only the external body. but 
both the human body and the external body. 
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representational object of the idea ýý26 may allow us to make Spinoza consistent if 
we can claim that the object in proposition 13 means not the representational 
object but the parallel object. In this case, we cam argue that in proposition 13, 
Spinoza refers to the parallel object of the idea, whereas he refers to not the 
parallel but the representational object when be explains the knowledge of our 
mind. This is why the object of the idea is, at one time, only the human body and at 
another, both the human body and the external body: the object which is parallel to 
the idea is the human body and the object which is represented by the idea is the 
human body as well as the external body, This kind of understanding seems to 
make Spinoza consistent. 
However, there is no sign that the term "the object" in proposition 13 
means only the parallel object. Rather, we can find proposition 13 is related to the 
representational object as follows. For Spinoza "having the idea of, " "knowing, " 
27 
and "perceiving" are all representational terms. As Della Rocca claims, Spinoza 
uses these terms interchangeably as the representational ten-ns. By virtue of the fact 
that "having the idea, " is the representational term, the phrase "the human mind has 
(is) the idea of the object" implies that "the human mind represents the object of 
the idea"; they are interchangeable. If so, the phrase "the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind" in the proposition is closely related to the 
representational object. Therefore, we cannot claim that the term "object" in 
proposition 13 means only "the parallel object, " and thus the distinction between 
the parallel and the representational object does -not 
help us to solve the 
incompatibility. This argument can simply be understood as follows: as long as the 
idea in the hum an mind also represents external bodies the human mind has to 
somehow contain ideas of external bodies, and therefore it 
is not plausible to argue 
that the object of the idea constituting the human mind does not 
include external 
bo di e s. 
One might argue that although "perceiving" and "knowing" are 
interchangeably representational terms, "having the idea of' 
iss not a 
26 For Radner, this term would be "the parallel object of the idea" (the human 
body) and 'the 
representational object of the same idea" (the external body). 
27 Spinoza also uses "contemplating" as the representational term. 
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representational term but only a parallel term. Then, one can still argue that the 
term "object" in proposition 13 means only the parallel object (the human body), 
whereas the other statements where Spinoza uses the terms "perceiving" and 
"knowing" are related to the representational object (the human body and the 
external body). Thus, according to this argument, we can explain why "the object" 
in proposition 13 is only the human body despite the fact that the idea represents 
both the human body and the external body. 
But, there is textual evidence for the argument that for Spinoza "perceiving 
it is synonymous with "having the idea of it. " For example, Spinoza states that 
"[w]e perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways" (E, 11, Ax 4; my 
italics), and then when he uses this axiom in the demonstration of proposition 13, 
the axiom is restated as follows: "But (Ax 4, pt. 2) we have ideas of the 
modifications of a/the body, therefore ... " 
(E, 11, Prop 13, Demon; my italics). In 
this way, we can see that "having the idea of it" is also a representational phrase, 
and therefore the problem remains. 
(3) The Expanded Body: The Human Body As Including the 
External Body 
It seems that if we want to make sense of Spinoza, we should argue that 
either (1) "the object" in proposition 13 is both the human body and the external 
body or (2) the doctrine is that the ideas represent in some sense only the human 
body. We have seen that there is a solid basis against point (1), and thus that "the 
object" has to be only the human body. In that case, perhaps we should turn to 
consider point (2). We can perhaps think of Spinoza's view as 
being that in the 
same way that the body of the forest includes the trees, so the affecting external 
bodies are parts of the represented body. If Spinoza maintains this view, 
it might be 
a clue to solve the problem. I shall show that Spinoza holds this 
kind of view-that 
we are parts of a wider whole-and examine whether 
it is implied in his concept of 
representation (or whether we can connect it to his concept of representation). 
I 
shall start with Spinoza's metaphysical system concerning 
"individuals. " 
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a. Part of the Wider Whole 
According to Genevieve Lloyd, for Spinoza, the most basic individual 
bodies are composite bodies which are made up of the simplest bodies on the basis 
of the maintenance of the ratio of motion and rest among the simplest bodies. It 
follows that for Spinoza what makes a body an individual is the ratio of motion and 
rest. This individual body is unified with other individual bodies in the larger body 
which itself is also regarded as an individual. Therefore, there exists a hierarchy of 
individuals in Spinoza's metaphysical system, and the apex of the hierarchy is the 
universe as a whole. Individual bodies in Spinoza's system are, according to 
Lloyd's critical standpoint, regarded as parts of wholes. More precisely, for 
Spinoza, an individual body is a part of a wider whole, and this wider whole is also 
an individual body as a part in relation to the more comprehensive wider whole. In 
other words, for Spinoza, any dimensional body which is part of the wider whole, 
28 no matter how large it is, is regarded as an individual . 
With respect to the individuality of minds, she argues that as in the case of 
bodies, there exists a relationship between the part and whole in the realm of the 
mind; in Lloyd's own words, "the mind is integrated into wider systems that 
correspond in their totality to the universe as a unified whole . "29Hence, a human 
mind becomes a part of God's mind, in other words just as bodies are included in a 
totality of material modes so the human mind is a set of ideas in the mind of God 
which is a totality of ideas as modes of thought. 
From Lloyd's arguments above, we can see that there exists a hierarchy of 
individuals in the mental and physical realm in Spinoza's system. From this, we 
could infer that when the human body is affected by the external body, there 
is a 
wider body which includes the human body and the external body. We can regard 
this wider body as the expanded human body which includes the affecting external 
body and the human body before being affected. If so, when Spinoza argues that 
the human mind represents the external bodies, we can regard the external 
bodies 
' Genevieve Lloyd, Part of Nature: Seýf-Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics (Ithaca: 
Cornell 
University Press, 1994), pp. 10-12. 
29 Ibid., P. 16. 
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as a part of the (expanding) human body. This can make Spinoza consistent as it is 
compatible with his argument in proposition 13 that "the object"' is tb-e body. 
Andrew Collier's arguments shed more light on this point, 
b. Body-Actual and Body-Cosmic 
Collier divides the concept of the body in Spinoza into two domains-. one is 
the "body-actuaT used in a narrow sense and the other the "body-cosmic" used in 
a wider sense . 
30 My body-actual is the "patch of the attribute of extension that is 
bound by my skin7 i. e. some of its parts such as "the spleen, lymph and so on, " and 
my body-cosmic is "the whole body of the universe" na m-ely ",,, vorld as the body" 
which is an integrated concept involving my body-actual and its outside world such 
as "my house, my bike, rny path to work across Southampton Common, and so 
on"; therefore, his concept of my body-actual is implied in the concept of body- 
CoSmic. 31 
Collier goes on to apply this concept of the body to the relationship 
between the -mind and the 
body. In Spinoza's system, the body under the attribute 
of extension corresponds to the mind under the attribute of thought. From Collier's 
perspective, for Spinoza's system, regarding the former as "body-cosmic" is more 
plausible than regarding it as "body-actual. ýý32 If my body is body-actuaL no 
external thing can be a part of my body even if my body-actual causally interacts 
with the outer world. But if my body is body-costnic, the body-actual as well as 
external things are implied in my body; they can. be parts or elements of my body- 
'0 According to Collier, it is something like Marx's "inorganic body, " however he regards "body- 
cosmic" as the more accurate term (Andrew Collier, "The Materiality of Morals: Mind, body and 
interests in Spinoza's 'Ethics, " Studia Spinozana, vol. 7 [1991], p. 73, note 1). 
31 Andrew Collier, "The Inorganic Body and the Ambiguity of the Freedom, " Radical 
Philosop, ky, vol. 57 (1991), p. 5. 
He states as to the concept of the body-cosmic as follows: "Rather, we are "more perfect" than 
other organisms in that we are able to affect and be affected by more of nature in more ways than 
others. In a sense, we spread ourselves more thinly over nature, but in a sense nature is more part 
of us than it is of other organisms. It is, as Marx puts it. our inorganic body" (Andrew 
Collier, 
"The Materiality of Morals, " p. 77). 
32 Collier "The Inorganic Body and the Ambiguity of Freedom, " pp. 5-6. 
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cosmic: " "The more we are sensitive to the world around us, and the more we 
control it, the more it is part Of US.,, 
34 
Collier does not connect this sort of view with Spinoza's concept of 
representation and neither does Lloyd. But I think that if we connect the concept 
of "body-cosmic" with the concept of representation, it offers an approach to 
apprehending Spinoza's representationalism. One of the important points of the 
concept of the body-cosmic is that this is an integrated concept between my body 
and the external bodies (in Collier's words, my body-actual and its outside world). 
Let us take an example. 
When 1 walk along Byres Road in Glasgow there is, in Spinoza's theory, a 
body-cosmic (as my body which includes Byres Road). The human body-actual and 
the affecting external body is integrated into the concept of the body-cosmic. In 
this case, in my mind, there is one compound idea for one compound body wbicb is 
my body-cosmic, and also two simpler ideas for two simpler bodies (my body- 
actual and Byres Road) which constitute the compound body. Therefore, the. fact 
that my mind has the idea of my expanded body which absorbs Byres Road entails 
that my mind has the idea of my body and of Byres Road. If we proceed along with 
this line, we can allege that there is compatibility between proposition 13 and 
proposition 16 by virtue of the fact that the human mind represents the external 
body as a part of the (expanded) human body. Furthermore, we can also allege that 
there is compatibility between parallelism and representationalism by virtue of the 
fact each idea in the human -mind matches 
its object; one idea represents one object 
whether it. is a single or a compound individual. 
What I 
-have explained 
is that from this kind of view, we might get a clue to 
solve the problem. The attraction in connecting between the concept of "body- 
cosmic" and representationalism is the hope that we may explain Spinoza's 
contradiction between the two propositions. But does Spinoza really understand 
"representing the external body"' or "having the idea of the external body" along 
with this line of thought? To say "yeS. " we are faced with the problems, which 
33 For Collier, Spinoza's perception is the proprioception. of the body-cosmic rather than body- 
actual. 
34 Collier, "The Inorganic Body and the Ambiguity of Freedom, " p. 6. 
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lead us to concluding that we cannot ascribe the doctrine of "body-cosmic" to 
representationalism. 
The above view is textuafly problematic in connecting this doctrine of 
Spinoza's with his concept of representation, since Spinoza argues the doctrine 
apart from representationalism, and the doctrine of "body-cosmic" seems to be 
irrelevant to the concept of representation. In fact, nothing in the text supports this 
kind of view of Spinoza's propositions on representation. From the text, we can 
rather find some indications against it. Spinoza writes: 
It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the 
constitution of our own body rather than the nature of the external bodies. 
(E, 111, Prop, 16, Corol 2; my italics) 
The concept of the body-cosmic is a compound of the body-actual and the external 
bodies, and thus this doctrine would argue that the ideas we have of external 
bodies indicate the constitution of the body-cosmic rather than of the body-actual. 
But what Spinoza says in the quotation is that those ideas indicate the constitution 
of body-actual; the term "our own body" does not mean the "body-cosmic" but the 
"body-actual, " since in the quotation, Spinoza clearly takes "external bodies" as 
bodies other than our (ordinary) body. Thus, the quotation severely damages the 
"cosmic body" interpretation. 
The concept of the "cosmic body" in interpreting Spinoza. on 
representationalism has another problem: it can be objected to by arguing from 
Spinoza's doctrine of error. In proposition 17 of part 11, Spinoza is explaining how 
we can be mistaken. Our bodies are affected on seeing a tree, say. If the tree does 
not continue to exist but the affects in our body continue we wiU continue to 
suppose the tree is there. So even though on the disappearance of the tree the 
cosmic body contracts, the human mind stiU has the idea. of the tree; that 
is how 
error is possible. According to the. doctrine of the cosmic body, if the tree goes out 
of existence but the affects in the body remain we ought to say that the cosmic 
body has shrunk. But Spinoza says that we have the idea of the external object 
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although it no longer exists. If the human mind still has the idea of the tree as a part 
of the expanded human body despite the disappearance of the tree, this does 
violate the argument of the cosmic body. The fact that for Spinoza, even though 
the tree does not continue to exist the human mind has the idea of the tree makes 
the concept of the cosmic body incompatible with Spinoza's representationalisrm 
In this way, Spinoza's account of error does not fit the account of the cosmic 
body, so that we cannot rely on the doctrine of the cosmic body to explain the 
contradictions between the two propositions. 
(4) The Distinction between Adequate Ideas and Inadequate Ideas 
We are driven back to Della Rocca's suggestion. Spinoza's doctrine of 
"adequate and inadequate ideas" could explain why the idea represents two objects 
(the human body and external bodies) despite the fact that the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is only the human body. It could also explain why 
there is the (apparent) incompatibility between parallelism and representationalism. 
In Spinoza's view (following Della Rocca), ideas in the human mind are 
inadequate whereas ideas in God's mind are adequate. Thus, the same idea can be 
adequate as well as inadequate depending on whether it is in the human mind or in 
God's mind. The idea of the human body in the human mind represents both the 
human body and the external body since it is confused and inadequate, although the 
same idea in God's mind represents the human body since it is adequate. This can 
explain why there is the apparent incompatibility between parallelism and 
representationalisn-L Our representative knowledge which is inadequate does not 
involve strict parallelism. Only the adequate knowledge in God's mind -implies 
strict parallelism. So, we should distinguish an adequate from an inadequate 
representation; the former is always linked with parallelism, whereas the latter is 
not because it is confused. The incompatibility between parallelism and 
an mind wl ch is ideqi te, and ts representationalism only occuxs in- the hum ý 
lui ina aa hi 
incompatibility results from confused ideas. Confused ideas do not count against 
parallelism; because what they give us is not the plain truth. As we saw, Della 
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Rocca uses this strategy to explain the problem of the duality of represented 
objects, but does not deal with the contradiction between propositions 13 and 16. 
Nonetheless, this view has much to be said for it, and will be retained in attempting 
to reconcile propositions 13 and 16. 
The reason why Spinoza claims in proposition 13 that the object of the idea 
is only the human body despite his later argument that the idea represents two 
objects (the human body and external bodies) is that in proposition 13 Spinoza 
refers to an adequate representation while he refers to an inadequate representation 
in the later argument. Thus, it seems that if we distinguish the adequate 
representation from the inadequate representation, not only the incompatibility 
between two theories but also the incompatibility between his claim in proposition 
13 and his later argument can be solved. 
However, as we saw when examining Della Rocca's interpretation, there is 
a solid obstacle to this interpretation. That is, in proposition 13, Spinoza uses the 
term "human mind": "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the 
[human] bodjý'(my italics). For Spinoza, ideas in the human mind are not adequate 
but confused and inadequate. If so, "the object" in the proposition should not be 
just the body (the human body) but the external body as well as human body. 
(5) The Essence of the Human Mind 
Now, we might be inclined to think that due to the fact that Spinoza is 
confused between the parallel and the representational relationship, he is 
committed to a self-contradiction. However, I still think that it is more than an 
unconscious or confused commitment, because Spinoza says it repeatedly in many 
places. Spinoza should have a reason for this, and thus we ought to try to find it. 
We can think of Spinoza's representationalism in the following way. 
Although the human mind has the idea of the human body as well as of the external 
bodies (i. e. ideas in the human mind represent both the human mind and the 
external bodies), the idea which constitutes the essence of the human mind is only 
the idea of the human body. In proposition 13, Spinoza perhaps refers to the 
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essence of the human mind, and this is why the object of the idea in the proposition 
is not both the human body and the external bodies but only the human body. To 
find whether this is Spinoza's real intention or not, we have to beforehand ex-a-miLne 
whether he holds this distinction among ideas. From the following statements, we 
can see that Spinoza certainly maintains it: 
[W]e clearly see what is the difference between the idea, for example, of 
Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind itself of Peter, and the idea of 
Peter himself which is in another man; for example, in Paul. For the former 
directly manifests the essence of the body of Peter himself, nor does it involve 
existence unless so long as Peter exists; the latter., on the other hand, indicates 
rather the constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and 
therefore so long as Paul's body exists with that constitution, so long will 
Paul's mind contemplate Peter as present, although he does not exist. (E, H, 
Prop 17, Schol; my italics) 
In this way, for Spinoza the idea of Peter in Peter's mind constitutes the essence of 
Peter's mind,, whereas the idea of Peter in Paul's mind does not constitute the 
essence of Paul's mind. Here, we can see that Spinoza distinguishes "ideas which 
c ideas which do not constitute it": constitute the essence of the human mind" from "i 
the former is the idea of the human body, the latter can confusedly represent 
external bodies. 
Some commentators normally regard the former idem as presenting the 
parafle! relationship and the latter ideas the. representational relationship, -and they 
continme to axgue that since Spinoza is con-f4sed between two kinds of ideas, he 
clahm--, that ideas in the, human rnind represent. the, hummn bodya But, it. iS unlikely 
that one is confused if one -has a clear 
distinction between two sorts of idea, As 
Deffa Rocca rightly argues, Spinoza intentionally regards the correspondence as W --- 
implyiing (or involvingg) the representation, and thus, the former ideas should -he 
regarded as presenting not only the, parraflel relationship but also representational 
one. This is why Spinoza consciously argues that ideas in the human miW also 
represent the hur-nan body. In that case, the foLlowing problerns, can be raised: (1) 
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how we can explain a duality of represented objects and its compatibility with one- 
to-one correspondence in parallelism, (2) how we can explain the incompatibility 
between the two propositions. 
The distinction between adequate ideas in God's -mind and inadequate ideas 
in the -human mind could explain the problem of (1): the reason why there is a 
duality of represented objects is because ideas in the -human mind are inadequate, 
and concerning adequate ideas in God's mind a duality of represented objects does 
not happen. Thus, although in the hum an mind there is incompatibility between the 
duality of represented objects and parallIelism, there is no such incompatibility in 
God's mind. We can explain the incompa-fibi-lity by appealing to adequate ideas in 
God's mind. Nevertheless, as we have seen, thiss, distinction cannot explain the 
problem of (2). 
To explain this problem,, we have to appeal to the essence of human mind: r"r- 
the proposition 13 ought to be understood as giving the -nature or essence of the 
i 
human n-ýnnd. What. Spinoza wants to claim in- the proposition is that the essence of 
the hum an mind is constituted by the idea of the human body. The corollary to 
proposition 11 in part 11 is relevant here: "When we say that the. human mind 
perceives this or that thing, we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea 
... 
in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind. " Just before this,, in 
the demonstration to proposition 11 he says "the first thing which constitutes the 
actual being of the, htiman mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing. " 
And, having established that the essence of the human mind is the idea of the 
human body, Spinoza goes on, in the rern--ai-nder of the, corollary to propositio n 1- 1- 5 
to make the distinction between clear and con--ftised ideas (the latter involving 
reference to external objects), 
Therefore, when Spinoza says in proposition 13 that the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is only the hLim-ant body, the. phrase "constituting the 
human mind") means "constituting the evvence of the human mind. " It is ! likely that 
Spinoza just omits the word "essence. , 35 The use of "constitute" strongly suggests 
35 Spinoza, as we have seen, restates proposition 13 in many places, and one of them informs us 
that there is an ellipse of the term "formal being": "The idea which constitutes the formal 
being 
of the human mind is the idea of the body (Prop 13, Part 11)" (E., H, Prop 15, Demon; my 
italics). 
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this. Where Spinoza talks of the idea of external bodies, he tends to use "have, " for 
example, "the ideas we have of the external bodies" (E, 11, Prop 16, Corol 2; my 
italics). So, when Spinoza uses the term "constitute" in relation to the idea 
constituting the human mind, the term. "constitute" should be taken as referring to 
essence: "[T]he idea constituting [the essence offl the human mind. " In this way, 
we can- explain the contradiction between propositions 13 and 16. 
This fact supports our view that proposition 13 ought to be understood as giving the nature or 
essence of the human mind. 
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Chapter Seven 
Spinoza and Contemporary Philosophy 
0 
of Mind 
Some contemporary versions of the mind-body problem are in some way 
related to Spinoza's mind-body theory. We have seen that the -main arguments of 
Spinoza's mind-body theory are (i) identity between the mind and the body (ii) the 
parallel relationship between the mental and the physical by virtue of identity (ffiii) 
the concept of representation. Of these, I found that point (i) is similar to versions 
such as Davidson's anomalous monism, or Strawson's person theory, However, 
there is another kind of version that holds the possibility of demonstrating a 
connection with point (iii) on the basis of point, (ii); this is claimed by Lee C. Rice. 
He has put forward the view that the main points of cognitive science theory can 
be closely related to the main points of Spinoza's mind-body theory. Therefore I 
shall, in this chapter, examine some arguments from cognitive science, P. F. 
Strawson and Donald Davidson, in turn in order to consider the possibility of 
whether they can be used to throw light on Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
1. Cognitive Science 
(1) Rice's Comparison Between Cognitive Science and Spinoza 
According to Lee C. Rice, a comparison with cognitive science provides 
insight into Spinoza's perspective with respect to the relationship between the 
mind and the body. The main emphasis in his article is the framework of cognitive 
science, emphasising points of similarity between some doctrines of cognitive 
science and Spinoza's theory. However, it should be said that Rice's approach to 
cognitive science is coloured by a sympathy with behaviourism, and is to that 
extent atypical of cognitive scientists' ideas. 
First of all, Rice emphasises that Spinoza. clearly denies that there is a 
causal connection or any other interaction between the mind and the body as the 
two attributes of thought and extension have no relationship and are distinct, and 
he further emphasises the argument that, for Spinoza, "the representative feature 
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... could play no role in the physical causal account. "' His interpretation is based 
on Spinoza's analogy of sleepwalkers: 2 "I have already shown, however, that they 
do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the 
consideration of its nature alone, and that they find that many things are done 
merely by the laws of Nature which they would never have believed to be possible 
without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those things which 
sleepwalkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are astonished when 
they wake" (E, 111, Prop 2, Schol). Whatever is going on mentally in this case, a 
complete explanation is possible in physical terms according to Spinoza. 
Spinoza's assertion that there is a complete physical explanation seems to 
run counter to the views of cognitive science, since cognitive scientists claim that 
any account of human behaviour which is at all plausible must take account of the 
way in which a subject represents to himself what is happening. ' (It is no good a 
behaviourist referring to "stimuli" because features of the situation are not stimuli 
until they are attended to. ) Rice stresses the view that Spinoza's position is the 
same as the perspective of cognitive science in some respects. For workers in 
cognitive science: 
The semantics of representations cannot literally cause a system to behave 
in the way it does. This point is exactly the same as Spinoza's argument 
(against Descartes specifically, and against any form of dualism generally) 
that ideas cannot move bodies, nor bodies ideas [E 2P53 S]. 4 Only the 
material structure of the representation ... 
is causally efficacious. ' 
Rice rightly points out that in Spinoza the cause of physical behaviour is not ideas 
but physical stimuli. For cognitive science, and for Spinoza, the content of a 
mental representation cannot cause physical changes. What much of cognitive 
1 Lee C. Rice, "Cognitivism: A Spinozistic Perspective, " Studia Spinozana, vol. 8 (1990), p. 2 10. 
2 Ibid., p. 211. 
3 Ibid., p. 213. 
4E 2P53S is presumably a misprint for E 3P2S, since there is no proposition 53 in the Part 11 of 
the Ethics and proposition 2 and its scholium in part III contain that argument. 
5Ibid., p. 215. 
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science hopes is that some kind of symbolic coding occurs. 6 The physical 
properties of the symbols are causally efficacious, and inferences between the 
contents of ideas correspond to physical interactions between the symbols. The 
symbols are physical, but they also in some way have representative content. The 
representational function supervenes on the physical properties. Rice, therefore, 
regards this position of cognitive science as the same as paraflelism in Spinoza.. 
Whether Rice's interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory as 
parallelism is accurate or not, when restricted to the point of Spinoza's denial of 
the causal relation between the mind and the body he is certainly correct. Rice 
attempts to spell out the connection between Spinoza and cognitive science by the 
use of the concept of a transducer. He makes this point as follows. 
The basic role which transducers play, if we momentarily step out of the 
CS [cognitive science] framework, is that of receiving physical stimuli 
from the environment and translating these into primitive symbolic 
representations. The primitive output from the transducers is the 
paradigm of spinozistic parallelism: it is a simple representational 
structure (idea) which can figure in subsequent nonprimitive operations 
of the semantic engine. 
In this way, Rice argues that we can find the paradigm of cognitive science in 
Spinoza's system. Rice's claim seems to be that just as physical stimuli are 
translated into symbolic representations in terms of the transducer in cognitive 
science, so, in Spinoza, events in the world are mapped into ide&-; through some 
means or device fimctioning as a transducer. 
6 Connectionists are less hopeful. See Tim Crane, Ae Mechanical Mind (London: 
Penguin 
Books, 1995), pp. 154-163. 
7 Ibid., p. 217. 
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(2) Similarities and Differences 
I agree with this point of Rice's comparison between cognitive science and 
Spinoza's mind-body theory in terms of the representational features based on (1) 
the argument of a non-causal relationship and (2) the function of the transducer. 
However, in applying the term "transducer" in Spinoza we should examine this 
concept in some more detail, since Rice does not explain it sufficiently. According 
to Pylyshyn, generally "a transducer is a device that receives patterns of energy 
and retransmits them, usually in some altered fonn. Thus a typical transducer 
simply transforms or maps physical (spatiotemporal) events from one form to 
another in some consistent way. "' In cognitive science, "[a] description of a 
transducer function shows how certain nonsymbolic physical events are mapped 
into certain symbol systems. "9 We can, therefore, see that the function of the 
transducer is to receive physical stimuli and send them on in altered form. As Rice 
puts it, "transducers are, by definition, stimulus-bound" that is, they respond to 
particular changes. 'O We can find this function of the transducer reflected in 
Spinoza's view that without the external body's effects on the human body, the 
human mind can represent neither its own body nor the external body (E, 11, Props 
19 and 26). However, there are some differences arising from Spinoza's 
parallel-isn-L The mapping from transducers to representations does not lead to 
representations of the transducers as a rule. But the ideas associated with parts of 
the body are of parts of the body (albeit confused representations: see E, 11, Prop 
28). 
Let us recall Spinoza's concepts relevant to representationalisn4 which I 
have mentioned in chapter six. There are the following elements: 
(1) The human body, which is the object of (represented by) the human mind and 
is affected by external bodies. 
(2) External bodies, which affect the human body. 
8 Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition: I bward a Egundation for Cognitive Science 
(NET Press, 1986), p. 15 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 152. 
10 Rice, op. cit., p. 217 
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(3) Modiflcations (affections, states) of the body which involve the nature of the 
body as well as of the external bodies affecting it. 
(4) The human mind, which is the complex idea composed of the ideas of the body 
and of the affecting external bodies. (That is to say, the complete 
consciousness, not that which gives the essence of an individual). 
(5) The ideas which represent both (1) and (2) by means of representations of (3), 
and which go to make up the human mind. 
From the above, I think that we can regard (3) the modification of the human 
body, as corresponding to the concept of transducer. 
Let us put it in the following way. The terms in cognitive science could be 
translated into Spinoza's terms, using Rice's perspective: physical stimuli are 
replaced by external bodies, the human body is the engine for producing thought, 
the transducer is the modiflcation of the human body, and the output, primitive 
symbolic representations, is the idea. In this way, regarding the term "transducer, " 
there are replaceable or comparable terms within Spinoza's theory. Thus, we can 
find that in Spinoza's system there is a representational feature of the mind with 
respect to the body which is the same paradigm as the argument of cognitive 
science that certain nonsymbolic physical events are mapped on to certain 
symbolic systems or that physical stimuli are translated into symbolic 
representations. Both of them have the same format of representational feature: 
the formulation of cognitive science that physical stimuli are translated into 
symbolic representations has the same format as Spinoza's formulation that 
physical events are mapped into ideas. In fact, both representational features are 
based on the argument of a non-causal relationship between the mental and the 
physical (the argument that the mental cannot cause the physical). 
However, this fact does not offer an especially fruitful view concerning 
similarities between Spinoza and cognitive science, since the place of mental 
representation in explaining behaviour is quite different. Rice claims that 
c4cognitivists are unanimous in holding that any account of human conditioning 
which makes use of the idea that a subject is being informed of what 
is happening 
will provide a better and more predictive explanation of observed phenomena 
than 
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one which is based more narrowly on reinforcement contingencies" (my italics). " 
Thus, we must, in order to predict behaviour, attribute to bodies mental 
representations of the world. Spinoza denies that. Physical explanations are in 
principle self-contained, for him. 
Despite appealing to the importance of mental representations in 
explaining behaviour, defenders of cognitive science have to ward off the threat of 
epiphenomenalism. Fodor considers the threat: (1) the causal powers of an event 
are entirely determined by its physical properties; (2) intentional properties 
supervene on, but are not identical with, physical properties. If one then says that 
(3) a property is causally responsible only if it affects causal powers, then 
intentional properties are not causally responsible. 12 Fodor does not accept (3). 
In spite of their similarities, we can find a Oference in so far as Spinoza 
has the view that one idea straightforwardly causes another, and cognitive science 
thinks that causation between ideas is derivative. Fodor presents the problem in 
this way in The Elm and the Expert. Mental processes tend to be truth preserving: 
starting from true statements, people tend to reason in ways which lead to true 
statements. The solution? "Well, as Turing famously pointed out, if you have a 
device whose operations are transformations of symbols, and whose state changes 
are driven by the syntactic properties of the symbols that it transforms, it is 
possible to arrange things so that, in a pretty striking variety of cases, the device 
,, 13 
reliably transforms true input symbols into output symbols that are also true. 
Even if there is causality among ideas, it rests upon physical causality, There is a 
normative element in relations between ideas. In contrast, Spinoza's theory gives 
equal weight to the mental and the physical, and takes rationality and mental 
causation to be closely identified. Rice -argues that 
for both cognitivists and 
Spinoza, "[o]nly the material structure of the representation (conceived as genetic, 
" ]bid., p. 213. 
12 Jerry A. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More, " Philosophical Topics, vol. 17 (1989), pp. 
15 1- 
152. 
" Jerry A. Fodor, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics 
(Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994),, p. 9. 
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neurological, or even hormonal) is causally efficacious. 1914 As we have seen, not all 
defenders of cognitive science would accept this. In any case, it is far different 
from what Spinoza understands. For Spinoza causation in the mental realm is not 
supervenient on causation in the physical: there are mental and physical laws of 
causation, although there is only one order of events which can be conceived in 
both ways. The mind does not need causation in the body, since it has its own 
causation. There is no such a causal dependency from the mind to body, and vice 
versa. Spinoza's view that the mental cannot cause the physical and vice versa, 
does not imply that only the material structure of representation is causally 
efficacious, but implies that both are causally independent. 
Another related difference is that in Spinoza's mind-body theory, there is a 
prominence given to consciousness, whereas cognitive science tends not to discuss 
consciousness at any length. Spinoza also maintains self-consciousness of the mind 
in his argument of "the idea of the idea. " When we restrict Spinoza's mind-body 
theory to the representational feature the mind's dependency upon the body 
should be recognised, since "what is represented" is somehow dependent on its 
object. But this representational feature is not one which can determine the body's 
priority to the mind. In order to determine the matter of the priority between the 
mind and the body, we should examine the concept of the mind. If, for Spinoza, 
the mind exists not only objectively but also formally, his theory does not argue 
the body's priority to the mind, whereas Rice's Spinoza and cognitive science 
claim the body's priority to the mind. I shall consider this issue in some more 
detail. 
if the mind exists only objectively and only the body exists formally it is 
hardly possible to deny that the mind depends on the body, and therefore we can 
take it as the justification for physicalism. In other words, if all representing is 
done by physical things, and there is no more to mind than representation, then 
physicalism holds true. From this, one may further assume that any 
representationalism arguing that the mind represents the body actually existing 
implies the ground of physicalism. It is true that in the representational relationship 
14 Fice, op. cit., p. 215. 
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between the mind and the body, the mind as the idea is somehow dependent upon 
the body as the object. But, this should not be treated as leading to physicalism, 
since it is simply the outcome of the representational function, carrying no 
ontological implications. 
We saw in chapter two that Spinoza gives equal ontological weight to the 
mind and to the body. Thus, he believed that the mind is itself active and the mind 
exists not only objectively but also formally. The following statements of 
Spinoza's lead us to think in this way. 
By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms 
because it is a thinking thing. 
Explanation. I use the word "conception" rather than "perception" 
because the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive 
in its relation to the object. But the word conception seems to express 
the action of the mind. (E, 11, Def 3) 
From Spinoza's reason for using the term "conception, " we can see that Spinoza 
wants to confirm the activity of the mind, and that presumably he worries that 
people may be misunderstanding his theory: that is, owing to the representational 
relationship between the mind and the body, people think that the mind does not 
have formal reality but has only objective reality. 
As Alan Donagan notices, for Spinoza, following Descartes, the mind has 
a double reality (objective and formal). Donagan writes: 
Descartes analysed the representativeness of ideas as the medieval 
Aristotelians did, by ascribing two kinds of esses to them: essesformale, 
the being they have as individual modes of substance under the attribute 
cogitatio (which corresponds to the medievals' esse naturale), and esses 
objectivum, the being they have as being of something-as representing 
something (which corresponds to the medievals' esses inten-tionale) (AT 
VH9 41-47). As E HP8C and P48S[NS] show, Spinoza accepted this 
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Cartesian distinction as sound, and was willing to make express use of 
it. 15 
We can clarify the claim that for Spinoza the mind exists objectively and also 
formally from his following statements: 
[T]he object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also changed, and 
vice versa 16 
As thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the 
mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of 
things arranged and connected in the body. (E, V, Prop 1, Demon) 
If the mind does not have formal reality, those quotations would be unjustified. In 
this way, since the mind has also formal reality, there is no possibility of treating 
Spinoza's representationalism as leading to physicalism or materialisn-4 which is 
the implication of Rice's position. 
To sum up, when we restrict Spinoza's mind-body theory to 
representationalism, Spinoza has the same position as cognitive science has in 
arguing that the mind exists objectively and the body formally. Furthermore, both 
of them have the same paradigm of representationalism in the mental, locating it in 
a physical part of the human body; the transducer in cognitive science and the 
modification of the human body in Spinoza's terminology. But, Spinoza's overall 
picture is not compatible with cognitive science, since, as we have just seen, for 
Spinoza the mind exists not only objectively but also formally, whereas for 
15 Alan Donagan, "Homo Cogitat, " in Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (eds. ), Spinoza: 
Issues and Directions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), p. 105. E, R, Prop 8, 
Corol are as follows: 
"Hence, it follows that when individual things do not exist unless in so far as they are 
comprehended in the attributes of God, their objective being or ideas 
do not exist unless in so far 
as the infinite idea of God exists. " 
16 Spinoza, Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Part 11, Chapter XX, note c, 
4 10 
in Edwin Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 136. 
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cognitive science the mind exists only objectively. These differences are related to 
Spinoza's argument of the equality between the mind and the body, and this 
argument separates him from cognitive science. 
In summary, one might say that there are perhaps some similarities 
between Spinoza and the programme of cognitive science, but the important 
differences should not be overlooked. 
2 Strawson's Person Theory 
In contemporary mind-body theories, there is a version which attempts to 
avoid falling into materialism or idealism by holding a concept besides the mind 
and the body, which is the ultimate source of them; this is theory of P. F. 
Strawson. Therefore, in comparing Spinoza's mind-body theory with 
contemporary theories, it is worthwhile to consider Strawson's "person theory, " 
since within it we can find a similar framework of thought to that of Spinoza, 
despite their differences. Therefore, I shall, in this section, examine his main 
argument and consider the possibility of whether it can be considered as being 
close to Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
(1) Person Theory 
Strawson, in his book Individuals, suggests the concept of "person" to 
solve the n-ýind-body problem. According to Strawson, "person7' 
is defined as 
follows: 
What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of 
entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and 
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predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, &c. 
are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. 17 
In this way, Strawson describes "person7' as an entity to which predicates ascribing 
both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are applied. Strawson's 
"person7 is logically prior to mental experiences or bodily events; once there is the 
concept of "person, " then mental or bodily states can be attributed. "Person7 is, 
therefore, regarded as being logically prior to the concepts of "mind" and "body" 
in Strawson's doctrine. In his own words, "The concept of a person is logically 
prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be 
analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima. "" 
Strawson divides predicates which describe a person into two groups. One 
group is called M-predicates which are only applied to material bodies, not 
consciousness, and the other is P-predicates namely all other predicates which are 
applied to persons; the examples of the former are "weighs 10 stone, " "is in the 
drawing-room, " and so on. And the latter "is smiling, " "is going for a walk, " "is in 
pain, " "is thinking hard, " "believes in God" and so on. '9 Strawson's position is 
that the concept of person possesses these two kinds of predicate. From his 
perspective, the mental and the physical should be distinguished from each other, 
and they cannot be reduced one to the other. Hence, if we accept somehow the 
unity of the person as well as the logical distinction between the mental and 
physical, and reject one-sided monism such as any variety of materialism or 
idealism, we need to set up a third concept as the primitive or ultimate ground to 
which both mental events and bodily events are ascribed, and we can see that 
Strawson designates this as "person. " 
Let us consider the concept of "person" in some more detail. According to 
Strawson, having the concept "person7' in our ordinary life is bound up with the 
pronoun "U' With respect to this point, Strawson criticises not only 
Cartesian 
dualism but also the no-ownership doctrine. There are, in Cartesian doctrine, two 
17 P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 101-102. 
18 Ibid., p. 103. 
19 Ibid., p. 104. 
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distinct substances, two substances of different types. It follows that there are two 
subjects, one thinking and the other extended, and "I" is used in two senses. 
Strawson argues that Descartes' version, in which the subject of consciousness is 
purely immaterial is problematic, and that holding the concept ego is only an 
li, 20 illusion. He points out that this is an error which occurs in Cartesian dua sm. 
Strawson also rejects the "no-ownership" or "no-subject" doctrine, that 
there is no subject to which our states of consciousness are ascribed. He criticises 
Wittgenstein's statements in Tractatus (5.631-5.641) such as "The thinking, 
presenting subject-there is no such thing. "21 According to Strawson, for 
example, when Smith says "John is in pain7' and when John says I am in pain, " 
they refer to the same fact, being in pain, and to the same subject. Hence, we have 
to admit the existence of the subject which possesses the pain, which is in pain. 22 
His point in rejecting Cartesian dualism and "no-ownership" doctrine is 
that we can overcome the problems in the two theories by regarding the term "I" 
as denoting "the persoW' to which we can then ascribe both mental and physical 
predicates; that is to say, the owner of consciousness is not purely inimaterial or 
material but both mental and physical, and this is the very concept of "person. " 
Strawson's "persorf' is described by saying that "Persons, then, are distinct from 
material bodies, but they are not therefore itrunaterial bodies or incorporeal 
20 ]bid., pp. 94-95; pp. 100-101. 
21 P. F. Strawson, "Persons, " in David M. Rosenthal (ed. ), The Nature of Mind (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 104; "Persons, " in Donald F. Gustafson (ed. ), Essays in 
Philosophical Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 377. 
The other statements cited are as follows: "In an important sense there is no subject, " "The 
subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world, " and "There is [therefore] really 
a sense in which in philosophy we can talk non-psychologically of the 1. The I occurs 
in 
philosophy through the fact that the 'world is my world. ' The philosophical I is not the man, not 
the human body, or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the 
limit-not a part of the world. " 
22 Strawson, 'Tersons, " in David A Rosenthal (ed. ), Ae Nature of Mind, pp. 107-108; 
Versons, " in Donald F. Gustafson (ed. ), Esscys in Philosophical Psychology, pp. 386-387; 
Individuals, pp. 104-105. 
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nonbodies. A person has states of consciousness as well as physical attributes and 
is not merely to be identified with one or the other. "" 
(2) Spinoza and Strawson 
Person theory is regarded as "a modifled version of the double aspect 
theory" by Jerome A. Shaffer. He interprets Spinoza's mind-body theory as 
double aspect theory, and from this standpoint, he attempts to draw a connection 
between Spinoza and Strawson. Shaffer makes the claim: "The historical ancestor 
of the person theorist is Spinoza, the Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth 
century. 9ý24 And again, he says that "[fln recent philosophy, a modified version of 
the double aspect theory which we will call the person theory has been presented 
by P. F. Strawson. i, ý25 It seems that Shaffer treats person theory as a sort of double 
aspect theory. According to him, these two theories are the same in the sense of 
holding one thing which has both the mental and the physical properties. 
Furthermore, Shaffer claims that Strawson rejects both materialism and Cartesian 
dualism as Spinoza did in the 17th century, and both of these philosophers attempt 
to find a compromise between these two theories. 26 
I basicafly agree with Shaffer's argument in the sense that both Spinoza 
and Strawson reject materialism as weff as Cartesian dualism, and that both of 
these philosophers attempt to avoid onesideness of materialism or idealism. 
Douglas Odegard claims this sort of similarity between Spinoza and Strawson. He 
writes: 
in certain respects Spinoza's view is similar to the kind of position 
adopted by P. F. Strawson in "Persons, " according to which a human 
being, or person, is a subject of both mental and corporeal predicates. 
23 Arthur C. Danto, "Persons, " in Paul Edwards (ed. ), yhe Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vol. 6 
(New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 112. 
24 Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy ofMind (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 5 1. 
25 Ibid., p. 52. 
26 Ibid., pp. 50-55. 
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Like Spinoza, Strawson dismisses Cartesian and Humean dualism9 
avoids reductive forms of materialism and immaterialism, excludes 
neutral monism, claims more than a merely contingent connection 
between mind and body and refrains from identi6ring a person with the 
central nervous system. 27 
So as to make identity between the mind and the body (of humans for Strawson 
and of everything for Spinoza), both Spinoza and Strawson do not ignore the 
mind or the body and do not admit the reduction of one to the other. The 
fundamental point is that both of them attempt to find identity between the mind 
and the body not in the onesideness of them but in a common referent of the mind 
and the body. When we restrict Strawson's doctrine to humans, Strawson's 
format is similar to Spinoza's: they both attempt to reconcile the identity of the 
human mind and the human body by suggesting a common referent for the mental 
and the physical. From this, we can say that at least Strawson's basic paradigm is 
the same as Spinoza's. 
Even so, there are different points upon which Strawson would have to 
disagree with Spinoza. For Spinoza, the mental and the physical are in principle 
conceptually independent. We saw in chapter two, that as far as our knowledge up 
to the present day is concerned, our understanding of the mind depends upon our 
understanding of the body. Thus, for Spinoza, since science is not yet enough 
developed for us to have a satisfactory independent science of the mind, our 
temporary position does not permit us to obtain knowledge of the mind without 
relying on knowledge of the body. Strawson also argues for a dependency of the 
mental on the physical, but this time a logical dependency: 
[O]ne does genuinely ascribe one's states of consciousness to something, 
viz.,, oneself, and ... this 
kind of ascription is precisely such as the theorist 
finds unsatisfactory, i. e., is such that it does not seem to make sense to 
suggest, for example, that the identical pain which was in fact one's own 
27 ]bid., pp. 66-67. 
2 17 
might have been another's, We do not have to seek far in order to 
understand the place of this logically non-transferable kind of ownership in 
our general scheme of thought. For if we think of the requirements of 
identifying reference, in speech, to particular states of consciousness,, or 
private experiences, we see that such particulars cannot be thus 
identifyingly referred to except as the states or experiences of some 
identified person. 28 
We can see that Strawson's point in the above quotation is that we can justify 
particular states of consciousness only by attributing the experiences to a 
"person. " Nevertheless, even though both Spinoza and Strawson maintain that we 
can gain access to the mental by giving access to the physical, Spinoza says it is at 
present true, but not necessary, while for Strawson it is essential; Spinoza does not 
really make the mental depend on the physical as opposed to Strawson who argues 
for a logical dependency of the mental on the physical. 
There is another difference concerning the causal and the exploratory 
barrier. Douglas Odegard presents a difference between Spinoza and Strawson as 
follows: 
A less deeply metaphysical, but more interesting, difference, however, lies 
in the distinction between the Strawsonian remark "A man is a single 
subject of both mental and corporeal predicates" and the Spinozistic 
remark "A man is a subject of mental predicates when conceived under 
thought and a subject of corporeal predicates when conceived under 
extension. " Both remarks imply that there is just one subject throughlout, 
but the second remark, unlike the first, warns us not to mix our mentalistic 
and physicalistic talk indiscriminatel Y. 
29 
28 Strawson, 'Tersons, " in David A Rosenthal (ed. ), ]he Nature of Mind, pp. 106-107; 
"Persons, " in Donald F. Gustafson (ed. ), Essays in Philosophical Psycholoýu, p. 3 84. 
29Douglas Odegard, "The Body Identical with the Human mind: A Problem in Spinoza's 
Philosophy, " in Eugene Freeman and Maurice Mandelbaum (eds. ), Spinoza: 
Essays in 
Interpretation (Lasalle: Open Court, 1975). p. 67. 
" 18 
This non-MlXM, g of the attributes in Spinoza's theory is not compatible with 
Strawson's person theory. Spinoza does not allow causal and explanatory 
interconnection between the mind and the body as opposed to Strawson who 
requires it. From my perspective, this is a crucial difference between "double 
aspect theory" and "person theory, " and therefore this is why Strawson should not 
be classified as a double aspect theorist. Furthermore, for Strawson some P- 
predicates are involved with the physical. Strawson counts "... is smiling" as a P- 
predicate, for example, it is applied to others on the basis of observation, yet it 
implies the existence of consciousness. Not all P-predicates are like this: "... is 
thinking of Christmas" cannot be applied to others on the basis of observation, and 
in that sense is purely mental. Spinoza would not allow P-predicates of the first 
kind. 
We have seen that according to Shaffer, these theories of Strawson and 
Spinoza are the same in the sense of holding that there is one thing which has both 
mental and physical characteristics. They both rest upon a common referent of the 
mental and the physical in arguing for their monistic theories. In Strawson the 
referent is person. In my view, the correct analogue in Spinoza is mode of 
substance so long as we talk of what has both mental and physical predicates. But 
it is not so good an analogue when Strawson goes on to talk of person as being 
prior to the mental and the physical. Spinoza's concept of mode is not prior to the 
mental and the physical. Instead, "mode" is physical as wen as mental. 
One might tend to suggest that what best corresponds to "person7 in 
Spinoza's theory is not mode of substance but substance, and thus that Spinoza is 
similar to Strawson in arguing that the common referent is prior to the mental and 
the physical; in Spinoza it is substance which is prior to modes; in Strawson it is 
person which is primitive. However, if substance is the analogue of person in 
Spinoza's philosophy it is difficult to avoid the issue of panpsychism. Spinoza 
attributes mind to everything in nature (in order words, a very large number of 
modes, now described as physical and now as mental), whereas Strawson limits 
the attribution of mind to humans. Strawson thinks that persons are distinctive 
219 
among physical things, but Spinoza thinks that everything has a mental aspect 
(although in very different degree). 30 
As we saw in chapters three and five, for Spinoza mind and body are 
modes of substance and these modes are things or events. For Spinoza, there is an 
identity between mental and physical events: a mental event is an event as given by 
a mental description and the physical event is the very same event as given by a 
corresponding physical description. However, for Strawson, mental events are not 
identical with physical events. He never suggests that someone's pain is identical 
with a physical state of that person. As we have seen in Strawson's statement (p. 
213-214), he describes "person" as an entity to which predicates ascribing both 
states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are applied. However, there 
is no identity between events in consciousness and events in the body. Hence 
Strawson's position rests upon the fact that these distinct sorts of event are 
attributed to one referent, person. But, this is a very limited monisn-4 not to be 
compared with Spinoza's identity theory. The frameworks of their theories are not 
along the same lines, since Spinoza finds identity of the mental and physical within 
tokens or events as opposed to Strawson who flnds identity within a primitive 
concept. 
As we have seen, Shaffer states: "The historical ancestor of the person 
A- - -theorist is Spinoza, the Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth century. ", and again, 
"[fln recent philosophy, a modified version of the double aspect theory which we 
will call the person theory has been presented by P. F. Strawson. " But he 
overstates the similarity between Spinoza and Strawson owing to his 
misinterpretation of Spinoza. The only similarity we can find is that both Spinoza 
and Strawson attempt to avoid onesideness of materialism or idealism. The 
similarities of the two theories are easily exaggerated. 
30 This has been explored by Thomas Nagel, but lies outside the scope of this thesis; Nagel 
presents an argument for dualism of properties, but also suggests that perhaps at some 
deeper 
level proto-physical properties might be seen as identical with proto-mental properties, and thus 
that there is one kind of ultimate (fimdamental) property as a common source of mental and 
physical properties (Thomas Nagel, "Paripsychism, " in his Mortal 
Questions [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979], pp. 181-195). But from our point of view this would cut 
against Spinoza's doctrine of the separation of the attributes. 
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3. Davidson's Anomalous Monism 
One philosopher who has recently found identity within events is, as well 
known, Donald Davidson who originates token identity theory. It is beyond doubt 
that Spinoza's understanding of the mind-body theory is monistic. His monistic 
stance follows similar lines to Davidson's in the sense that they claim identity of 
the mental and physical within individuals. Davidson's theory, in my opinion, 
shows a connection with Spinoza's perspective and can be treated as an 
explanation which provides a link with Spinoza's position, although some details 
of their arguments are different. Let us consider Davidson's token identity theory 
to find how far his theory is similar to and different from Spinoza's. 
(1) Outline of Davidson's View 
Davidson defines his anomalous monism as "monism, because it holds that 
psychological events are physical events; anomalous, because it insists that events 
do not fall under strict laws when described in psychological terms .,, 
3 1 Here, I shall 
briefly describe his theory as I understand it. Anomalous monism starts from three 
principles any two of which are apparently inconsistent with the third. They are as 
f ll WS. 32 00 
(1) The Principle of Causal Interaction. 
Some mental events, at least, cause physical events and vice versa. 
(2) The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality. 
Wherever events are related as cause and effect, there must be a strict 
deterministic law. 
(3) The Anomalism of the Mental. 
31 Donald Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy, " in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: 
Claren. Press, 1980), p. 23 1. 
32 ibid. 
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There are no strict laws which are able to explain and predict mental 
events. That is to say, there are no purely psychological or psycho-physical 
laws. 
From principles I and 2, we can infer that mental events as causes or effects of 
physical events, are under strict deterministic laws. But, according to principle 3, 
there are no such kinds of laws. If so, then apparently principles I and 2 are in 
contradiction with principle 3. Davidson, however, claims that there is no inner 
contradiction. To substantiate his claim he maintains that "laws are linguistic", 
principle 1 is "blind to the mental-physical dichotomy" and principle 3 "concerns 
events described as mental. ý933 On the basis of this explanation, Davidson asserts 
that the demonstration of identity follows easily from these three principles. 
Now, I shall consider Davidson's argument for identifying mental events 
and physical events in terms of the above principles. 34 
(i) Suppose m, a mental event, caused p, a physical event (in accordance with 
principle 1). 
(ii) They are under strict laws (based on principle 2). 
(iii) These laws are neither psychological nor psycho-physical laws but purely 
physical laws (by elimination from principle 3). 
(iv) Only in the case of using a physical description, are strict and deterministic 
laws possible. 
(v) Hence, m falls under physical laws. 
(vi) Then, m must be describable in physical terms. In order words, m has a 
physical description. 
(vii) Therefore, m is a physical event, in addition to being a mental event. More 
precisely, m is an event with physical properties (a physical description) in 
addition to mental properties. 
From the above explanation, we can see that all mental events that are invo e in 
causal interactions must be identical with physical events. There must 
be some 
33 Donald Davidson, "Mental Events, " in his Essays on Actions and Events, p. 215. 
34jbid., p. 224. 
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description of a "mental" event which instantiates a strict law and this description 
cannot be mental but must be physical, since only physical descriptions can 
instantiate strict laws. Therefore, mental events that causally interact with physical 
events admit of a physical description, and then it is apparent that all events are 
physical under this strict law. Thus, Davidson's anomalous monism can be 
described by saying that mental events are identical with physical events, but no 
strict laws connect the mental and the physicaL or the mental and the mental. 
It is generally accepted that Davidson's anomalous monism is a kind of 
token identity theory that denies "reduction between the psychological and the 
physical, " "reductive type-type identities. , 35 Thus, anomalous monism should be 
understood in such a way that we cannot have reductive type-type identities. 
Now, I shall draw out some obvious implications of Davidson's position 
so as to compare it with Spinoza's accounts of the relation of the mind to the 
body. 
(1) When there is cause, there must be a strict law. 
(2) There is a lack of (strict) psycho-physical laws. 
(3) There is a lack of (strict) purely psychological laws. 
(4) Physical descriptions are to be preferred to mental descriptions, since only the 
former can instantiate strict laws. 
(5) The reducibility of the mental to the physical is rejected. 
(6) There is a combination of materialism and dualism of descriptions: 
"Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are 
physical, but rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, 
that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations. ý936 
(7) There is token (event) identity theory: unlike the type-type identity theory, he 
sees no identity of mental and physical types (properties or descriptions), but 
mental events are identical with physical events. 
35 Terence Horgan and Michael Tye, "Against the Token Identity Theory, " in Ernest Lepore and 
Brian P. McLaughlin (eds. ), Actions and Events (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 427. 
See 
also Brian P. McLaughlin, "Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the 
Mental, " in ibid., 
pp. 356-357; Mark Johnston, "Why Having a Mind Matters, " in ibid., p. 
409. 
36 Davidson, "Mental Events, " p. 214. 
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(8) He admits psycho-physical causation: some mental events cause physical 
events and vice versa. 
(2) Similarities and Differences 
Davidson's argument requires not only the lack of the psycho-physical 
laws but also the lack of psychological laws. But Spinoza explicitly admits of the 
latter kind of laws. In other words, there is only one set of strict laws in Davidson, 
whereas Spinoza requires two sets of strict laws. Even more Spinoza does not 
give greater weight to either one or the other. He states as follows: 
God's power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting, that is to 
say, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows 
from the idea of God [idea Defl, in the same order and in the same 
connection objectively in God. (E, H, Prop 7, Corol) 
We should pay attention to the fact that, for Spinoza, the weighting of mental and 
physical is equal. We have seen, in chapter two, that Spinoza denies that the mind 
is dependent, or supervenient on the body and vice versa. There is a strict law in 
the mental and the physical realm respectively, and therefore the mind is 
autonomous in so much as the body iS. 37 
There is further Oference between them concerning causation: there is, for 
Spinoza, a causal barrier between the mind and the body, whereas there is causal 
interaction for Davidson. I think that for Spinoza there is no clear distinction 
37 If we reject the materialistic identity of the mind and the body we are obliged to propose 
another kind of identity, because, for Spinoza, the mind is somehow identical with the 
body and 
vice versa. So far as I am aware and as I explained in chapter five, the 
identity of the mind and 
the body can be derived from substance monism with attribute dualism. We can explain the 
identity of the mind and the body in terms of the conjunction of substance monism with property 
dualism: "[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which 
is 
now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and 
the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways" 
(E, 11, Prop 7, 
Schol). 
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between the concept of cause and explanation, whereas Davidson separates, like 
other contemporary philosophers, the notions of the explanatory and the causal. 
We saw in chapter three that Spinoza's identity theory is compatible with a 
non-causal relationship between the mental and the physical, since Spinoza denies 
referential transparency in a causal context. But, for Davidson, since causation is 
transparent, if we deny causal interactions between the mental and the physical, we 
cannot hold mind-body identity. In other words, for Davidson, since causation is 
transparent and a mental and a physical event are one and the same event, there 
have to be causal interactions between the mental and the physical. On the other 
hand, for Spinoza, since mental and physical events are identical and there is no 
causal interaction between them, causation has to be opaque. 
In spite of some important differences between their positions, both 
Davidson and Spinoza claim an identity theory combined with the view that the 
mental is not reducible to the physical. That is to say, the fact that they hold not 
only the identity theory but also the irreducibility of the mental to the physical 
supports a feasible connection between Spinoza and Davidson. This irreducibility 
entails another notable similarity between Spinoza and Davidson. Both Spinoza 
and Davidson identify mental and physical events. The mental event is an event 
under a mental description and the physical event is the very same event under a 
physical description for both Spinoza and Davidson, although the physical 
description for Davidson is paramount, though not for Spinoza. Odegard's view of 
Spinoza's identity theory very briefly talks about "event": "He [Spinoza] identifies 
the two events in such a way that they are really a single event conceived under 
two attributes-under thought as the making of a decision and under extension as a 
bodily event. "" Odegard never compares Spinoza to Davidson, 
" however I think 
that this is an appropriate statement when explaining the similarity between 
Spinoza and Davidson. 
3813ouglas Odegard, op. cit., p. 68. 
11 Possibly, Odegard was not acquainted with Davidson's anomalous monism, since 
Davidson's 
"Mental Events" was written in 1970 and Odegard's article was written 
in 1971 when 
Davidson's theory was not yet well-known. 
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Della Rocca has recently pointed out a similarity between Davidson and 
Spinoza concerning explanatory relation between the mind and the body. 
According to Della Rocca, both Spinoza and Davidson are the same in arguing 
explanatory independence, although Davidson's explanatory barrier is weaker than 
Spinoza's. Furthermore, Della Rocca regards this explanatory independence as the 
important feature for both Davidson's and Spinoza's theories. 40 Concerning this 
point, Della Rocca states as follows: "Spinoza's system teaches us the surprising 
lesson that the radical explanatory separation of mental and physical properties 
may lead to (instead of preclude) the identity of mental and physical particulars. 
One philosopher, however, to whom this lesson would come as no surprise is 
Donald Davidson. He, too, recognises a certain kind of explanatory independence 
of mental and physical properties, and he argues in part from this independence to 
, 41 the identity of mental and physical particulars. I think that this explanatory 
barrier is, for both Davidson and Spinoza, the fundamental feature in establishing 
non-reductionism in their identity theories, and that this also leads them to find 
identity of mind and body in individuals. 
I take non-reductionism and token identity as the important similarities 
between them since these kinds of identity theory contribute insight to 
contemporary philosophy of mind. The mind and the body are one individual 
which has two descriptions for both Davidson and Spinoza. Like Davidson, 
Spinoza also regards the mind and the body as the same individual: "[T]he mind 
and the body, are one and the same individual which at one time is considered 
under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension7' 
(E, 11, Prop 
21, Schol). Therefore, despite the fact that Spinoza's monism is not anomalous as 
he allows strict laws involving the mental (though not psycho-physical 
laws), it is 
fair to say that what Spinoza thinks about a pattern of identity 
between the mental 
40 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (New 
York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 152-155. Della Rocca reveals another similarity concerning 
holism 
(ibid., pp. 155-156). He also compares Spinoza's psychology and 
Davidson's psychology 
("Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology, " in Don Garrett [ed. ], The 
Cambridge Companion to 
Spinoza [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19961, pp. 209-210; pp. 
234-236). 
4' Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 
153. 
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and the physical is the same framework as that of Davidson's anomalous monism: 






My purpose in this study has been to unravel the meaning behind Spinoza's 
real thoughts on the relationship between the mind and the body. For this purpose, 
I explored Spinoza's mind-body theory begi i with a critique of the diverse InnIng 
interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body theory. I shall summarise these 
interpretations and the reasons why they cannot belong to Spinoza's realm of 
thought. 
The hylomorphic interpretation insists upon Aristotle's influence on 
Spinoza through the medieval Aristotelians. As we saw Wolfson with whom this 
position is chiefly associated, ascribes hylomorphism from the following angles: 
(1) the relation of mode to substance can be explained as the relation of species to 
genus in Aristotle; (2) the attributes of thought and extension in Spinoza are the 
translation of Aristotelian matter and form; (3) Spinoza's doctrine of "mind as the 
idea of the body" is a new way of restating the Aristotelian definition of the soul 
as the form of the body. We argued that there are fundamental differences in each 
case: (1) a substance is the cause of mode in Spinoza whereas genus is not the 
cause of species in Aristotle, and for Aristotle there is no suggestion that a genus 
is more real than (species or) individual things, whereas for Spinoza the individual 
thing is less real than substance; (2) in Spinoza, the concepts of extension and 
thought are derived less from Aristotle's concepts of "matter and form" than 
Descartes' concepts of "extension and thought. "-for Aristotle pure matter is just 
potentiality with no properties at all, whereas for Descartes and Spinoza extension 
is the essence of material substance; (3) Spinoza's two uses of the term "idea" 
makes his theory Merent from the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form 
of the body. For Spinoza, there is the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence 
of Peter's mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man. Even though the 
former idea explains the essence of Peter's body as in Aristotle's concept of 
"form, " there is no such concept of the latter idea in Aristotle. For Spinoza, the 
cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and the ideas represent both the 
knower's own body and external bodies. This role of the idea is clearly distinct 
from the role of the form in Aristotle. 
229 
The idealistic interpretation is fundamentaffy dependent upon the 
dominance of the attribute of thought over extension and the other attributes; the 
attribute of thought is, following this interpretation, highlighted and treated as the 
primary one. According to this interpretation, Spinoza's infinite attributes are 
ordered in the intellect, and thus all attributes are interpretable in terms of thought. 
In God's thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute, and it follows 
from this that the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the others. But, 
even if thought is distinctive or singled out from the other attributes and is more 
comprehensive than the other attributes, this should be regarded as the 
representational fimction of thought. If in God's thinking the attribute of extension 
or of whatever exists, it exists not as itself but as the idea of extension, and in 
God's thinking, there do not exist the modes themselves of every attribute but, an 
idea of the modes of every attribute, this should not be interpreted as idealism. It 
is not the case for Spinoza that everything is or exists in God's thinking, but that 
everything is represented or perceived by God's thinking. The former leads to the 
dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation, whereas the latter emphasises 
the representational role of thought. It follows that we can point out the 
uniqueness of thought in Spinoza's system in terms of the representative function, 
but should not interpret Spinoza's system as idealism. "The dominance of thought 
in a representational sense" does not lead to idealism. 
Barker interprets Spinoza as an epiphenomenalist, holding that Spinoza's 
real tendency is to argue "the priority of the body over the mind. " He finds 
support in the scholium. to proposition 2, part III and argues that the obvious 
tendency of this scholium. is to glorify the body at the expense of the mind. 
However, the scholium. is not concerned with either giving a priority to the body 
ying the body at the expense of the mind. But it is concerned with the or glorif 
explanation of the experience of the body in order to refute the common belief of 
the superiority of the mind over the body (i. e. the common belief that mind 
commands the body). The proposition to which this scholium. 
is attached is that 
"the body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind 
determine 
the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be anything else" 
(E, III, 
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Prop 2). This proposition would be unjustified if we treat the scholium as 
presenting "the priority of the body over the mind" as Barker argues. 
Furthermore, there is an incompatibility between Spinoza's theory and 
definitions of epiphenomenalism as follows: Spinoza's denial of causation between 
the mind and the body is a solid basis for rejecting this epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation since epiphenomenalism holds that there is causality from the body 
to the mind. Moreover Spinoza's affirmation of causation between mental events 
is also incompatible with the definition of epiphenomenalism that the mind is never 
the cause of even any other mental events. Even more, due to Spinoza's argument 
of the sameness of "the relationship between the mind and body" and "the 
relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind, " epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation is committed to a self contradiction. 
Hampshire, who interprets Spinoza as a kind of materialist, holds that for 
Spinoza the body is a machine for producing thought, and therefore the mind is 
embodied in the body as its machine or contrivance. Not only is the body 
independent from the mind in explaining it, but it is also primary and the mind is 
secondary in the order of explanation by virtue of the predominance of the laws of 
physics. Hampshire emphasises that physical descriptions are prior to mental 
descriptions in getting an overall picture of the world. Hampshire's explanation is 
rooted in the apparent asymmetry between the mind and the body in the scholium 
to proposition 13 in the Ethics, book 11: "[I]n order to determine the difference 
between the human mind and other things and its superiority over them, we must 
first know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the 
human body. " But this asymmetry runs contrary to the thrust of Spinoza's 
argument. Arguably, Spinoza is clami mig that our understanding of the mind is 
secondary to our understanding of the body as far as our present state of 
knowledge is concerned. Spinoza really has this sort of attitude in arguing his 
philosophy: our knowledge at the present day is not capable of completely 
grasping some facts, but we shall be able to discover them when our 
knowledge is 
increased by more scientific discovery. For Spinoza, in reality, there exists a 
syrnmetry between the mind and the body. In many places, 
Spinoza argues for the 
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equivalence of mental and physical descriptions: for example, "the object cannot 
be changed unless the idea is also changed, and vice versa. "' 
Apart from the above interpretations, Spinoza's mind-body theory is most 
often interpreted as parallelism and this interpretation is compatible with the two 
key conditions: that there is not a causal relationship between mind and body, and 
that he gives equal weight to mind and body. But it is crucial to recognise that 
Spinoza's parallelism Mers from traditional parallelism. For Spinoza, parallelism 
ought to be argued within an identity doctrine. Unlike traditional parallelism, 
Spinoza's mind-body theory asserts the identity of mind and body. Whereas 
traditional parallelism argues that the mind and the body are parallel because they 
are entirely different in nature, Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are 
parallel because they are identical with each other. We can see how Spinoza's 
parallelism differs from traditional parallelism. According to the traditional view, 
parallelism is basically a dualistic position, but in Spinoza's view, it is a monistic 
position. Traditional parallelism holds the view that the mind and body run parallel 
with one another and never converge nor diverge. However, when we consider 
Spinoza's mind-body theory we should do so along with his ontological theory. 
We should not discuss Spinoza's mind-body theory without considering his whole 
metaphysical system, especially substance monism, and we should strive to make 
his mind-body theory compatible with his whole system. That is to say, traditional 
parallelism is substance dualismý while Spinoza's parallelism is conceptual or 
property dualism within substance monism. Spinoza's Parallelism is derived from 
one substance and one order of events, so his parallelism should be understood in 
the sense that one event with a mental description is the very same event which 
can equally be given a physical description. 
Bennett and Della Rocca interpret Spinoza somewhat along these lines. So 
their interpretations seem to be closer to Spinoza. However, the problem is that 
Bennett mininuses Spinoza's argument for identity while Della Rocca perhaps 
overstates it. On Bennett's interpretation, there is neither a numerical 
identity 
1 Spinoza, Short Treatise of God, Man and His Well-Being, Part IL Chapter XX, note c, 
# 10 in 
Edwin Curley (ed. and trans. ), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I (Princeton: 
Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 136. 
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between mental and physical events nor a numerical identity between the mental 
and the physical properties; there exists only an identity of non-graspable 
determinables of which the mental and the physical are determinates. On Della 
Rocca's interpretation, there is a numerical identity between the mental and the 
physical events and perhaps also between the mental and the physical properties 
(depending on whether he thinks the attributes are really distinct or not). 
But, given that Spinoza maintains substance monism and the real 
distinction between the attributes of thought and extension (and that his mind- 
body theory follows from his doctrines of substance and attributes), we should 
argue that for Spinoza there is a numerical identity between mental and physical 
events and that there is no identity between mental and physical properties: the 
mental and the physical events are one and the same event described under mental 
and physical properties, respectively. From this fact, it follows that his theory 
should be understood as a kind of token identity theory. Thus, my interpretation of 
Spinoza's mind-body theory entails both token identity and property (or 
conceptual) parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance 
parallelism. If Spinoza's mind-body theory is a token identity theory, which leads 
to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body, we ought to regard 
Spinoza as a double aspect theorist, since the double aspect theory entails both 
identity and parallelism. For this reason, I have called his theory a token double 
aspect theory. 
My interpretation of Spinoza's n-ýind-body theory has to maintain the 
objective interpretation of the attributes. Although the objective interpretation is 
nowadays the most common interpretation and I agree with it, there are the 
problems in this interpretation: (1) if Spinoza's attributes are regarded as 
objective, how can distinct attributes all constitute the nature or essence of 
substance? (2) how can an objectivist explain the fact that Spinoza introduces 
attributes through the phrase "which the intellect perceives as (constituting the 
essence of substance)" in definition 4 of part 11 and elsewhere? In order to 
reinforce my interpretation of Spinoza's mind body theory, it is necessary to solve 
these problems. A clue is provided by the fact that Spinoza uses the term 
233 
express" or "manifest" interchangeably with the phrase ", which the intellect 
perceives as constituting. " 
This line of understanding of the attributes suggests a solution to the 
problems in the objective interpretations. Since the attributes constitute and 
express the essence of the same substance (or the same essence of the substance), 
there must be something common in the ways of expressing the same thing; the 
tune analogy was appealed to in order to explain this point. The advantages in 
treating essence as "what is structurally common to all attributes" are, as I have 
mentioned throughout this thesis, as follows: (1) it can explain some statements in 
which Spinoza seems to identify attribute with essence, (2) it can also explain how 
each attribute constitutes and expresses the essence of the substance, (3) it offers a 
ground for Spinoza's argument that mental and physical properties are parallel to 
each other, (4) it helps us to explain that the double aspect theory is compatible 
with the objective interpretation, and (5) it makes my interpretation of the 
attributes consistent with the interpretation of the mind-body theory, as Spinoza 
wishes to claim. 
There is a ffirther problem in making sense of Spinoza's mind-body theory. 
This arises from his representationalism. His concept of representation seems to be 
problematic if we consider it together with his argument of parallelism in double 
aspect theory. Since Spinoza argues that ideas in the human mind represent both 
the human body and the external bodies, his representationalism is contradictory to 
his argument of one to one correspondence between the mental and the physical. 
Furthermore, his argument in proposition 13 that the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is the human body and nothing else is clearly 
inconsistent with his claim in proposition 16 that the human mind represents 
external bodies as well as the human body. Some commentators have tried to 
explain these incompatibilities as resulting from Spinoza's confusion between the 
parallel and the representational relationship owing to the fact that 
he uses the 
same term "idea" in two different ways. 
I argued that before we conclude that these problems result 
from 
Spinoza's confusion we should try all possible interpretations. I considered some 
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existing interpretations, but suggested that if we understand proposition 13 as 
referring to the essence of the human mind the problem can be eased 
(ameliorated). What Spinoza wishes to claim in proposition 13 is that the essence 
of the human mind is constituted by the idea of the human body. This can account 
for the distinction Spinoza makes between the idea of Peter in God's mind and the 
idea of Peter in Paul's mind. Even so, I have argued that Spinoza must ultimately 
appeal to the fact that our ideas are confused to hold his representationalism and 
parallelism in line. 
Finally, I looked briefly at the way that Spinoza has been seen as influential 
in contemporary mind-body theories such as person theory, anomalous monism, 
and some aspects of cognitive science. My aim there was to warn against taking 
some remarks of Spinoza and using them without taking his whole doctrine into 
account. Hence I have not fully endorsed the use made of Spinoza. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that Spinoza's theory contains much which chimes in with modem 
approaches to the problem. 
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